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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROLE OF AMENITIES IN THE LOCATION DECISIONS OF PH.D. 
RECIPIENTS IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 
 
By 
 
Albert J. Sumell 
 
December, 2005 
 
Committee Chair:    Dr. Laura O. Taylor 
 
Major Department:  Economics 
 
Location-specific amenities have been shown to play an increasingly important 
role in individual migration decisions.  The role certain amenities play in the location 
decisions of the highly educated may be the cause of persistent regional differences in 
certain types of human capital, and consequently in regional productivity.  This 
dissertation examines the determinants of the location decisions of new Ph.D. recipients 
in science and engineering (S&E).  A discrete choice random utility model of the city 
location decisions of new Ph.D.s is developed to estimate .preferences for city attributes 
as well as willingness to pay for improved amenity quality.  By estimating the value 
Ph.D.s place on various urban amenities, the results of this research help inform 
policymakers as to their ability (or inability) to attract and retain highly educated workers 
to their region through public investment in amenity quality.   
 To link the choice of city with the geographic attributes of cities, a unique micro 
dataset is used which reports the planned employment city location of S&E Ph.D. 
recipients in the U.S. at the time of degree.  The primary data comes from the 1997-1999 
Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED), administered by Science Resources Statistics of the 
National Science Foundation.  The SED is given to all new doctorate recipients in the 
   xii 
U.S. at or near the time of degree, and has a response rate over 90%.  The application 
focuses on approximately 23,000 new Ph.D.s who received their degree in one of twelve 
S&E fields during the period 1997-1999, and who had made a definite commitment to an 
employer in a known U.S. metropolitan area. 
 The results consistently suggest that natural amenities, such as summer or winter 
temperatures, play a larger role in the location decisions of new S&E Ph.D.s than 
reproducible amenities, such as crime or air quality.  The implication is that policymakers 
have only a limited ability to improve the composition of their workforce through 
amenity investment.  The results also indicate that the influence of amenities on location 
choice is related to a number of observable characteristics such as age, race, marital 
status, citizenship, and Ph.D.s’ previous migration behavior.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The economic stability and potential for growth within a region is largely 
determined by its ability to develop and maintain a highly educated workforce.  A 
specialized cohort of the workforce, new Ph.D.s in science and engineering (S&E), can 
play a particularly crucial role in the engine of economic growth.   Previous literature has 
suggested that the proportion of the workforce with advanced degrees in science and 
engineering direct influences the economic productivity within a region (Romer, 1990).   
When hired into jobs in industry, new scientists and engineers transmit knowledge 
acquired in universities to the private sector and create or reinforce networks between 
industrial and academic scientists (Stephan et al., 2004).   Especially important is their 
ability to transfer tacit knowledge, which cannot be codified and thus requires face to 
face interaction for transmission.  This transmission of knowledge can directly and 
indirectly enhance the economic position of a city in a number of ways.   The knowledge 
embodied by these workers serves as an input into the production of new scientific 
discoveries and technological innovations, which can advance the productivity of 
established businesses or lead to the development of new businesses in an area (Griliches, 
1998; Trajtenberg, 1989). When hired into the academic sector, new Ph.D.s contribute to 
economic growth through their university research and through collaboration with 
industrial scientists.  They also contribute to economic growth by training future
2 
 
 scientists and engineers and by enhancing the reputation of the university where they 
work. 
 Despite the important role these workers can play in fostering economic growth 
and development in a region, relatively little is known regarding the individual and 
geographic factors that influence their location decisions.  Understanding these factors is 
necessary in order for policymakers to identify what policy objectives can be taken to 
increase the inflow and retention of highly educated scientists and engineers.1  This 
dissertation addresses this issue by examining the determinants of the residential location 
choices of new S&E Ph.D.s at the time of degree.  A random utility model (RUM) of 
migration is employed to estimate how city amenities influence Ph.D.s’ utility and their 
choice of where to work and live.  The RUM uses Ph.D.s’ observed (utility-maximizing) 
location choice at the primary metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level to infer how the 
amenities provided by an MSA affect that probability that it will be chosen.   
Given the potential economic gains, municipal policymakers are willing to invest 
public resources in order to attract and retain more of these workers to their area.  
However, the ability of policymakers to influence the flow of highly educated workers 
through public investment in amenities is heavily dependent on the amenity preferences 
of these workers.  For instance, if highly educated workers are primarily drawn to cities 
that offer superior natural amenities, such as climate or proximity to the coast, then cities 
without these amenities may need to attract these workers by offering greater financial 
rewards.   Conversely, if these workers are shown to hold strong preferences for 
                                                 
1Recent literature has suggested that, due to their high mobility, increasing the number of highly educated 
workers produced in a region will have a negligible affect on the proportion of a region’s workforce that is 
highly educated (Bound et al., 2001).  As a result, in order to improve the composition of the workforce, 
policymakers are encouraged to invest in attracting highly educated workers produced in other regions, 
rather than invest in the production of highly educated workers in their own region.   
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reproducible amenities, such as low crime rates or air quality, then policymakers may 
effectively attract more highly educated workers by improving the quality of these 
amenities in cities.    
The analysis considers the roles of both site-specific (natural) amenities, and 
publicly-provided (reproducible) amenities in the location decisions of new Ph.D.s.  In 
doing so, the results can offer insight into the efficacy of policies intended to increase the 
inflow of highly educated scientists and engineers, and the degree to which cities rich in 
natural amenities hold an advantage over other cities.  In addition, the model considers 
the influence of Ph.D.s’ expected private consumption (income less housing 
expenditures) in cities, and the proximity of Ph.D.s’ current location to alternative cities. 
By modeling location decisions as a function of expected private consumption and 
amenity quality, the model can estimate an individual’s willingness to tradeoff private 
consumption for improved amenity quality.   
To link the choice of city with the geographic attributes of cities, a unique micro 
dataset is used which reports the planned employment city location of Ph.D. recipients in 
the U.S. at the time of degree.  The primary data comes from the 1997-1999 Survey of 
Earned Doctorates (SED), administered by Science Resources Statistics of the National 
Science Foundation.  The SED is given to all new doctorate recipients in the U.S. at or 
near the time of degree, and has a response rate over 90%.  The survey provides 
information on the degree granting institution, as well as socio-demographic 
characteristics, field of training, previous work experience, and Ph.D.s postdoctoral plans 
for employment.  In this application, we focus on approximately 23,000 new Ph.D.s who 
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received their degree in one of twelve S&E fields during the period 1997-1999, and who 
had made a definite commitment to an employer in a known U.S. metropolitan area.2   
 Due to their high mobility at the time of graduation, new Ph.D.s offer researchers 
a unique view into the migration decision-making process.3  Previous studies that have 
examined the determinants of migration behavior have found that amenities play an 
important role in the decision of where to locate.  However, most studies determine the 
role of amenities in migration by examining the relationship between a region’s amenity 
level and the net or gross migration rates to or from a region.  For example, Mueser and 
Graves (1995) use aggregated migration flow data to calculate migratory elasticities with 
respect to geographic attributes, and find that a region’s climate is an important 
determinant of its net migration rate.4  In addition, Gyourko and Tracy (1989) and Clark 
and Hunter (1992) investigate the roles of taxation and publicly-provided services on 
inter-city migration flows.  These studies have found that violent crime rates, air quality, 
and student to teacher ratios impact a city’s net migration rate and thus can be used to 
explain wage differentials across regions. 
A potential weakness of these studies is that by using aggregated migration data, 
they can obscure the influence of personal characteristics, such as age or race, on 
migration choice.  The analysis employed here builds upon this research by using 
individual level data to determine the factors that influence migration decisions.  By 
linking the migration decision with individual characteristics the model estimates how 
                                                 
2 According to the Science and Engineering Indicators (2000), there were approximately 7.7 million 
employed scientists and engineers in the U.S. in 1997 that were trained in and were working in an S&E 
field.  Approximately 520,000 full-time employed S&E workers held a doctorate degree.    
3 More than 70% of all new S&E Ph.D.s with definite plans during this study period move to a new city 
after they receive their degree. 
4 Other examples which study the regional determinants of migration flows include Clark and Cosgrove 
(1991), Graves and Linneman (1979) and Greenwood and Hunt (1989).  Similarly, Douglas (1997) and 
Wall (2001) use net migration flows between regions to infer a region’s quality of life.  
5 
 
preference intensities vary according to socio-demographic characteristics, thus offering 
greater insight into the deterministic relationship between personal characteristics and 
amenity preferences.  
A separate migration literature evaluates the role of amenities on the migration 
decisions of the highly educated.  For instance, Florida (2002a, 2002b) explores the roles 
of diversity and cultural amenities in attracting young people with a bachelor’s degree or 
above to cities.  His work suggests that an area’s level of diversity, as measured by the 
percent of gay households, is a key indicator of its ability to attract a highly educated 
workforce. According to Florida, a lack of diversity prevents the cultivation of creativity 
and presents a barrier to attracting talented workers from various ethnicities, races, and 
sexual orientation.  Cities with more diversity can better compete for a wider range of 
talented workers, and thus can accrue future benefits, economic and otherwise, that result 
from having a highly skilled workforce.    
Although Florida’s work has garnered a considerable amount of attention from 
municipal policymakers, his conclusions have been criticized for using aggregate data 
and relying on cross-sectional correlations (Krupka, 2004).  While evidence suggests that 
there is a positive correlation between the concentration of highly educated workers and 
the amount of diversity or cultural amenities in a region, no research has established a 
causal link between these variables.  By estimating the monetary values Ph.D.s place on a 
host of both traditional and cultural amenities, this research aims to build a more 
empirically robust case regarding the ability (or inability) of amenity-investment policies 
to attract highly educated workers to an area.  
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 To estimate the values Ph.D.s place on city attributes, the analysis builds on the 
random utility model of migration presented in Cragg and Kahn (1997).  The authors 
develop and apply a discrete choice model for estimating the demand for climate.  
Specifically, they estimate a 48-dimensional conditional logit model which links 
individual migration decisions across U.S. states to the climate amenities in that state.  
This approach allows the authors to recover estimates of individuals’ willingness to pay 
for improved climate.  The authors point out, however, that the state level analysis is too 
spatially aggregated to use for valuing local public goods that vary within states.  These 
goods include but are not limited to, crime, school quality, air quality, commute times, 
and climate indicators that may vary within a state.   
 Chattopadhyay (2000) also uses a discrete choice model of migration to estimate 
demand for amenities, but at a smaller geographic level.  His research models location 
choices within a single city (Chicago) to estimate the demand for local public goods such 
as air quality, school quality, and the demographic composition of cities.5  By using 
individual residential choices within a single city, the level of analysis is too narrow to 
estimate values for amenities that vary across cities.  Notably, in order to estimate the 
values for amenities that vary across cities, such as climate, one would need to model 
location choices at a national or regional level. 
The discrete choice model employed in this dissertation uses individual location 
decisions at the MSA level and on a national scale to estimate the value of amenities.  
The major advantage of using individual location decisions at an MSA/national level is 
that the model can estimate values for several important amenities that vary across cities 
                                                 
5 Banzhaf and Smith (2003), Palmquist and Israngkura (1999) and Quigley (1985) also use a RUM on 
individual location decisions within a city to estimate the value of amenities.   
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(such as general climate), as well as within states (such as crime or air quality), within 
one framework.   
 All of the research described above uses migration decisions to infer the amenity 
preferences of the general population or of the highly educated.  It is important to 
recognize that new S&E Ph.D.s represent a specialized cohort of highly educated workers 
that engages in a unique labor market.   One cannot assume that the amenity preferences 
of this cohort are equal to those of the general population, or of highly educated workers 
as they are typically defined (e.g., those with a bachelor’s degree).  Ph.D.s are different 
from typical workers in a variety of ways outside of their level of education:  they have 
higher incomes, are less likely to smoke, more likely to vote, and less likely to have 
children.6 7  It is plausible to expect that Ph.D.s not only have different preferences for 
amenities, but are more informed on and concerned with the quality of amenities prior to 
choosing a city in which to work and live.  In addition, new Ph.D.s are likely to be 
selective regarding the types of jobs which they are willing to consider, and these jobs 
may only exist in a few select cities.8  Thus, while the results provide insight into the 
amenity preferences of new S&E Ph.D.s, the results cannot be generalized to other 
attractive cohorts of the workforce such as those with only a college degree in science 
and engineering.   
                                                 
6 For more examples of the dissimilarities across education levels see Baum and Payea (2004). 
7Although no known previous research has directly examined the empirical relationship between education 
level and preferences for city amenities, some work has suggested that scientific workers consider different 
amenities than the rest of the population.  For example, Stern (2004) suggests that scientific researchers are 
willing to accept lower wages in order to work for firms that are more science-oriented.  In this respect, the 
ability engage in scientific discovery is itself an amenity, implying that new Ph.D.s would be willing to 
sacrifice income in order to live in a more productive environment, or cities with better access to 
knowledge and/or more research oriented firms. 
8 In other words, new Ph.D.s are unlikely to consider jobs for which non-Ph.D.s are qualified.  This point is 
addressed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the 
underlying theory of random utility models, and describes the three alternative classes of 
RUMs estimated in this dissertation:  the conditional logit model, the nested logit model, 
and the mixed logit model.  Although each model is based on the same underlying theory, 
the conditional logit model imposes restrictive utility assumptions that could potentially 
bias the estimated coefficients.   The nested and mixed logit models relax some of the 
restrictions required by the conditional logit, and may provide more accurate estimates of 
the influence of amenities on Ph.D. location decisions and their willingness to pay for 
these amenities.    
 A key component of all random utility models is the determination of the choice 
set, which consists of a Ph.D.s’ observed city of employment and a set of alternative 
cities where Ph.D.s were likely to have considered employment.  The models estimate 
Ph.D.s’ amenity preferences by comparing the attributes of the observed (utility-
maximizing) city of employment to the attributes in alternative (potential) cities.   In 
order to ensure proper estimation of the model, and given the unique nature of the Ph.D. 
labor market, careful consideration must be paid to the specific set of alternative cities 
that are included in the choice set.  In Chapter 2, a method is developed to determine the 
set of alternative cities that were most likely to have been considered by Ph.D.s at the 
time of their job/city selection process.   
Chapter 3 provides a summary of the Ph.D.s’ included in the empirical analysis 
from the SED and discusses the data needed to estimate the models.  The principal data 
on Ph.D.s’ city choices are identified from the SED.  The city location of Ph.D.s going 
into industry has not been recorded in the SED but has become available to us in 
9 
 
verbatim form.  Further, because the SED records the academic institution of 
employment, we are able to determine the city of employment for Ph.D.s employed at an 
academic institution either as a faculty member or as a postdoctoral appointee.  Chapter 3 
also describes the migration behavior of new Ph.D.s to and from MSAs, states, and 
regions of the country.   In addition, Chapter 3 discusses the data on MSA attributes 
which are used to explain location choice in the random utility models. 
Chapter 4 describes the estimation of Ph.D.s’ expected private consumption.  The 
random utility models arrive at monetary estimates for willingness to pay by identifying 
the amount of private consumption individuals are willing to forgo in order to live in 
cities with higher quality amenities. However, because the SED does not ask for Ph.D.s’ 
expected wages or housing expenditures, private consumption must be estimated using 
alternative data sources.   To predict the salary of new Ph.D.s, hedonic wage equations 
are estimated from a sample of full-time employed Ph.D.s that relate characteristics of an 
employee, their job, and their location, to their annual salary.  The data used to estimate 
salary comes from the biennial Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR), which offers the 
career information (including annual salary) and demographic information of 
approximately 30,000 Ph.D.s employed during the same time period.   The second 
component of private consumption, housing expenditures, is estimated using the mean 
reported housing expenditures of people with similar incomes in each MSA.  The data for 
housing expenditures comes from the 2000 Census 5% Public Use Micro Sample.   
Chapter 5 presents the estimation results from the three classes of RUMs.  The 
reliability and robustness of the coefficient estimates are explored by estimating several 
models with different choice sets and different samples.  Furthermore, controls for 
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observable preference heterogeneity are incorporated into the specification, which 
provides insight into how preferences differ across observable characteristics of the 
individual.  Each model is tested for quality of fit and potential bias and the results are 
compared with one another in order to determine a set of preferred models to be used in 
the estimation of willingness to pay. 
Chapter 6 uses the estimated utility coefficients from the random utility models to 
calculate Ph.D.s’ willingness to pay for amenity improvements in MSAs.  These 
estimates provide insight into the relative extent to which amenities influence Ph.D. 
location choice.  Chapter 7 concludes by discussing the major policy implications of the 
results and limitations of the analysis, as well as potential avenues for future research. 
 11 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
RANDOM UTILITY MODELS:  THEORY AND METHOD 
 
 
 
 This chapter describes the estimation methods employed to determine Ph.D.s’ 
preferences for city attributes, and in turn, measures of willingness to pay (WTP) for 
these attributes.  Three classes of random utility models are estimated in this application:  
the conditional, the nested, and the mixed logit model.  All of the models belong to the 
same larger family of models named generalized extreme value (GEV) models.9  
However, the conditional logit, and to a lesser degree the nested logit, require a property 
known as the “Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives” (IIA).  The mixed logit does 
not require the IIA property and has become a common approach to discrete choice 
modeling in recent literature.    
 This chapter has several components.  Section A describes the theoretical 
framework for determining individual preferences and section B describes the estimation 
method for the traditional RUM, the conditional logit model.   Sections C and D explain 
the estimation methods for the more advanced classes of RUMs, the nested and mixed 
logit models, respectively.  Section E explains how the estimated coefficients from each 
model are used to calculate implicit prices and willingness to pay measures for amenities.  
Finally, the determination of the choice set, or the set of potential employment cities of 
Ph.D.s, is discussed in section F.  
                                                 
9 The unifying attribute of all GEV models is that the error terms, or unobserved portions of utility, are 
assumed to follow a generalized extreme value distribution. 
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A. Random Utility Theory 
 The construct for the conditional, nested, and mixed logit models all stem from 
random utility theory.  Random utility theory assumes that individuals are able to 
evaluate the utility level associated with various alternatives, and choose the alternative 
that offers them the highest utility level.  In this application, we assume all Ph.D.s 
consider an individual specific set of alternative employment cities at the time of degree.  
Each Ph.D. i chooses (is observed in) the job and city that maximizes the common 
random utility function: 
max U (Zj,Cij | Xi)         (1) 
subject to: 
Cij  = (1 – Tj)* [yij(Xi)] – rij(yij)]      (2) 
where Zj is a vector of characteristics in city j, Cij is a measure of private consumption for 
Ph.D. i in city j, Xi is a vector of characteristics of the individual, and yij(Xi) and rij(yij) are 
the expected annual incomes and housing expenditures for a Ph.D. with attributes Xi  in 
city j.  Private consumption, Cij, represents the difference between after tax income and 
housing expenditures.   
Substituting the maximal value for Cij yields the indirect utility function: 
),),;,((*max* * ijijjijijCij XZXTZCvUv ij ==      (3) 
 Researchers observe the city that yields each individual the highest utility, but do 
not know the actual utility of each individual.   Ph.D.s’ utility is comprised of a 
deterministic component, known to both the researcher and individual, and a random 
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component that represents all aspects of utility that the researcher has not quantified.  To 
express the utility of individual i working in city j, equation (3) becomes:  
Ui (working in city j)  = ijij eV +        (4) 
where ijV  represents the deterministic part of utility, and eij, represents any non-
systematic (unobservable) features of utility.  ijV  is expressed as: 
JjXCZBV iijjij ,.....,1'' =++= φψ       (5) 
 
Where Ζj represents a vector of characteristics (Z1, Z2….., Zn) specific to each city, Cij 
represents the expected private consumption in city j as defined in equation (2), and Xi is 
a vector of individual characteristics that affect preferences for city attributes, such as 
marital status or sector of employment.  Each individual i chooses to work in city j if and 
only if Vij > Vik for all j ≠ k. 
The parameter on composite consumption,ψ , represents the utility gained by 
having another dollar to spend net of housing payments and taxes, or the marginal utility 
of income.  The inclusion of composite consumption in the models allows us to 
determine a monetary measure of Ph.D.’s willingness to trade-off income for improved 
amenity quality in cities. 
The random utility model requires a number of important assumptions.  First, the 
model assumes that localized public goods vary across MSAs, but are similar within an 
MSA.  This is more realistic for some local public goods, such as climate and amount of 
recreational space, than for others, such as educational quality and crime indicators.  The 
model also assumes that at the time of degree, each Ph.D. has full information concerning 
the quality of amenities in their observed MSA and in alternative MSAs.  Although 
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restrictive, this is more likely to hold true for MSAs than for census tracts.10  Finally, the 
model assumes that non-pecuniary aspects of potential jobs in a sector do not factor into 
the Ph.D.s decision of where to locate.  This is required because we do not have 
information concerning job specific characteristics of potential jobs available to Ph.D.s in 
each city.11   
 
B. Conditional Logit Model 
Under the conditional logit framework, when the individual specific error terms, 
(ei1, ei2, … eiK), are independently distributed random variables with an extreme value 
(Gumbel) distribution, the probability that individual i chooses city j is given by: 
Prob (i chooses city j) = ∑
=
J
j
v
v
e
e
ij
ij
1
=∑
=
+Ψ+
+Ψ+
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j
XCZj
XCZ
e
e
iij
iijj
1
''
' '
φβ
φβ
     (6) 
 
This is the conditional logit choice probability originally derived by McFadden (1974). 12 
The estimated vector of parameters, Bˆ , indicate the effect of city characteristic, Z, on the 
likelihood that a Ph.D. will choose city j.  Note that the vector of individual 
characteristics, Xi, does not vary across alternative cities and thus will drop out of 
equation (6) unless interacted with city attributes.   
 The basic intuition of equation (6) is that the larger the utility of city j as a 
proportion of the sum of utilities from all cities, the larger is the probability an individual 
will be observed working in city j.   By comparing the city-specific attributes in chosen 
                                                 
10 Even if census tract level data were more theoretically appropriate to use, it would be to empirically 
formidable to do so on a national scale, given that there are over 50,000 U.S. census tracts.    
11 In other words, the model assumes that a Ph.D. chooses a city employment based on the characteristics of 
the city and their net income, rather than the non-monetary characteristics of the job.   
12 The conditional logit model includes attributes of the alternatives, such that the regressors differ across 
alternatives and a single coefficient is estimated for each set of regressors. 
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cities with the attributes of all cities, the model determines which attributes individuals 
prefer, or how an increase in the value of an attribute influences individual utility.  For 
instance, if a certain characteristic, such as warmer winters, is more prevalent in chosen 
cities, the model infers that a warmer winter positively affects choice and is thus 
preferred to a colder winter, other things constant.    
Although the conditional logit model is very practical and useful in many settings, 
it imposes a restrictive property known as the “Independence from Irrelevant 
Alternatives” (IIA).  The IIA property requires that alternatives share only observed 
attributes, and no subset of alternatives share unobserved attributes.  If the error terms 
(ei1, ei2, … eiK) share unobserved characteristics across a subset of alternative city choices, 
the IIA property is violated and the vector of parameters will be biased (Quigley, 1985).     
Empirically, the IIA property implies that when an alternative is added (or 
removed) to a choice set, or the level of an amenity changes in a city, the relative 
probability of choosing one city over another does not change.  There are many situations 
where this pattern of substitution is unrealistic. For example, if an increase in violent 
crime in city A were to cause a one percent decrease in the probability of moving to city 
A, the IIA property requires that the probability of moving to all other cities increases by 
one percent.  If some cities are better substitutes for city A than other cities, than this 
proportionate substitution will not occur and the IIA property will be violated. 
As a result of the restrictiveness of the IIA property and the potential bias in the 
parameters, random utility modelers often employ alternative specifications of the RUM 
that do not require IIA.  The two most common alternatives RUM researchers utilize are 
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the nested logit and the mixed logit model (Parsons & Massey, 2003).  A discussion of 
the nested logit model follows.  
 
C. Nested Logit Model 
  In order for the IIA property to hold in the conditional logit model, it is implicitly 
required that individuals perceive all alternatives as equal substitutes.  If individuals only 
consider or systematically prefer one set of alternatives, then some alternatives will be 
better substitutes for others and IIA will be violated in the conditional logit framework.  
For example, in recreational demand modeling, it is likely that individuals prefer the 
alternatives in one region because it’s close to their residence, or because alternatives 
within a region have certain attributes that other alternatives do not have. Thus, 
individuals will perceive sites in one region as better substitutes for sites in other regions, 
and the IIA property will not hold when the model groups all alternative sites together.     
Generally speaking, if one can determine which subsets of alternatives that 
individuals are likely to consider as preferred substitutes, then one can maintain IIA in 
the model by clustering relevant alternatives into subsets, or nests.  The nested logit 
model estimates the probability of choosing a subset of alternatives, in addition to the 
choice of a specific alternative within a subset.  In the example above, an appropriate 
modeling approach would be to partition sites by region and estimate the probability of 
choosing a specific region in addition to the probability of choosing a specific site within 
a region.   
In this application, given the nature of the Ph.D. employment market, it is 
plausible to expect that Ph.D.s prefer a subset of cities within a specific sector of 
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employment over cities in other sectors.   Ph.D.s often desire or expect to work in a 
specific sector of employment before they consider specific jobs (cities) within a sector, 
and are more likely to consider alternative cities that offer employment in their preferred 
sector of employment.   Thus, the model nests a Ph.D.’s choice of employment sector and 
employment city.   
This model implicitly assumes a two-step decision process.  First, a Ph.D. 
considers whether they will work in industry, an academic full-time (FT) position, an 
academic postdoctoral fellowship or research associateship (postdoc), or ‘other’, and 
second, they search among potential cities that offer employment in that sector.13   If they 
decide to work in industry, they choose among one set of available cities, if academe, 
another set, etc., and the sets may contain different cities.  This nesting structure is 
depicted in Figure 1 below. 
The individual’s utility employed in sector k equals:  
Ui (working in sector k)  = ikik eV +       (7) 
         
Where ikV and ike represent the deterministic and random components of utility, 
respectively. ikV is specified as a function of individual characteristics, Xi, school 
characteristics, Ps, and the inclusive value for sector k, KiI , or:  
k
i
k
s
k
i
k
ik IoPXV ++= δφ        (8)
                                                 
13Industry includes all Ph.D.s with definite plans to work in industry or business.  Full-time academe 
includes all Ph.D.s with definite plans for employment in a known 4-year college or university, medical 
school, or a community college.  Postdocs include all Ph.D.s with definite plans to study on a postdoctoral 
fellowship, or research associateship at a known university.  The ‘other’ sector includes all Ph.D.s with 
definite plans for employment with the U.S. government, a foreign government, a non-profit organization, 
an international organization, the military, and self-employed Ph.D.s. 
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Figure 1: 
Choice of Sector then City Nesting Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
The inclusive values are a weighted average of city-specific utilities in each  
 
 
sector, and represent the expected maximum utility associated with choosing a specific 
sector.14  Using the vector of coefficients from the city choice conditional logit model, 
the inclusive values take the following form for each sector:  
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The probability that individual i chooses sector k equals: 
P(i, sector k )  
∑
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To estimate the city choice and the sector choice jointly, the model combines (6) 
with (10), as follows.  The probability that individual i will work in sector k in city j is 
given by the product of the probability of i choosing sector k and i choosing city j, or: 
                                                 
14 The inclusive value is often also referred to as the ‘log sum-term’ in the literature. 
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The IIA property of the conditional logit model is not exhibited across nests, but 
is still required within nests.  The coefficient on the inclusive value captures the degree of 
correlation between unobserved components of cities within a sector and provides 
researchers with a statistical test as to the appropriateness of the model.  McFadden 
(1978) and Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) have shown that utility theory requires the 
coefficient on the inclusive value, oˆ , to lie between zero and one. Furthermore, the value 
of the parameter indicates the degree of correlation among alternatives within a nest. The 
closer oˆ is to zero, the greater the degree of correlation among cities within a sector, and 
the closer oˆ is to one, the lower the degree of correlation among cities within a sector.  If 
oˆ is greater than one, this implies that cities across nests are more correlated with one 
another than are cities within a nest.  If oˆ is less than zero, the implication is that the 
alternatives within a nest are negatively correlated with one another.  When oˆ does not lie 
between zero and one, the model does not satisfy the conditions for consistency with 
utility maximization (Hauber & Parsons, 2000). 
  
D. The Mixed Logit Model 
The mixed logit model (MXL) has become an increasingly feasible and attractive 
approach to random utility modeling in recent years.15   The MXL holds two important 
                                                 
15 The mixed logit model has taken on several names in the literature, although the basic model is the same 
for each.  The following are common alternative names:  random parameters logit, random coefficients 
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advantages over the conditional logit and the nested logit models:  it relaxes the IIA 
property and allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity in preferences.  The 
conditional logit restricts all parameters to be equal for all individuals with the same 
observed characteristics, while the nested logit requires the parameters to be equal for 
individuals within the same nest.  Thus, these models inherently assume that all 
individuals with the same observed characteristics hold equal preferences for city 
attributes.  While this may not be a bad assumption for some city attributes, it is unlikely 
to hold true for all attributes.   
The MXL model is a generalization of the standard logit models and controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity by allowing coefficients to randomly vary across individuals.16   
The coefficients and hence utilities of each individual are correlated with city attributes.  
By capturing the correlation between individual utility and city attributes, the model 
allows for a more flexible pattern of substitution.  As noted previously, the IIA property 
is violated in the conditional logit if any subsets of alternatives share unobserved 
attributes.  When correctly specified, the MXL does not exhibit IIA because the 
individual-specific utilities are correlated with the unobserved attributes of the 
alternatives. 
To understand how the MXL can arrive at more accurate estimates than a 
standard logit, consider the following example.  Imagine a model that includes a city 
attribute that one group of Ph.D.s prefers, and another group dislike.  For example, one 
group may prefer a large number of art and entertainment (A&E) enterprises, while 
                                                                                                                                                 
logit, mixed multinomial logit, error components logit, and logit kernel model.  For simplicity, we always 
refer to it as a mixed logit model.  
16 Although the mixed logit controls for unobserved heterogeneity, the model cannot explain the source of 
heterogeneity (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002). 
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another group dislikes the presence of a lot of enterprises because of the associated 
crowds, noise, etc.17 The counterbalancing preferences of these groups would likely 
cancel each other out in the estimation of the choice probability. Thus, the parameter on 
the number of A&E enterprises in the standard logit model will likely be near zero and 
statistically insignificant.  This result would erroneously suggest that Ph.D.s are generally 
not concerned with the number of art and entertainment enterprises in their potential city 
of employment.   
In a correctly specified MXL model, the coefficient for A&E enterprises will be 
positive for one group of Ph.D.s and negative for another group. Although the overall 
mean may be close to zero, the results from the MXL would not imply that Ph.D.s do not 
have any preference for the number of A&E enterprises.  Rather, and more appropriately, 
the vector of parameters would suggest that some Ph.D.s have strong preferences for, and 
others against, a larger amount of A&E enterprises. 
Under the MXL, approach the utility of individual i observed in city j equals: 
JjXCZBV ijiijijiij ,.....,1'
' =+++= εφψ       (12) 
Notice the utility of an individual in the mixed logit model is equivalent to the 
utility equations in the conditional logit (equations 4 and 5), except here the vector of 
parameters on amenities (B') varies over individuals in the population.  In the standard 
logit, the non-systematic portion of utility is only captured by the error terms (ei1, ei2, … 
eiK), while in the MXL model, this randomness is captured by a vector of parameters ( 'iB ) 
in addition to the error terms.   
                                                 
17 In this example, we assume that the associated crowds, noise, etc. are not separable, or cannot be 
measured independently of the number of art and entertainment enterprises.  
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With a known vector of parameters ( 'iB ), the choice probability in the MXL is 
equivalent to that of the conditional logit.  Specifically, the probability that individual i is 
observed in city j conditional on 'iB equals: 
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The unconditional probability that individual i is observed in city j equals the 
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where ( )ηβ ,| bf  is a probability density function for β with meanb and standard 
deviationη .  Equation (14) states that the choice probability for an individual is the 
standard logit probability evaluated at all possible values ofβ over a given distribution of 
β  over the population. The model reports the weighted mean ofβ over the population, as 
well as the derived standard deviation of β  across the population )(η .  The derived 
standard deviation ofβ is an estimated parameter that reflects the amount of unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences for an attribute(s).  Larger values of η signify greater 
variation in β over the population. 
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E. Calculating Willingness to Pay 
After the random utility models are estimated, the utility coefficients are used to 
determine the implicit price of an amenity and a Ph.D.s’ willingness to pay for an 
exogenous change to the quality of an amenity.  The implicit price (or “part-worth 
utility”) of an amenity equals the change in utility from an additional unit of that amenity, 
divided by the change in utility from an additional dollar of private consumption (the 
marginal utility of income).  These estimates are calculated using the coefficients from 
the logit choice probability equations.  The implicit price for amenity z is defined as the 
coefficient on amenity z over the coefficient on composite consumption, or: 
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where zβˆ  is the coefficient on amenity z andψˆ  is the coefficient on composite 
consumption.  While zP  tells us the amount Ph.D.s are willing to pay for a marginal 
increase in amenities, it is also of interest to estimate the amount Ph.D.s are willing to 
pay for non-marginal increases in the value of amenities.  Determining willingness to pay 
is equivalent to estimating welfare changes (compensating variation) that result from 
changes to amenity quality in cities.    The intuitive interpretation of a welfare change is 
as follows.  If amenity quality in cities decreases (increases) by some exogenous amount, 
how much does an individual’s composite consumption have to increase (decrease) in 
order to keep their utility the same?    
 The general formula used to calculate willingness to pay is the same for the 
conditional, nested, and mixed logit models.   
ψˆ/][ 01 iii EUEUWTP −=         (16) 
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where 0iEU  represents the expected maximum utility for individual i before any change in 
amenity quality, and 1iEU  represents the expected maximum utility following the 
amenity change, and ψˆ  represents the marginal utility of income.  Because the marginal 
utility of income is constant (equal to the coefficient on private consumption), income 
effects are zero.  This implies that the amount someone is willing to pay for an increase in 
the quantity of amenity z equals the amount they are willing to accept for a decrease of 
the same quantity.18   
Using the coefficients from the conditional logit models, the expected maximum utility is 
estimated as: 
A
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where A equals 0 or 1, which reflects the expected maximum utility with and without the 
change in the level of amenity quality in all cities, respectively.   
 The expected maximum utility in the nested logit differs for Ph.D.s in different 
sectors. For individuals in sector k, expected utility takes the form:   
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lnˆ φβ and A reflects the expected maximum utility with and 
without the amenity change.    
 Finally, in the mixed logit model, the expected maximum utility is differs for all 
individuals in sample, depending on the variation inβ .  For individual i, the expected 
utility level equals:  
                                                 
18 In other words, the compensating variation equals the equivalent variation.   
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where A reflects the expected maximum utility with and without the amenity change.   
Note that the WTP estimates for attributes with random coefficients must accommodate 
the distribution of estimates across the population.  Because 'ˆiB  is unobserved for each 
individual, the variations in 'ˆiB  are simulated randomly according to the specified 
distribution around the mean value of the coefficient.  For example, assume attribute x 
has an estimated mean coefficient )( XB  and derived standard deviation )ˆ(η .  To estimate 
WTP for a change in the level of attribute, first we estimate random coefficient values for 
each individual as ( XB  + ηˆ * u), where (u) represents random deviates.  This random 
coefficient value enters the expected utility equation for the mixed logit (equation 19), 
after which WTP is calculated as defined in equation (16).  
 
F. Determination of the Choice Set 
The models described above estimate utility coefficients by comparing the 
attributes of the observed city of employment which offers the Ph.D. the highest utility 
level, to the attributes in alternative cities of employment, or cities where a Ph.D. may 
have considered residing but decided against it.  Two major issues must be addressed 
before the random utility models can be estimated.  First, we must establish the choice set 
for each Ph.D., or determine the relevant set of alternative cities Ph.D.s were likely to 
have considered while conducting their job search.  Second, we must establish the 
covariates, or the relevant set city characteristics that were likely to have influenced the 
Ph.D.’s choice of city among the alternative cities in the choice set.  This section 
26 
 
describes the criteria used to determine the individual’s choice set.  The relevant set of 
city attributes assigned to each city will be discussed in Chapter 3.   
  Incorrect specifications of the choice set can lead to biased utility coefficients and 
resulting WTP estimates (Phaneuf & Herriges, 1999).   As a result, careful consideration 
must be paid to the specific set of alternative cities that are selected into the choice set.  
The formation of the choice set requires two implicit assumptions.  First, to estimate the 
model, the choice set must be greater than one, which requires us to assume that all 
Ph.D.s could have found employment in a city other than their observed city.19  Second, 
all alternative cities assigned to the choice set are assumed to have a positive (non-zero) 
probability of being the selected city (McFadden, 1978).  In other words, the models 
require that Ph.D.s are not observed in a potential city because that city offered them 
lower utility, not because they were not able to locate in that city.20   
   Previous researchers have devised a number of criteria to assign alternatives to the 
choice set.  The most common approach is to assign all possible alternatives to the choice 
set, which implicitly assumes that all possible alternatives are considered by each 
individual (Hicks & Strand, 2000).  The ‘complete alternatives’ approach is not 
appropriate for the purposes of this application due to the fact that there over 300 MSAs 
in the U.S., and the dimensionality of estimation would become exponentially large if all 
alternatives were included in the choice sets.   
                                                 
19 Another way of stating this assumption is that the choice probability defined in equation (6) is assumed 
to be less than one. 
20 Note that this assumption does not require that individuals actually consider all alternatives included in 
their choice set.  When the scope of the choice set is larger than the set of alternatives that were actually 
considered the model will arrive at accurate estimates, conditional on satisfying the independence from 
irrelevant alternatives assumption (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985). 
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When dealing with a large number of alternatives, a common approach is to 
randomly select a limited number of alternatives into the choice set (Blackley & Ondrich, 
1988; Ioannides & Zabel, 2002).  McFadden (1978) has shown that this approach will 
provide consistent and efficient estimates when all alternatives in the assigned set have a 
positive probability of being the observed choice.  This approach is not theoretically 
appropriate for the purposes of this application because it would require us to assume that 
all Ph.D.s could have found adequate employment in any city.      
 The primary goals of the choice set selection process is to determine the 
alternative cities that were most likely to have actually been considered by each Ph.D., 
and to eliminate cities in which Ph.D.s could not have found adequate employment.  In 
order to accomplish these goals, we weight the probability that any city will be selected 
into a Ph.D.’s choice set.  The process of changing the probability that certain cities are 
included in a choice set has been termed ‘importance sampling’ (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 
1985).  A considerable number of studies have examined the affect of using a full choice 
set approach, a random sampling approach, or an importance sampling approach to 
selecting alternatives into a choice set.  For example, Haab & Hicks (1997) use the 
attributes of individuals and alternative sites to estimate the probability that an alternative 
will appear in an individual’s choice set.  By interacting individual attributes with 
alternative specific attributes, the authors eliminate the number of irrelevant sites that can 
enter into the choice set.  The authors conclude that their approach provides more precise 
estimates than RUMs that use a randomly selected or complete choice set.  Other studies 
of recreational demand, such as Parsons and Kealy (1992), Hauber and Parsons (2000), 
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and Hicks and Strand (2000), have used the geographic proximity of sites from an 
individual’s residence to determine the relevant set of alternatives. 
The process of choice set determination is particularly complicated for the 
purposes of this model due to the complexity and uniqueness of the Ph.D. labor market.   
For one, new Ph.D.s, eager to obtain returns to their investment in graduate school, are 
unlikely to consider or accept jobs for which non-Ph.D.s are qualified.  For instance, a 
Ph.D. in mechanical engineering who wishes to go to Yuma, Arizona, may find that there 
are no firms in, or near, Yuma that are willing to hire mechanical engineering Ph.D.s.   In 
addition, new Ph.D.s typically will limit their job search to a specific sector, either as a 
result of individual preferences or because of job market considerations.  For example, a 
Ph.D. in mathematics who is qualified for a number of industrial jobs may not search for 
these jobs because she desires to work in academe.  Alternatively, a biologist who desires 
to work in academe will likely limit their search to postdoctoral appointments because he 
is unlikely to be hired in a tenure track position at an academic institution.21    
The approach used to select alternative cities is closely related with the method 
used by Feather (1994).  In a RUM application to lake recreation, Feather uses the 
observed visitation rates of lakes to assign probabilities that any lake will appear in an 
individual’s choice set.  He contends that the more popular a lake, the more likely that an 
individual considered going to that lake.  Therefore, popular lakes should have a higher 
probability of appearing in an individual’s choice set than other lakes, and lakes which no 
                                                 
21 Stephan and Ma (2004) find that the probability a new Ph.D. accepts a postdoctoral position is positively 
related to the supply of new Ph.D.s and negatively related to the demand for new Ph.D.s in academe.  In 
addition, one in eight respondents from a 1995 survey reported that they accepted their most recent postdoc 
because other jobs were not available.  This implies that the postdoc sector is often not the top sector choice 
of new Ph.D.s, or that new Ph.D.s may be willing to accept a faculty position in a city with worse amenities 
over a postdoctoral position in a city with better amenities.   
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one attends should not be included in any individual’s choice set.  In comparing this 
method to the random sampling procedure, Feather notes that the models that used 
importance sampling to generate the choice sets had welfare estimates that were 
significantly more stable with respect to the number of alternatives than the random 
sampling method.  
In this application, the probability that a city is selected into a Ph.D.’s choice set 
is weighted based on the popularity of that city among Ph.D.’s who were likely to be 
competing for the same jobs.  The rationale for this approach is that the greater the 
proportion of Ph.D.s in the same job market (job market set c) that are observed in city k, 
the more likely that a Ph.D. in job market set c considered employment in city k.  
Therefore, city k should have a larger probability of being selected into the choice set of 
all Ph.D.s job market set c.  Similarly, if no Ph.D. in job market set d was hired in city j, 
we assume that city j did not have an adequate job opportunity for any Ph.D. in job 
market set d.22  Therefore, city j is eliminated and has no possibility of being in the 
choice set for any Ph.D. in job market set d.  
  The job market sets are identified according to a Ph.D.’s field of training and her 
sector of employment.23  The implicit assumption here is that Ph.D.s only compete for 
jobs with other Ph.D.s in their field of training and their sector of employment. 24  For 
                                                 
22 The Survey of Earned Doctorates is given to everyone granted a Ph.D. in the U.S., and has over a 90% 
response rate.  Our data covers all Ph.D.s that made a definite commitment to an employer in a U.S. MSA.  
Thus, we assume that if no Ph.D. is observed in a city, it is because no job was available to any Ph.D. in 
that job market set, not because a job was available in that city but no Ph.D. was willing to accept it. 
23 Doctorate degrees were granted in a total of 166 detailed science and engineering fields.  We group 
detailed fields into 15 broad fields matching how the Information Sciences Institute (ISI) categorizes 
journals in science and engineering.  
24 We initially considered defining job market sets according to the year the Ph.D. graduated as well. We 
found that cities that offer employment to Ph.D.s in a specific field remained relatively constant over the 
three years of our data.  Therefore, we do not expect the choice sets (and results) to significantly vary 
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instance, assuming a Ph.D. trained in biology is not competing for the same types of jobs 
as a Ph.D. trained in astronomy, the city choice of an astronomer does not inform us as to 
the potential city choices of a biologist, and vice versa.25  In addition, we assume Ph.D.s 
who choose to work industry are not considering the same set of jobs as Ph.D.s who 
choose to work in academe, or that Ph.D.s prefer employment in a specific sector.26  
Overall, there are 45 job market sets (15 fields* 3 sectors), with each job market set 
containing Ph.D.s in the same field and sector of employment.   
 The probability that an alternative city is selected into the choice set of a Ph.D. is 
directly proportional to the percent of Ph.D.s in her job market that located in that city.  
Specifically, if 25% of all Ph.D.s in a job market set locate in New York City (NYC), 
then NYC has a 25% probability of being selected into the choice set of all Ph.D.s in that 
job market set for each draw.  Cities are selected into the choice set using K draws 
without replacement from a list of all observed cities in each job market set.  Thus, for 
each Ph.D. in job market c, city j has a selection probability in draw X equal to: 
( )( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −= − XXP Cjcjc Nn ,,         (20) 
where jcn ,  is the number of Ph.D.s observed in city j from job market set c, and CN  is 
the total number of Ph.D.s in job market set c.  Finally, each Ph.D.’s observed city choice 
is added to the choice set and all duplicate cities are deleted.  Thus, after K draws each 
                                                                                                                                                 
depending on whether job market sets are identified by time periods.  The effect of using time windows in 
importance sampling was examined by Banzhaf and Smith (2003). 
25 The assumption that S&E Ph.D.s primarily search for jobs in their own field is supported by surveys of 
employed S&E Ph.D.s.  Specifically, the 2000 National Science Foundation’s Science and Engineering 
Indicators reports that 95.5% of employed Ph.D.s in S&E accepted a position that was closely or somewhat 
related to their field of training. 
26No question is asked in the SED that allows researchers to differentiate between Ph.D.s who consider jobs 
in only sector and Ph.D.s who consider jobs in multiple sectors.  However, Ph.D.s’ sector choice is heavily 
dependent on field of training.  This is illustrated in Table A.1 in the appendix, which reports Ph.D.’s 
choice of sector by field of training.    
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Ph.D.’s choice set varies from a minimum of two alternatives to a maximum of (K+1) 
alternatives.   
 The random utility models will be estimated with different sized choice sets.  
Specifically, the number of draws (K) varies from five to twenty five for each random 
utility model.27  There is no basis a priori to prefer one choice set size to another.  
Theoretically, the models estimated with smaller choice sets may have biased coefficients 
if the choice sets systematically exclude relevant alternatives (cities that were likely to be 
considered by Ph.D.s).  Conversely, the models estimated with larger choice sets may 
have biased coefficients if the choice sets systematically include cities in which Ph.D.s 
would not have been able to find adequate employment.  
                                                 
27 We start with the five draws because this is the minimum number of draws Parsons and Kealy (1992) 
suggest are necessary to obtain reliable results when dealing with a large number of alternatives. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  
This chapter describes the data used to estimate the random utility models.  Each 
model requires data on Ph.D.s’ city choices as well as attributes from U.S. metropolitan 
areas.   The data on Ph.D.s’ city choices comes from the Survey of Earned Doctorates 
(SED), administered by Science Resources Statistics of the National Science Foundation.   
The SED is a census of all newly minted Ph.D.s in the U.S. and is administered at or near 
the time of degree, and has a response rate of approximately 92%.  The analysis is 
restricted to all Ph.D.s in a science and engineering field from fiscal years (FY) 1997-
1999 with definite plans for employment in a U.S. MSA.  Section A provides an overview 
of Ph.D.s in the SED and discusses our ability to draw inferences regarding the 
preferences of the science and engineering workforce from this data.  Section B examines 
the migration behavior of these Ph.D.s, and explores the ability of metropolitan and states 
to retain Ph.D.s from the area and/or attract Ph.D.s produced in other regions.  Section C 
describes the MSA level attributes included in the random utility models.  
 
A. Ph.D.s in the Survey of Earned Doctorates 
Table 1 presents the distribution of new Ph.D.s that completed the survey between 
FY 1997 - 1999 by sector of employment.  As indicated by Table 1, 65,427 new S&E 
doctorates completed the survey between FY 1997-1999, but only 25,827 of these Ph.D.s 
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have a known U.S. employment city.   There are three noteworthy reasons the U.S. city 
of employment is not observed for all new S&E Ph.D.s.   First, 36.3% of all new S&E 
Ph.D.s did not name an employer or an employment location on their survey because they 
had not made a definite commitment to an employer at the time the survey was 
administered.28   Secondly, 10.2% of S&E Ph.D.s with definite plans made a commitment 
to an employer outside the U.S. such that the location choice is not germane to the 
analysis.  Finally, approximately 31% of S&E Ph.D.s with definite plans in the U.S. 
either do not report their employment/city or their employment city is not accessible to 
researchers.   This last point warrants further explanation.  While the SED asks all 
graduates to identify the geographic location of their employer, the SED data available to 
researchers only identifies the employment state or foreign country of Ph.D.s.29 We are 
able to identify the city location choices of industrial Ph.D.s through a verbatim file that 
has become available to researchers since 1997.30   In addition, the city choices of Ph.D.s 
employed at a known academic institution are identified by matching the institution with 
its geographic location.31  However, the employment city of Ph.D.s not employed in 
industry or at a known academic institution cannot be determined from the data.  The 
empirical analysis is thus restricted to S&E Ph.D.s who had accepted and reported a 
                                                 
28 Ph.D.s with definite plans had either signed a contract or made definite commitment to a new employer, 
or were returning to or continuing in pre-doctoral employment. 
29 Specifically, the SED asks all Ph.D. recipients to “name the organization and geographic location where 
you will work or study.” 
30 This verbatim file has only been available to researchers since 1997.  As part of a larger project, we also 
coded the data by firm name.  See Stephan et al. (2004) for more information on this project. 
31 683 new faculty appointments and 6,213 postdoctoral appointments in the U.S. did not report a legible 
academic institution on their survey.  A large proportion of postdoctoral appointments that did not report an 
academic institution likely accepted a postdoctoral position in another sector, such as at an industrial lab or 
with a government agency.  Stephan and Ma (2004) report that between 1981 and 1995, 30% of new 
postdoctoral appointees with definite plans accepted a position in a sector outside of academe. 
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position with an industrial firm or an academic institution at the time they completed the 
survey. 
 An important issue to investigate is whether the inferences drawn from the 
empirical analysis can be generalized to the entire population of S&E Ph.D.s, or to the 
population of new S&E Ph.D.s.32  First we will address whether the estimated 
preferences of new Ph.D.s can be generalized to the population of all employed S&E 
Ph.D.s.  As shown in Table 1, slightly more than 45% of new S&E Ph.D.s with definite 
plans during this study period have plans to work in a postdoctoral position, while 25% 
have plans to work in industry and only 14% have plans to work in academe.  Because 
postdocs eventually transition into more permanent employment positions in either 
industry or academe, a representative sample of experienced workers will have a 
substantially smaller proportion of postdocs in comparison. As a whole, faculty comprise 
44% of the entire doctoral S&E workforce, 38% of S&E Ph.D.s work for a private firm, 
and postdoctoral appointees comprise approximately 6% of the doctoral S&E 
workforce.33  
 The types of job opportunities that are available to new Ph.D.s have changed 
considerably over the past thirty years.  In particular, there has been a dramatic decrease 
in the share of new Ph.D.s who immediately find employment in a faculty position at an 
academic institution, and in turn, a proportional increase in the share of postdoctoral 
                                                 
32The empirical analysis only includes Ph.D.s with definite plans and a known city of employment.   The 
population of new S&E Ph.D.s includes Ph.D.s without definite plans for employment and Ph.D.s without a 
known city.  The population of S&E Ph.D.s includes all employed doctorates, regardless of the time they 
earned their degree.   
33 Source: Characteristics of the Doctoral Scientists and Engineers in the U.S. (1997).  National Science 
Foundation/Division of Science and Resource Studies. 
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appointments.34  Ehrenberg (1992) notes that the total share of new S&E doctorates 
starting a postdoctoral appointment increased from 22% to 39% between 1970 and 1988, 
and in turn the proportion of new faculty decreased from 44% to 24% over the same time 
period.35   
 Of critical importance for the purposes of this analysis is not the type of 
employment new Ph.D.s find, but how their employment opportunities may influence 
their city choices.  Prior to selecting between alternative jobs/cities, Ph.D.s will weigh 
both the characteristics of each job (salary, workload, ability to engage in research, etc.) 
in addition to characteristics of the surrounding city.  Employment characteristics 
constant, an individual will select the city with the bundle of amenities that best matches 
her preferences.  However, the job related characteristics are likely to hold greater 
importance for newly minted Ph.D.s, particularly postdocs, than they would for 
experienced Ph.D.s.  First, a postdoc is likely to be more willing to endure an 
appointment in a city with low quality amenities simply because the appointment is 
naturally short-term.36  In addition, as with the choice of a graduate school, a postdoctoral 
appointment influences an individual’s future employment prospects.  Regardless of the 
location, higher quality appointments (those with a highly respected mentor, at higher 
                                                 
34 A Ph.D.’s choice of sector is largely determined by their field of training.  This is illustrated in Table A.1 
of the appendix, which reports the number and share of new doctorates with definite plans going into each 
of the four sectors for ten broad S&E fields.  The postdoc sector represents the dominant sector choice 
among the majority of S&E disciplines.  Notably, approximately three in four biologists and astronomers, 
and more than half of all chemists and physicists accept a postdoctoral appointment before moving on to 
more permanent employment in another sector.  Industry is the most popular sector destination for 
engineers and computer scientists, while mathematicians are most likely to find employment in an 
academic institution. 
35 This trend can be attributed to a number of potential factors.  The decrease in the share of new faculty 
may be a byproduct of a tightening of the academic labor market, caused by proportionally larger increases 
in the supply of new doctorates relative to the number of newly available tenure track positions in academic 
institutions (Ehrenberg, 1999).  Alternatively, the increased share of postdocs may simply reflect that a 
longer training period is required before a Ph.D. can obtain a faculty appointment (Ehrenberg, 1992). 
36 Stephan and Ma (2004) report that in 1990 the median length of a Ph.D.’s postdoctoral experience was 
34 months. 
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ranked institutions, with greater opportunities to publish in scientific journals, etc.) are 
more likely to be selected by new Ph.D.s because it will enhance their ability to select a 
higher quality job/city after the appointment is complete.37    
 The stakes are somewhat different for industrial placements and Ph.D.s going into 
academe.  City attributes are likely to weigh more heavily into the decision of where to 
work because the duration of their residency in the city is expected to be longer.38  More 
generally, individuals will be less willing to tolerate low quality amenities when choosing 
between potentially long-term career positions than when choosing between short-term 
postdoctoral positions.  To account for the potential influence of the expected 
employment duration on the estimated amenity values, the empirical models introduce 
controls which relate the estimates to Ph.D.s’ sector of employment.    
 Still in question is whether the subpopulation of new Ph.D.s included in the 
empirical analysis is a random sample of all new S&E Ph.D.s.  In particular, sample 
selection bias may result from the exclusion of Ph.D.s without definite plans as well as 
the exclusion of Ph.D.s who do not report their employment city.   Table A.2 of the 
appendix offers some insight into the potential existence of selection bias by showing the 
individual and institutional characteristics of Ph.D.s included in the empirical analysis 
(Ph.D.s with definite plans in the U.S. and with a known academic institution) vs. Ph.D.s 
                                                 
37 This is not to suggest that city amenities do not have any influence on the choice of a postdoctoral 
position, just that city amenities are likely to matter less for new Ph.D.s choosing between postdoctoral 
positions than for new Ph.D.s choosing between more permanent positions.   
38 As with postdocs, the potential for future employment elsewhere may influence the decision of where to 
work for new Ph.D.s in industry and new faculty.  These Ph.D.s also face high turnover rates during their 
first few years of employment.  For example, Ehrenberg (1992) reports that 15% of non-tenured professors 
employed in the U.S. are not employed in the same institution in the next year.  In addition, Bender and 
Heywood (2005) find that approximately 22% of S&E Ph.D.s employed in a nonacademic institution 
changed employers within a two year period. 
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that are not included in the empirical analysis (Ph.D.s without definite plans in the U.S. 
and Ph.D.s that did not report an academic institution). 
Although some notable differences exist, the samples are reasonably similar 
regarding the observable characteristics of Ph.D.s.   Compared to Ph.D.s without definite 
plans, the sample of Ph.D.s with definite plans has a larger proportion of males (68% vs. 
62%), U.S. citizens (67% vs. 61%), and white Ph.D.s (65% vs. 58%).  As expected, 
whether or not a Ph.D. has definite plans is heavily influenced by her employment status 
prior to graduation.  In particular, Ph.D.s who were full-time employed one year prior to 
graduation comprise approximately 25% of the sample of Ph.D.s with definite plans, 
compared to only 12.5% of the sample of Ph.D.s without definite plans.   Institutional 
characteristics also play a role in determining post-graduation employment status.  The 
sample of Ph.D.s with definite plans has a higher proportion of Ph.D.s from top 110 
institutions (81%), compared to Ph.D.s without definite plans (76%).  In addition, Ph.D.s 
from top-ranked institutions comprise approximately 65% of the sample of Ph.D.s with 
definite plans, compared to 59% of the sample of Ph.D.s without definite plans.39   
 The last two columns of Table A.2 compare the characteristics of Ph.D.s with 
definite plans and a known academic institution to the characteristics Ph.D.s with definite 
plans but an unknown academic institution.  The sample of Ph.D.s who report their 
academic institution is very similar in terms of observable characteristics to the sample of 
Ph.D.s who do not report an academic institution.  In fact, the difference between sample 
means does not exceed six percentage points for any single characteristic.40  These 
                                                 
39 A chi-square test that these characteristics are equal across samples can be rejected the 1% level of 
significance. 
40 The largest difference between these samples is in the proportion of biologists.  Specifically, biologists 
comprise approximately 37% of the sample of Ph.D.s with an unknown academic institution, compared to 
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considerations suggest that it is reasonable to draw inferences from the analysis for new 
Ph.D.s with definite plans, regardless of whether they reported their academic institution 
of employment.   However, more sizeable differences exist between the samples of 
Ph.D.s with definite plans and Ph.D.s without definite plans.  In particular, females, non-
whites, and non-citizens are somewhat under-represented, while new Ph.D.s who were 
full-time employed prior to graduation and from top ranked research universities are 
somewhat over-represented in the empirical analysis. 
 
 
B. Migration Behavior of New Ph.D.s 
Local policymakers have a vested interest in the migration behavior of highly 
skilled workers.  The presence of a highly skilled workforce can be a magnet for new 
businesses and local metropolitan areas can receive substantial gains in productivity as a 
direct result of the contributions of nearby graduates (Link, 1995).  A few examples 
include Stanford’s role in the creation of Silicon Valley, M.I.T. and Harvard’s role in 
Route 128, and the role of Duke University, UNC Chapel Hill, and NC State in the 
development of Research Triangle Park.    
 While it is the local areas that can receive the largest benefits from universities, it 
is the state that bears the burden of funding these universities.  As a result, state 
policymakers are especially concerned with the returns on their investments in 
universities, and may relate this concern to the number of highly skilled workers that 
migrate out of state after receiving their degree.   Examining the migration behavior of 
Ph.D.s from states and metropolitan areas not only provides insight to the extent to which 
                                                                                                                                                 
43% of the sample of Ph.D.s without a known academic institution.  A chi-square test that these 
percentages are equal across samples can be rejected at the 1% level of significance. 
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knowledge created at local universities is absorbed by the local economy, but also the 
amount by which states recoup their substantial investments in higher education. 
With this in mind, Table 2 shows the inter-state and inter-regional migration 
patterns of new S&E Ph.D.s.   To measure the net gains or losses of new S&E Ph.D.s in 
an area, the table compares the number of Ph.D.s with definite plans trained in each state 
and region, to the number with definite plans for employment in each state and region.  
Table 2 indicates that 11% more Ph.D.s are trained in the U.S. than are employed in the 
U.S. during the study period.  This is because the number trained includes Ph.D.s with 
definite plans for employment in a foreign country. 41  Of Ph.D.s employed in the U.S., 
slightly less than half are employed in the same region in which they were trained, and 
only 37% are employed in the same state where trained.   
As indicated by Table 2, there is a lot of variation between states and regions in 
terms of net gains or losses.   Notably, there is a general migration of Ph.D.s away from 
the central states toward the coast.    Nine of the nineteen coastal states employ more new 
Ph.D.s than they train, compared to only six of the thirty-one states that do not lie on the 
coast.  Only two regions, New England and the Pacific, employ more Ph.D.s than they 
train. The Pacific region fares the best, largely due to the remarkable role of California, 
which retains a higher percentage of Ph.D.s and imports more Ph.D.s than any other state 
in the nation.  The boom in information technology during the study period, which was 
particularly strong in California, Oregon, and Washington, undoubtedly contributes the 
robust gains of the Pacific region. 
                                                 
41 We do not have any information regarding the number of Ph.D.s trained in foreign nations that migrated 
to the U.S. during these years.  Thus, if taken alone, the table overestimates the net loss of Ph.D.s in each 
state and to the U.S. as a whole. 
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Table 2 also shows that there is a remarkable “brain drain” from the central 
regions during the sample period.  The nine states in the East Central regions are major 
net exporters of Ph.D.s.  Only about one in four Ph.D.s trained in the East Central region 
finds employment in their state of training on average, and each state suffers a net loss in 
excess of 14%.  The pull from the East North Central region is particularly severe.  
Overall, the region suffers a net loss of 2,655 Ph.D.s, more than three times the amount 
lost from any other region.  When the fifty states are ranked in terms of net gains and 
losses, where the top net gainer is ranked 1st and the largest net loser is ranked 50th, East 
North Central states:  Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois, respectively rank 
44th, 45th, 47th, 48th and 49th.42   States in the West Central regions generally do not fare 
much better; of the eleven states, all but South Dakota and Arkansas employ fewer 
Ph.D.s than they produce. 
Table 3 takes a more detailed look at the migration behavior of new by Ph.D.s by 
examining the ability of metropolitan areas to retain and attract new Ph.D.s.  The table 
ranks the top 25 MSAs according to the number of new Ph.D.s employed and produced 
in each MSA.  A number of striking stories arise.  On average, an MSA retains 
approximately one of every five Ph.D.s that they train.   Despite the high mobility of new 
Ph.D.s, it is evident from Table 3 that areas that produce more Ph.D.s generally employ 
more Ph.D.s as well.  Of the top 25 producing MSAs, eighteen are also in the top 25 in 
terms of employment of new Ph.D.s.   As a whole, the top 25 producing MSAs, which 
represent approximately 35% of the U.S. population, employ more than half of all new 
Ph.D.s with definite plans in the data. 
                                                 
42 Surprisingly, New York state ranks 50th, or it loses more Ph.D.s on net than any other state.  This is 
largely due to the role of bordering New Jersey, which employs about one of four Ph.D.s trained in New 
York. 
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The ability of metropolitan areas to retain locally trained Ph.D.s and attract them 
from other areas varies substantially.  For instance, Los Angeles, San Jose, and Chicago 
each retain more than 25% of the Ph.D.s produced locally, compared to Champaign-
Urbana, IL and Lafayette, IN which only employ approximately 10% of the Ph.D.s they 
train.  In addition, the number of Ph.D.s trained in Champaign-Urbana, IL and Lafayette, 
IN combined is slightly greater than the total number trained in Los Angeles (1,468 vs. 
1,374).  Yet, Los Angeles employs more than triple the amount of Ph.D.s employed in 
Champaign-Urbana and Lafayette combined (883 vs. 279).  These variations demonstrate 
that the presence of a large university, by itself, does not guarantee sufficient job 
opportunities to attract a large number of Ph.D.s.  Certainly, other factors, such as a large 
industrial sector and/or high quality amenities, are important in determining the ability of 
MSAs to attract or retain new Ph.D.s. 
Although we do not investigate the precise role of amenities in the location 
decisions of new Ph.D.s in this chapter, Table 3 provides some casual evidence that new 
Ph.D.s are attracted to areas with higher quality amenities. For instance, thirteen of the 
top 25 U.S. MSAs from the Places Rated Almanac (Savageau & D’Agostino, 1999) 
rankings are also in the top 25 in terms of employment of new Ph.D.s.43 This relationship 
between rankings extends beyond the top 25 MSAs.  More than half of the top 100 MSAs 
from the PRA are one of the top 100 chosen MSAs of new Ph.D.s.  In addition, the 
overall correlation coefficient between the Places Rated Almanac rankings for all U.S. 
MSAs, and the MSA rankings in terms of employment of new Ph.D.s, is a robust 0.714.   
 
                                                 
43 The Places Rated Almanac Rankings are based on the mean of an index that combines each area’s 
quality of climate, crime, transportation, education, the arts, health care, and recreation. 
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C. MSA Data 
  To recreate the information available to Ph.D.s at the time of degree, the random 
utility model includes twenty eight MSA-level variables, Ph.D.s’ expected composite 
consumption, and the distance in miles between Ph.D.s’ MSA of training and all 
alternative MSAs in their choice set.  The variable distance is expected to play a 
significant role in location choice because it captures both the explicit monetary costs and 
the non-pecuniary costs of moving.44   
 Table 4 defines and presents summary statistics for all of the MSA variables 
included in the models.45  Each MSA variable is placed into one of four broad categories:  
natural amenities, publicly-provided amenities, “other” city characteristics, and region of 
the country. Natural amenities are ‘pure’ public goods of an MSA, or environmental 
attributes which are non-purchased and non-alterable.  These include January and July 
temperatures, July relative humidity, hours of January sunlight, the percent of an MSA’s 
surface area covered by water, and a dummy variable indicating whether the MSA lies on 
the coastline.   
 Publicly-provided amenities are reproducible public goods which can be altered 
through public investment.  These include crime rates, per-student expenditures and pupil 
to teacher ratios in public schools, acres of state or national protected parkland, number 
of bad air quality days, number of art and entertainment enterprises, number of superfund 
sites, and the average commute time to work.  The “other” category includes all city 
                                                 
44 Note that distance and composite consumption are the only characteristics that vary between both 
individuals and alternatives in the choice set.  To calculate the distance in miles between the city of training 
and city of employment, we first gathered the latitude and longitude coordinates of the institution where the 
Ph.D. was trained and where they were employed.   After converting the coordinate measures from degrees 
to radians, we multiply the number of degrees per radian by the number of miles per degree on a sphere the 
size of the earth.  Distance equals one if the alternative MSA is the same as the MSA of training. 
45 See Table A.3 in the appendix for source information of MSA data. 
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characteristics that are neither natural nor reproducible amenities, but are likely to 
influence a Ph.D.’s location decision.  In general, policymakers have little ability to 
influence the amount of these goods in their MSA through public investment.  These 
include several demographic variables, such as percentage nonwhite and percentage of 
foreign born residents, the geographic size of the MSA, population density, the number of 
utility patents, and the number of higher education institutions.  Finally, an indicator for 
the MSA’s region of the country is included to capture any unobserved regional effects 
that are not captured by the other variables.46 
 MSA variables are placed into the above categories to help distinguish between 
variables that can and cannot be improved by public investment. This distinction is 
important because if the results suggest that one category of amenities are substantially 
more influential than another category in determining location choice, the implications 
differ as to whether and how policymakers can attract more highly educated to their city.  
For instance, if new Ph.D.s are shown to have a relatively high demand for publicly-
provided amenities, policymakers may be able to effectively attract more of these 
workers by investing in the quality of these amenities.  Conversely, if publicly-provided 
amenities are shown to play a relatively small role in the location decisions of new 
Ph.D.s, policymakers may need to seek out alternative policies, such as promoting better 
labor opportunities or offering tax incentives for research and development in order to 
increase the number of highly educated workers in their area.  
 
                                                 
46 See Table A.4 in the appendix for a list of MSAs by region. 
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Table 1 
 
Ph.D. ‘Types’ by Sector 
Graduating Years FY 1997-1999 
 
Ph.D. Type All Industry FTAcademe Postdocs  Other 
(1) Number Trained in a Science & Engineering Field 65,427 16,040 9,019 25,547 14,821 
  
(2) Number from (1) with definite plans  41,670 10,666 6,500 18,951 5,553 
  
(3) Number from (2) with plans in the U.S. 37,395 10,061 5,369 17,336 4,629 
 
(4) Number from (3) with a known U.S. city of employment 25,827 10,018 4,686 11,123 0 
 
(5) Number from (4) in a M.S.A. 22,944 8,880 3,673 10,348 0 
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Table 2 
  
Inter-State and Inter-Regional Migration Patterns of New S&E Ph.D.s   
 
State/Region 
Number of 
New Ph.D.s 
Trained In 
State/Region 
Number of 
New Ph.D.s 
Working In 
State/Region 
Percentage 
Gain or Loss 
Number of 
New Ph.D.s 
Produced that 
Stay In 
State/Region* 
Percent of 
New Ph.D.s 
Produced 
that Stay In 
State/Region 
Percent of 
New Ph.D.s 
Imported from 
Other 
States/Regions 
East North Central 7712 5057 -34.4% 3065 39.7% 39.4% 
Illinois 2181 1576 -27.7% 717 32.9% 54.5% 
Indiana 1113 580 -47.9% 213 19.1% 63.3% 
Michigan 1544 1079 -30.1% 519 33.6% 51.9% 
Ohio 1807 1243 -31.2% 633 35.0% 49.1% 
Wisconsin 1067 579 -45.7% 287 26.9% 50.4% 
  
East South Central 1736 1288 -25.8% 656 37.8% 49.1% 
Alabama 562 349 -37.9% 196 34.9% 43.8% 
Kentucky 318 246 -22.6% 96 30.2% 61.0% 
Mississippi 279 199 -28.7% 68 24.4% 65.8% 
Tennessee 577 494 -14.4% 209 36.2% 57.7% 
  
Mid Atlantic 6610 5737 -13.2% 3033 45.9% 47.1% 
New Jersey 906 1322 45.9% 301 33.2% 77.2% 
New York 3524 2739 -22.3% 1390 39.4% 49.3% 
Pennsylvania 2180 1676 -23.1% 701 32.2% 58.2% 
  
Mountain 2447 2227 -9.0% 993 40.6% 55.4% 
Arizona 681 468 -31.3% 207 30.4% 55.8% 
Colorado 895 768 -14.2% 330 36.9% 57.0% 
Idaho 78 106 35.9% 32 41.0% 69.8% 
Montana 101 80 -20.8% 18 17.8% 77.5% 
Nevada 10 70 600.0% ** ** ** 
New Mexico 255 447 75.3% 104 40.8% 76.7% 
Utah 325 233 -28.3% 104 32.0% 55.4% 
Wyoming 102 55 -46.1% 25 24.5% 54.5% 
  
New England 3448 3643 5.7% 1504 43.6% 58.7% 
Connecticut 619 647 4.5% 175 28.3% 73.0% 
Maine 65 90 38.5% 27 41.5% 70.0% 
Massachusetts 2271 2502 10.2% 902 39.7% 63.9% 
New Hampshire 158 146 -7.6% 37 23.4% 74.7% 
Rhode Island 265 175 -34.0% 56 21.1% 68.0% 
Vermont 70 83 18.6% 21 30.0% 74.7% 
  
Other 46 72 56.5% 29 63.0% 59.7% 
Puerto Rico 46 72 56.5% 29 63.0% 59.7% 
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Pacific 6862 7637 11.3% 3988 58.1% 47.8% 
Alaska 37 41 10.8% 17 45.9% 58.5% 
California 5435 6195 14.0% 3112 57.3% 49.8% 
Hawaii 109 94 -13.8% 41 37.6% 56.4% 
Oregon 467 485 3.9% 142 30.4% 70.7% 
Washington 814 822 1.0% 291 35.7% 64.6% 
  
South Atlantic 6508 6092 -6.4% 3247 49.9% 46.7% 
Delaware 186 175 -5.9% 39 21.0% 77.7% 
District of 
Columbia 319 420 31.7% 53 16.6% 87.4% 
Florida 1130 809 -28.4% 411 36.4% 49.2% 
Georgia 1017 731 -28.1% 320 31.5% 56.2% 
Maryland 1104 1649 49.4% 429 38.9% 74.0% 
North Carolina 1286 1060 -17.6% 471 36.6% 55.6% 
South Carolina 381 289 -24.1% 124 32.5% 57.1% 
Virginia 950 830 -12.6% 325 34.2% 60.8% 
West Virginia 135 129 -4.4% 39 28.9% 69.8% 
  
West North Central 3042 2190 -28.0% 1173 38.6% 46.4% 
Iowa 644 331 -48.6% 164 25.5% 50.5% 
Kansas 388 233 -39.9% 112 28.9% 51.9% 
Minnesota 894 781 -12.6% 330 36.9% 57.7% 
Missouri 708 566 -20.1% 241 34.0% 57.4% 
Nebraska 267 169 -36.7% 80 30.0% 52.7% 
North Dakota 105 66 -37.1% 26 24.8% 60.6% 
South Dakota 36 44 22.2% 7 19.4% 84.1% 
  
West South Central 3259 2934 -10.0% 1518 46.6% 48.3% 
Arkansas 123 134 8.9% 43 35.0% 67.9% 
Louisiana 516 316 -38.8% 164 31.8% 48.1% 
Oklahoma 299 219 -26.8% 100 33.4% 54.3% 
Texas 2321 2265 -2.4% 1066 45.9% 52.9% 
  
SUM/MEANS U.S. 41670 36877 -11.5% n/a n/a n/a 
 
* The number of new Ph.D.s staying in region includes Ph.D.s who travels between states within a region. 
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Table 3 
 
Top 25 MSAs in Terms of Production and Employment 
 
PRODUCTION EMPLOYMENT 
MSA 
Number 
Produced 
Number 
Produced 
who are 
Employed 
in MSA 
Percent 
Who 
Stay in 
MSA MSA 
Number 
Employed 
Number 
Employed 
who were 
Trained in 
MSA 
Percent 
Who 
Were 
Trained 
in MSA 
Boston, MA-NH  1808 446 24.7% Boston, MA-NH  1390 446 32.1% 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA  1374 371 27.0% San Jose, CA  1269 261 20.6% 
Chicago, IL  1301 338 26.0% Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA  883 371 42.0% 
New York, NY  1217 267 21.9% Chicago, IL  790 338 42.8% 
Oakland, CA  1012 126 12.5% New York, NY  780 267 34.2% 
Washington, DC-MD-VA  924 182 19.7% Philadelphia, PA-NJ  567 178 31.4% 
Madison, WI  921 141 15.3% Washington, DC-MD-VA  503 182 36.2% 
San Jose, CA  871 261 30.0% Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI  491 206 42.0% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI  845 206 24.4% Oakland, CA  485 126 26.0% 
Champaign-Urbana, IL  812 97 11.9% San Francisco, CA  466 57 12.2% 
Greensboro-Winston-Salem,NC 799 150 18.8% Houston, TX  448 101 22.5% 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ  776 178 22.9% Greensboro-Winston-Salem,NC 427 150 35.1% 
Ann Arbor, MI 773 124 16.0% Seattle, WA  418 162 38.8% 
Austin, TX  724 129 17.8% Baltimore, MD  389 111 28.5% 
Pittsburgh, PA  706 152 21.5% Dallas, TX  380 99 26.1% 
Atlanta, GA  700 155 22.1% San Diego, CA  356 133 37.4% 
Lafayette-West Lafayette, IN 656 61 9.3% Austin, TX  339 129 38.1% 
Seattle, WA  643 162 25.2% Ann Arbor, MI  337 124 36.8% 
Baltimore, MD 617 111 18.0% Atlanta, GA  332 155 46.7% 
Columbus, OH  581 110 18.9% Pittsburgh, PA  330 152 46.1% 
San Diego, CA  579 133 23.0% Newark, NJ  325 21 6.5% 
State College, PA  578 69 11.9% New Haven-Meriden, CT  292 60 20.5% 
Sacramento, CA  517 104 20.1% St. Louis, MO-IL  287 93 32.4% 
Tucson, AZ  475 78 16.4% Madison, WI  271 141 52.0% 
Gainesville, FL  472 71 15.0% Raleigh-Durham, NC  252 109 43.3% 
Sum Top 25 20681 4222 20.4% Sum Top 25 12807 4172 32.6% 
Sum Non-Top 25 17096 3002 17.6% Sum Non-Top 25 10155 3052 30.1% 
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Table 4 
 
MSA Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Definition Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Natural Amenities      
JanSun Mean number of hours of January Sunlight  152 40.2 
JanTemp Mean January Temperature in degrees Fahrenheit 36.7 15.4 
JulRH Mean Relative Humidity in July 57.1 15.2 
JulTemp Mean July Temperatures in degrees Fahrenheit 75.8 5.4 
PWater Percent of an MSA’s surface area covered by water. 8.1 13.1 
Coast Dummy Variable indicating whether MSA borders Atlantic or Pacific Ocean 0.22 0.41 
Publicly Provided Amenities     
Vcrime 
Mean number of reported murders, robberies and assaults per 100,000 residents, 
1997-1999 562 312 
Parkacre 
Acres of protected parkland (in thousands) within 25 miles of MSA border in 
1999 4.35 23.2 
BadAQ Number of Days that Air Quality Index was labeled as unhealthy in 1999 8.2 10.8 
Supfund Number of “Superfund” Sites on EPA’s National Priority List, 1997-1999 3.1 5.7 
ArtEnt 
Number of art, entertainment, and recreation enterprises per 100,000 residents in 
1998 36 13.9 
Comtime Mean commute time to work in minutes in MSA in 1999 22.7 3.8 
PupTeach Student to Teacher Ratios for K-12 in 1998 17.2 2.8 
Studexp Expenditures per student (in thousands) enrolled in K-12 in 1998 5.99 1.2 
Other City Characteristics     
NStudnts Total number of students enrolled in K-12 in 1998 per 100 residents 17.0 2.8 
MSASize Geographic Size of MSA in square miles (in thousands) 2.31 3.25 
PopDens Number of residents (in hundreds) per square mile in MSA in 2000 4.44 0.93 
PerDem 
Percent of votes in the MSA congressional elections between 1997 and 1999 that 
were cast for a democratic candidate or against a republican candidate  46.4 16.6 
PerBach Percent of residents age 25 and above in 2000 with a bachelor's degree or higher 23.8 7.4 
Pnonwhite Percent of residents in MSA in 2000 that are not Caucasian 20.3 12.2 
Pforborn Percent of residents in MSA in 2000 that were not born in the U.S. 7.4 7.4 
HighEd Number of 4 year colleges or universities in MSA in 1997 3.4 5.5 
Pats Number of Utility Patents Granted in MSA in 1998 per 100,000 residents 28.0 32.3 
Regions     
NorthAtl Dummy Variable indicating whether MSA lies in North Atlantic Region of U.S. 0.18 0.39 
SouthAtl Dummy Variable indicating whether MSA lies in South Atlantic Region of U.S. 0.18 0.39 
NorthCen Dummy Variable indicating whether MSA lies in North Central Region of U.S. 0.23 0.42 
SouthCen* Dummy Variable indicating whether MSA lies in South Central Region of U.S. 0.21 0.41 
Mount Dummy Variable indicating whether MSA lies in Mountain Region of U.S. 0.08 0.26 
Pacific Dummy Variable indicating whether MSA lies in Pacific Region of U.S. 0.12 0.33 
 
*SouthCen is the benchmark dummy in all of the models.
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CHAPTER 4 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
 
This chapter explains the process used to estimate Ph.D.s’ income and housing 
expenditures, and presents results from the estimation of private consumption in their 
observed MSAs.47  Because the SED does not offer data on individual salaries or housing 
expenditures, these are estimated separately using alternative data sources.  The data used 
to estimate Ph.D. salary comes from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR), which 
provides the demographic and career information of approximately 30,000 employed 
Ph.D.s biennially.  The sample drawn from the SDR includes full-time employed S&E 
Ph.D.s in the U.S. in the 1997 and 1999 datasets.48  From this sample of full-time 
employed Ph.D.s, wage equations are estimated that relate characteristics of an employee 
and their job to their annual salary.   
This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section A describes the SDR data used to 
estimate annual salary and the specification of the salary equations for Ph.D.s by sector of 
employment.  Because the SDR only reports the U.S. employment state of industrial 
Ph.D.s (not city), the estimated salaries of industrial Ph.D.s are adjusted to account for 
the expected variations in income across MSAs.  Section B explains the process used to 
                                                 
47 As discussed in Chapter 2, the estimation and inclusion of composite consumption plays a vital role in 
the analysis.  The RUM uses a vector of city characteristics, as well as the expected private consumption, to 
model Ph.D.s’ choice of city.  The model implicitly assumes that to keep utility constant, Ph.D.s’ require 
higher private consumption levels in cities with lower amenity quality, and vice versa.  The coefficient on 
composite consumption represents an individual’s marginal utility of income, and is needed to estimate 
willingness to pay for changes to amenity quality.  
48 There are 10,447 observations that are in both the 1997 and 1999 SDR datasets.  For these observations, 
we use the more recent 1999 information in the analysis. 
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adjust the salaries of industrial Ph.D.s.   Section C reports the coefficient estimates from 
the salary regressions for each sector.  Finally, section D explains how Ph.D.s’ housing 
expenditures are estimated and reports the predicted measures of private consumption.  
 
A. The Salary Equations 
Each sector of employment is considered a separate market.  The relevant 
variables that influence expected salary, as well as the way in which job and individual 
characteristics are capitalized into salary differ across sectors. Thus, the explanatory 
variables used to predict salary differ across sectors.  All variables included in the salary 
equations for each sector of employment are defined in Table 5.   
 Means and standard deviations of explanatory variables for both datasets are 
reported in Table 6.  The table indicates that there are considerable differences between 
the two datasets, but most of these differences are anticipated.  For instance, new Ph.D.s 
in the SED are on average 14 years younger than doctorates in the SDR, and the SED is 
composed of a much larger proportion of postdocs (45% in the SED compared to 8% in 
the SDR).  Ph.D.s in the SDR, most of whom already completed their postdocs, contains 
a much larger proportion of scientists employed in faculty positions (45% in the SDR to 
16% in the SED).  Regarding personal characteristics, the SDR is composed of a higher 
proportion of married Ph.D.s, males, whites, and U.S. citizens, while new Ph.D.s in the 
SED are more likely to have been trained in computer science, and to have earned their 
degree from a top- ranked, public institution.49   
                                                 
49 Top fields are based on the 1995 National Research Council (NRC) rankings for all fields except 
medicine and agriculture.  The rankings for the majority of fields are based on the “scholarly quality” 
scores in the NRC rankings for each relevant program at institutions.  For field definitions that were 
broader than the program definitions in the NRC rankings (such as biology), we calculated the mean for 
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 Salaries of Ph.D.s in a faculty position are predicted using characteristics of the 
individual and their institution of employment.   To control for amenity quality as well as 
unobserved heterogeneity among MSAs, the salary equation includes indicators for the 
MSA location.   Some MSAs are aggregated because they contain a very small number of 
observations.  An MSA is identified separately only if 35 or more Ph.D.s are observed in 
the MSA.  Of the 198 MSAs that employ at least one Ph.D. in full-time academe, 84 
MSAs employ 35 or more Ph.D.s.   The remaining 114 small MSAs are aggregated with 
all other small MSAs in the same region.  Similarly, all Ph.D.s not employed in a 
metropolitan area, or “non-MSAs,” are grouped into a single dummy with other non-
MSAs in the same region.  Thus, each full-time academic Ph.D. is identified in one of 
102 location dummies for the OLS salary equation:  84 dummies for large MSAs, 9 
regional dummies for small MSAs, and 9 regional dummies for non-MSAs.50   
 The specification of the salary equation for full-time academic Ph.D.s is: 
ijiiWij
J
jij FXPwkxpw εγγγγγϑ +++++Σ= = }{ '4'3'2101     (21) 
where ijw is the annual salary for individual i in location j, ijϑ  is equal to one if individual 
i lives in location j, wkxp measures labor market experience, 
WP
WP  is a vector of employer 
characteristics, such as Carnegie Classification and institutional rankings, iX is a vector 
of individual characteristics including gender, marital status, and race, and iF
iF
represents a 
                                                                                                                                                 
each rated program applicable to our broader field for each institution.  For the fields of medicine and 
agriculture, we used the 1998 NSF CASPAR data to rank institutions, due to the absence of data for these 
fields in the NRC rankings.  Institutions in these fields were ranked by total federal R&D expenditures at 
each institution.  In the case of biology and medicine, which have a very large number of Ph.D. programs, 
75 institutions were included among the top programs.  For smaller fields, such as astronomy, the top 
category includes the top 25 programs. In most other fields, the top category includes the top 50 programs.  
50 Each of the 102 locations employ more than 35 Ph.D.s. 
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Ph.D.’s field of training.51  Note that the work experience variable, wkxp, equals one for 
all Ph.D.s in the SED, and some Ph.D.s in the SDR are also in their first year on the 
market.  Thus, salary is predicted out of sample, but not out of range of the SDR. 
  Estimating salary for Ph.D.s in industry is more complicated than for the 
academic sector because we do not know the MSA of employment for industrial Ph.D.s 
in the SDR; only the U.S. state of employment is known.52   Therefore, the salaries of 
industrial Ph.D.s are estimated using individual characteristics, characteristics of the 
institution of degree, and location dummies for the nine U.S. regions.53  The salary 
equation for industrial Ph.D.s takes the form: 
isiisis
S
sis FXPwkxpw εγγγγγϑ +++++Σ= = }{ '4'3'2101     (22) 
where isw is the annual salary for individual i in region s, isϑ is equal to one if individual i 
lives in region s, wkxp is work experience, sP  
sW
are characteristics of the Ph.D. granting 
institution such as Carnegie Classifications, iX represents demographic characteristics 
and iF  is field of training.  The estimated salaries of industrial Ph.D.s are adjusted to 
account for the expected variation across MSAs.  This is discussed further in Section 2 of 
this chapter.   
 Unlike the salaries of industrial and full-time academic Ph.D.s, postdoc salaries 
are relatively constant across cities, and most of the variations occur across fields and 
                                                 
51 Characteristics of the Ph.D. granting institution were initially included in the estimated wage equation for 
full-time academics.  However, we did not include them in the final specification because F-tests indicated 
that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero at the 90% level of confidence.  
52 The SDR only codes the state of employment, not the city. We are able to determine the city of 
employment for academic Ph.D.s in the SDR through their institution, but there is no indicator in the SDR 
that allows us to determine the city location of industrial Ph.D.s.   
53 Initially the industrial wage equation used state of employment rather than region of employment.  
However, F-tests indicated that the coefficients on states within regions are jointly equal to zero at the 90% 
confidence level for all regions excluding the Pacific. 
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institutions.  Thus, postdoc salaries are predicted using field of training and 
characteristics of the employing institution, but do not include controls for the employer 
location.  The salary equation for postdocs equals:   
iiWi FPw εγγγ +++= '21'0         (23) 
where iw  is the annual salary of postdoc i, WP are characteristics of the institution of 
employment, and
iF
iF  is a Ph.D.’s field of training. 
 
B. Adjusting Salary of Industrial Ph.D.s 
Recall, the salary equation for industrial Ph.D.s does not include location 
dummies at the MSA level of detail, only at the regional level.  These predicted salaries 
will be biased if there is variation in salaries across MSAs within a region.  For example, 
a Ph.D. in the Southeast would likely earn more in Atlanta, GA than in Macon, GA.  The 
salary equation for industrial Ph.D.s, by using location dummies for regions, can predict 
the salaries of Ph.D.s in the Southeast; however, this prediction underestimates the true 
earnings of Ph.D.s in Atlanta, GA and overestimates the expected earnings of Ph.D.s in 
Macon, GA.  To account for the variation in earnings across MSAs, the predicted salary 
of Ph.D.s in a region are weighted by a measure of the expected variation in earnings in 
each MSA relative to the mean earnings in the region.   
The fact that we do not know the location distribution of Ph.D.s in the SDR 
further complicates the prediction of industrial Ph.D.’s salary.  When there is a large 
proportion of Ph.D.s in one MSA, the predicted measure of regional salaries will be 
biased toward that MSA.  For instance, because a larger proportion of industrial Ph.D.s in 
the Southeast finds employment in a dominant MSA like Atlanta compared to a small 
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MSA like Macon, the predicted salary for a Ph.D. in the Southeast will likely be a closer 
estimate to the salaries Ph.D.s in Atlanta than of Ph.D.s in Macon.  Further, to weight the 
predicted salary of Ph.D.s in the Southeast solely by an exogenous wage adjustment in 
each MSA will overestimate the wages of Ph.D.s in Atlanta (more dominant MSAs 
where Ph.D.s earn more), and underestimate the wages of Ph.D.s in Macon (less 
dominant MSAs where Ph.D.s earn less).  Thus, in addition to applying an exogenous 
adjustment for variation in salary, the final salary estimate of industrial Ph.D.s salary also 
accounts for the expected share of Ph.D.s in each MSA. 
 To further clarify the issue, consider the following example.  Assume the 
predicted salary of Ph.D.s in the Southeast ( swˆ ) is equal to $100,000.  Furthermore, 
Ph.D.s in Atlanta earn 30% more on average than other Ph.D.s in the Southeast, and 80% 
of Ph.D.s in the Southeast are located in Atlanta.54   If we were to adjust swˆ  for Ph.D.s in 
Atlanta solely by the 30% differential measure, their new salary estimate will be 
$130,000.  However, because 80% of industrial Ph.D.s are observed in Atlanta, the 
$100,000 estimate for Ph.D.s in the Southeast is much closer to the true salary of Ph.D.s 
in Atlanta than all other MSAs.  Thus, $130,000 is an overestimate of the true salaries of 
Ph.D.s in Atlanta.   In this example, the predicted salary of industrial Ph.D.s in Atlanta 
should be increased to account for the fact that Ph.D.s earn more in Atlanta than 
elsewhere in the Southeast, but decreased to account for the fact that swˆ is skewed toward 
Atlanta.  Thus, salaries of industrial Ph.D.s are adjusted to correct for both the variation 
in wages across MSAs, as well as the location distribution of Ph.D.s in a region. 
                                                 
54 The actual percent of Ph.D.s in Atlanta is much lower (about 20%); we assume that 80% located in 
Atlanta just to demonstrate the issue. 
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 To calculate the expected variation in earnings and the share of Ph.D.s in each 
MSA, the 5% 2000 Census Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS) is used.55  The variation in 
earnings in MSA j is measured as: 
s
sj
js w
ww
C
−+=1            (24) 
where jw  is the mean salary of industrial Ph.D.s in MSA j, and sw is the mean salary of 
industrial Ph.D.s in region s.   
 The city location choices of all industrial Ph.D.s from the 5% 2000 Census PUMS 
are used to measure the share of Ph.D.s in each city.56  This equals:  
s
j
js N
n
S −= 1                (25) 
where jn is the number of Ph.D.s observed in MSA j, and sN is the number of Ph.D.s 
observed in region s.  Next, each industrial Ph.D.s’ competitive regional salary is 
estimated as: 
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=
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where iswˆ is the predicted wage for Ph.D. i in industry, jsC  measures the expected 
variation in salary in MSA j relative to the mean wages in region s, and jsS  measures the 
population distribution across MSAs in region s.  The variable sw~  represents the 
competitive regional salary of Ph.D.s, or the expected salary in a region if there were no 
                                                 
55 The 5% Census PUMS offers data on the mean earnings of a sample of industrial Ph.D.s in all U.S. 
MSAs in 2000 (Census of Population and Housing, U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce). 
56 Note, here we are assuming that the location choices of industrial Ph.D.s in the Census PUMS data 
accurately represent the location choice of industrial Ph.D.s in the SDR. 
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variation in salary across MSAs.  Substituting equations (24) and (25) into (26) yields the 
competitive salary of Ph.D. i in region s: 
isw~ = ∑∑ == ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
=
n
j
s
sj
s
j
is
n
j jsjs
is
w
ww
N
n
w
CS
w
1
1 1*1
ˆ
)*(
ˆ
     (27) 
 Intuitively, equation (27) states that a Ph.D.’s competitive salary in a region is 
equal to her predicted salary over the weighted sum of the expected variations in salary 
for all MSAs in that region.  Finally, the expected salary for all industrial Ph.D.s equals 
the competitive salary in region s isw~ , weighted by jsC , the variation in salary in MSA j 
relative to the mean salary in region s: 
jsisij Cww *~ˆ =           (28) 
 
C. Salary Estimation Results 
 Table 7 presents the results from the OLS salary equations for all three 
employment sectors.  In both academe and industry, the coefficients for the linear and 
square term of work experience are positive and significant, suggesting that salary 
increases at an increasing rate with job experience.  Controlling for work experience, age 
negatively affects salary, although the age penalty decreases as one gets older.  Personal 
characteristics such as citizenship, marital status, and race, do not have a statistically 
significant relationship with salary among either academic or industrial scientists.  In 
addition, males are found to earn more than females in both sectors, and Ph.D.s who are 
married with at least one child have higher salaries than single people in academe, 
however this relationship is not significant in industry.  
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 The estimated coefficients on field of training are consistent across sectors.  For 
instance, engineers and computer scientists have higher salaries than the benchmark, 
biologists, in all sectors.  Chemical engineers earn the most of full-time academics, while 
computer scientists earn the most of industrial scientists and postdocs, everything else 
constant.  By way of contrast, none of the field coefficients are negative and significant 
relative to the benchmark (biology) in academe or industry.  The coefficient on chemistry 
is negative and significant in the postdoc sector. 
Table 8 reports the mean predicted salaries of new Ph.D.s in each sector by field 
of training.  As expected, industrial Ph.D.s earn more on average than their counterparts 
in academe.  The average salary of an industrial Ph.D. in the SDR is slightly over 
$88,000, and the mean predicted salary is $67,504 for a Ph.D. in industry in their first 
year.    Faculty in the SDR earn approximately $66,600 on average, and the mean 
predicted earnings for new faculty is $44,854.57  Postdocs have the lowest earnings of 
three sectors.   The average an annual salary of postdocs in the SDR is approximately 
$30,000, and $27,724 for postdocs in their first year.   
The estimates in Table 8 show that there is a large disparity in average salaries 
across fields of training. The predicted mean salaries of computer scientists are the 
highest of all fields in all three sectors.  The difference between the mean salary of 
computer scientists and the mean salary of all other fields is more than $20,000 for 
postdocs and Ph.D.s in the industrial sector.  The strong predicted earnings of computer 
scientists likely reflects the time period of the analysis, when the technology bubble was 
at its peak and there was a particularly strong demand for highly trained computer 
scientists.  The estimated earnings are consistently high for engineers, particularly in the 
                                                 
57 Note that the predicted salary of faculty represents their 12 month salary. 
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two academic sectors.  New chemists have the lowest average salary in the postdoc sector 
and the second lowest salary to astronomers in full-time academe.  In industry, 
agricultural scientists have the lowest predicted salary, more than $30,000 less than the 
expected salary of computer scientists.   
To gauge the accuracy of our salary predictions, Table 9 compares the predicted 
salaries in eight S&E fields across sectors to those from a 1998 survey on Ph.D. starting 
salaries performed by the Commission on Professionals in Science and Technology 
(CPST).58   Our median salary predictions in these eight fields are relatively consistent 
with the results from the CPST study.   For instance, of the twenty-four comparable 
medians between the CPST study and our estimates, ten are within 5% of the other, 
twenty-one are within 10%, and all of our predicted salaries are within 35% of the results 
from the CPST survey.   
In addition, the relative differences between salaries across fields are highly 
consistent between the CPST survey and our predictions.  For example, in both the CPST 
survey and our predictions, computer scientists have the highest median salary of all 
fields in industry and in the postdoc sector, chemical engineers have the highest salary in 
academe, biochemists and molecular biologists have the lowest salary in industry, and 
chemists have the lowest of all postdocs.  Based on this comparison, we believe that the 
predicted salaries of Ph.D.s are within a reasonable range of the actual starting salaries of 
Ph.D.s in the sample. 
 
 
                                                 
58 Source:  "Employment of Recent Doctoral Graduates in Science and Engineering." Commission on 
Professionals in Science and Technology. August, 1998.  
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D. Housing Payments 
 To impute annual housing payments we use the 5% 2000 Census PUMS, which 
offers mean monthly mortgage payments and monthly rents in all U.S. MSAs for several 
income brackets.59  Ph.D.s expected housing costs are based on the mean housing 
expenditures of people with similar incomes.60  Specifically, each Ph.D. is categorized 
into an income bracket based on their predicted salary, and their housing expenditures are 
defined as the mean rents or mortgage payments of all people in an MSA that are in their 
income bracket.   
Because predicted incomes of postdocs are generally much lower than Ph.D.s in 
the other sectors, and they are likely to move to a new city once they complete their 
postdoc, we assume all postdocs rent an apartment rather than purchase a home.  Thus, a 
postdoc’s housing cost estimate is given by the mean annual rents (not mortgage 
payments) in an MSA for the following four income brackets: $10,000-$19,999, $20,000-
$29,999, $30,000-$44,999, and $45,000-$64,999.  
Conversely, faculty and industrial positions are more permanent than postdoctoral 
appointments, and Ph.D.s in these sectors are more likely to have purchased a home (or 
eventually will purchase a home) in their MSA.61 Thus, the housing expenditure estimate 
for industrial Ph.D.s and faculty is given by the mean annual mortgage payments in an 
                                                 
59 The 5% PUMS has 51 separate datasets for the 50 states and Washington D.C.  For the 39 MSAs that 
cross state lines, we calculate a weighted mean of rents in that MSA based on the number of people located 
in each state.   
60 As opposed to relating housing costs with education level which would require the stringent assumption 
that all people with a Ph.D. buy similar housing, regardless of income level.  We could not use both 
education and income levels to define housing costs due to Census confidentiality restrictions.   
61 The assumption here is not that all industrial and full-time academic Ph.D.s immediately buy a home in 
their MSA, but rather, that they base their decision of where to live on the cost of purchasing a home in 
each MSA, not the cost of renting an apartment. 
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MSA for the following income brackets:  $20,000-$34,999, $35,000-$49,999, $50,000-
$64,999, $65,000-$74,999, and $75,000 and above.   
The final measure of private consumption also accounts for the expected amount 
Ph.D.s pay in taxes in their MSA.  Thus, Ph.D.s’ predicted salary is reduced by the 
expected amount to be paid in both federal and state income taxes, and for homeowners, 
the expected amount paid in property taxes in their MSA.62  Table 10 reports the final 
estimates of after tax income, housing expenditures and private consumption for all 
Ph.D.s by sector.63   Housing expenditures account for approximately one third of a 
Ph.D.s net income, and this figure is proportionally consistent across the three sectors.  
The mean private consumption of all Ph.D.s is approximately $22,000.    Industrial 
Ph.D.s, who generally pay more in taxes and are more likely to locate in larger MSAs 
with higher housing costs and property taxes, have an estimated average private 
consumption of $31,316.  The average composite consumption of faculty and postdocs is 
$21,273 and $14,228, respectively. 
 
                                                 
62 Both federal and state income taxes come from the Federation of Tax Administrators (1999). The data for 
property taxes comes from the 1999 Places Rated Almanac, which offers the average amount a household 
with $75,000 income will pay in property taxes in all MSAs. 
63 The average composite consumption changes when different alternative cities are selected into Ph.D.s’ 
choice sets.  The measures reported in Table 11 are for Ph.D.s observed city choices. 
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Table 5 
 
Definitions of Variables Included in Wage Equations  
by Sector of Employment* 
 
Variable 
Name Variable Description Industry 
FT 
Academe Postdoc
Salary Annual Income of Ph.D. in 1997 or 1999 XX XX XX 
Demographic Characteristics: 
Wkexp Years of work experience X X  
Wkexpsq Years of work experience squared X X  
Age Age of the individual  X X  
Agesq Age of the individual squared X X  
Citizen 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is a U.S. 
citizen X X  
Married Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is married X X  
Wchild 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is married 
with at least one child X X  
Male Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is male X X  
White Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is white X X  
Asian 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is Asian 
or pacific islander X X  
Fields of Training: 
Aere 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was aerospace engineering X X X 
Chee 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was chemical engineering X X X 
Cive 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was civil engineering X X X 
Elee 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was electrical engineering X X X 
Mece 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was mechanical engineering X X X 
Oeng 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was other engineering X X X 
Astr 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was astronomy X X X 
Agri 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was agriculture X X X 
Biol** 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was biology X X X 
Chem 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was chemistry X X X 
Phys 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was physics X X X 
Math 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was mathematics X X X 
Comp 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was computer science X X X 
Earth 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was earth science X X X 
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Medi 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was in a medical related field X X X 
Characteristics of Ph.D. Granting Institution: 
PrivPh.D. 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not  an individual received 
their Ph.D. from a private institution X X  
Top110Ph.D. 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual received 
their Ph.D. from a top 110 institution X X  
TopfldPh.D. 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual received 
their Ph.D. from a top ranked institution their field X X  
Ru1Ph.D. a  Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding 
degree is Research University I. X X  
Ru2Ph.D. Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding 
degree is Research University II X X  
Doc1Ph.D. Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding 
degree is Doctoral Granting I. X X  
Doc2Ph.D. Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding 
degree is Doctoral Granting II. X X  
MedicoPh.D.
** 
Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding 
degree is Medical school or anything besides Ru1, Ru2, Doc1 and 
Doc2 dummies. X X  
Characteristics of Employing Institution: 
Privemp 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual works for 
a private institution  X X 
Top110emp 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual works for 
a top 110 institution  X X 
Topfldemp 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual works for 
a top ranked institution their field  X X 
Ru1emp Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school of 
employment is Research University I.  X X 
Ru2emp Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school of 
employment is Research University II  X X 
Doc1emp Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school of 
employment is Doctoral Granting I.  X X 
Doc2emp Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school of 
employment is Doctoral Granting II.  X X 
Compemp Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school of 
employment is a Comprehensive institution.  X X 
Libartemp Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school of 
employment is a Liberal Arts Institution.  X X 
Mediemp** Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school of 
employment is a Medical school.   X X 
Otheremp Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school of 
employment is Ru1, Ru2, Doc1 and Doc2, Comp, Libart, or Medi.  X X 
 
×× Indicates the variable is a dependent variable included in the equation 
× Indicates the variable is an explanatory variable included in the equation 
**Indicates the benchmark or control group.  
a) We use the Carnegie classifications of institutions as coded in the Survey of Earned Doctorates. 
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Table 6 
 
Means by Sector from the SED and SDR 1997 -1999 
 
 Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED)  Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR)* 
Variable 
Al Sectors 
(n=22903) 
Industry 
(n=8873) 
Full-Time 
Academe 
(n=3681) 
Postdoc 
(n=10349)   
ALL 
Sectors 
(n=413892) 
Industry 
(n=206411) 
Full-Time 
Academe 
(n=183966) 
Postdoc 
(n=23515) 
SALARY n/a n/a n/a n/a   77129 90187 68460 30331 
Demographic Characteristics:   
wkexp 1 1 1 1   14.8 14.1 17.0 2.7 
wkexpsq 1 1 1 1   327.0 296.4 401.7 10.7 
Age 32.7 32.31 36.02 31.77   46.1 45.3 48.5 34.7 
Agesq 1096 1068 1356 1026   2229 2145 2451 1229 
Citizen 0.62 0.55 0.82 0.61   0.85 0.82 0.92 0.65 
Married 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.54   0.81 0.83 0.81 0.63 
Wchild 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.35   0.50 0.54 0.47 0.35 
male 0.70 0.81 0.58 0.66   0.82 0.86 0.78 0.64 
white 0.62 0.55 0.80 0.63   0.78 0.72 0.86 0.67 
asian 0.31 0.39 0.12 0.30   0.20 0.26 0.11 0.30 
Fields of Training:   
aere 0.01 0.016 0.004 0.005   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
chee 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.02   0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 
cive 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01   0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 
elee 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.02   0.07 0.10 0.04 0.01 
mece 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02   0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 
oeng 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.04   0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03 
astr 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01   0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
agri 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03   0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 
biol 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.47   0.25 0.17 0.31 0.58 
chem 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.14   0.13 0.18 0.08 0.09 
phys 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.07   0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 
math 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.04   0.07 0.04 0.10 0.03 
comp 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.01   0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 
earth 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03   0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 
medi 0.09 0.04 0.26 0.08   0.12 0.08 0.16 0.09 
Characteristics of Ph.D. Granting Institution:   
privPh.D. 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.32   0.68 0.67 0.68 0.66 
top110Ph.D. 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.86   0.60 0.60 0.59 0.80 
topPh.D.fld 0.68 0.69 0.61 0.70   0.48 0.48 0.47 0.67 
ru1Ph.D. 0.77 0.78 0.73 0.78   0.77 0.76 0.78 0.77 
ru2Ph.D. 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08   0.11 0.11 0.10 0.08 
doc1Ph.D. 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.03   0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 
doc2Ph.D. 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03   0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
medicoPh.D. 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.07   0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 
Characteristics of Employing Institution:   
privemp 0.19 n/a  0.26 0.32   0.17 n/a 0.32 0.44 
top110emp 0.49 n/a 0.49 0.90   0.29 n/a 0.55 0.88 
topempfld 0.40 n/a 0.36 0.77   0.22 n/a 0.40 0.77 
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ru1emp 0.43 n/a 0.41 0.80   0.24 n/a 0.45 0.76 
ru2emp 0.03 n/a 0.06 0.05   0.04 n/a 0.09 0.05 
doc1emp 0.01 n/a 0.04 0.01   0.02 n/a 0.05 0.01 
doc2emp 0.03 n/a 0.07 0.03   0.03 n/a 0.07 0.03 
compemp 0.04 n/a 0.21 0.01   0.08 n/a 0.18 0.01 
libartemp 0.02 n/a 0.10 0.00   0.03 n/a 0.07 0.01 
mediemp 0.03 n/a 0.03 0.06   0.03 n/a 0.06 0.09 
otheremp 0.02 n/a 0.06 0.03   0.02 n/a 0.04 0.04 
 
*Reported means are weighted in the Survey of Doctorate Recipients to represent the population of 
doctorate holders in the U.S.  No such weights exist for the Survey of Earned Doctorates. 
. 
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Table 7    
OLS Results for Salary Equation: SDR by Sector 
* (**) [***] Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% (5%) [1%] level of significance. 
  ACADEME INDUSTRY POSTDOC 
  N=10633    R-sq=0.335 N=11469        R-sq=0.209 N=1768     R-sq=0.163 
Variable Name Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 54986*** 4.33 59160*** 3.44 30391*** 36.69 
Demographic Characteristics: 
Wkexp 3106*** 3.75 7397*** 6.2 n/a n/a 
Wkexpsq 25*** 3.69 60*** 5 n/a n/a 
Age -1411** -2.43 -1157 -1.34 n/a n/a 
Agesq 24*** 3.35 23** 2.05 n/a n/a 
Citizen 1974 1.09 1220 0.67 n/a n/a 
Married 459 0.35 883 0.53 n/a n/a 
Wchild 1451 1.20 2508* 1.69 n/a n/a 
Male 2468** 2.21 3256** 2.08 n/a n/a 
White -192 -0.11 -3560 -1.19 n/a n/a 
Asian -3331 -1.46 -4672 -1.47 n/a n/a 
Fields of Training: 
Aere 7177 1.24 3924 0.78 12484*** 4.67 
Chee 19352*** 4.55 4915* 1.77 4845*** 2.91 
Cive 12889*** 4.34 3249 0.84 12192*** 6.21 
Elee 12613*** 5.38 16553*** 7.42 10078*** 6.63 
Mece 8867*** 3.12 5726** 2.13 8056*** 4.51 
Oeng 14624*** 6.32 7828*** 3.10 3732** 3.18 
Astr -1100 -0.21 3153 0.33 7238*** 4.04 
Agri 237 0.09 -2744 -0.70 934 0.82 
Chem 1296 0.62 2246 1.00 -1699** -2.42 
Phys 3362 1.45 3014 1.15 6040*** 7.64 
Math 1165 0.59 4727 1.35 9951*** 9.65 
Comp 16940*** 5.73 22482*** 6.47 15043*** 5.97 
Earth 62 0.02 -1376 -0.32 5768*** 5.18 
Medi 7574*** 5.29 8030*** 3.02 351 0.56 
Characteristics of Ph.D. Granting Institution: 
PrivPh.D. -1231 -1.10 -3963*** -3.00 n/a n/a 
Top110Ph.D. 848 0.53 146* 0.07 n/a n/a 
TopfldPh.D. -670 -0.45 2887 1.54 n/a n/a 
Ru1Ph.D. -1985 -0.85 9685*** 2.74 n/a n/a 
RU2Ph.D. -1106 -0.41 6969* 1.84 n/a n/a 
Doc1Ph.D. -5361* -1.76 6698 1.60 n/a n/a 
Doc2Ph.D. -2052 -0.61 10273** 2.37 n/a n/a 
Characteristics of Employing Institution: 
Privemp -2490* -1.85 n/a n/a 1071*** 2.89 
Top110emp -3913* -1.81 n/a n/a -1981** -2.21 
Topfldemp 2810* 1.67 n/a n/a 602 0.98 
Ru1emp 3549 1.36 n/a n/a -1128* -1.65 
Ru2emp -3536 -1.24 n/a n/a -2596** -2.42 
Doc1emp -194 -0.06 n/a n/a -4852*** -2.64 
Doc2emp -5893** -2.12 n/a n/a -2634** -2.24 
Compemp -5902** -2.44 n/a n/a -1229 -0.73 
Libartemp -7316** -2.56 n/a n/a 186 0.08 
Otheremp 1023 0.33 n/a n/a -1011.716 -0.88 
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Table 8 
 
Means and (Std. Dev.) of Predicted Salaries by Field and Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Industry FT Academe Postdocs 
All S&E 
$67,504 
(14460) 
$44,853 
(9443) 
$27,724 
(5210) 
Aerospace 
Engineering 
$64,751 
(10199) 
$47,722 
(4205) 
$34,926 
(1270) 
Chemical 
Engineering 
$62,270 
(12260) 
$55,367 
(6250) 
$31,233 
(1783) 
Civil 
Engineering 
$62,411 
(9917) 
$51,934 
(6291) 
$39,136 
(1576) 
Electrical 
Engineering 
$78,501 
(11076) 
$51,582 
(6212) 
$36,948 
(1566) 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
$63,727 
(10379) 
$46,190 
(6552) 
$36,990 
(1505) 
Other 
Engineering 
$66,054 
(11275) 
$53,629 
(7086) 
$30,529 
(1658) 
Agriculture 
$54,388 
(12751) 
$39,117 
(4926) 
$25,392 
(1677) 
Astronomy 
$63,219 
(8632) 
$36,680 
(8621) 
$35,223 
(1618) 
Biology 
$58,200 
(11399) 
$39,321 
(7037) 
$25,190 
(1761) 
Chemistry 
$60,070 
(12991) 
$37,402 
(6289) 
$23,714 
(1699) 
Computer 
Science  
$86,704 
(11717) 
$54,597 
(7618) 
$47,052 
(1742) 
Earth 
Science 
$59,854 
(8990) 
$37,967 
(7005) 
$31,893 
(1585) 
Math 
$63,748 
(11046) 
$37,640 
(6595) 
$38,813 
(1448) 
Medicine 
$63,855 
(13764) 
$48,161 
(7533) 
$26,235 
(2030) 
Physics 
$62,735 
(9769) 
$41,195 
(7763) 
$33,842 
(1582) 
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Table 9 
 
1998 CPST Median Salary Results* and OLS Median Salary Estimates 
 
 CPST Median Salaries   Our Predicted Median Salaries 
Field of training Industry 
FT 
Academe Postdoc   Industry 
FT 
Academe Postdoc 
Biochemistry & Molecular Biology   $53,000 $26,500 $25,250   $56,999 $38,879 $25,196 
Chemistry   $58,000 $34,000 $25,000   $60,149 $37,005 $23,717 
Chemical Engineering   $61,200 $64,000 $33,000   $63,184 $55,031 $31,222 
Computer Science   $72,500 $56,500 $44,000   $84,729 $54,313 $47,058 
Earth sciences   $58,600 $40,000 $34,000   $59,315 $37,890 $31,791 
Engineering   $63,600 $55,000 $35,250   $69,420 $51,467 $35,252 
Mathematics   $60,000 $49,700 $37,500   $63,063 $37,316 $38,822 
Physics   $62,000 $45,000 $36,000   $61,259 $40,759 $33,960 
 
 
* Source:  "Employment of Recent Doctoral Graduates in Science and Engineering." Commission on 
Professionals in Science and Technology. August, 1998.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
Table 10 
 
Means and (Std. Dev.) of Net Income, Housing Payments and Private Consumption 
of New Ph.D.s by Sector 
 
Sector N 
Net 
Income 
Housing 
Payments 
Private 
Consumption 
All 22679 
$33,309 
(12964) 
$11,328 
(4564) 
$21,981 
(9635) 
Industry 8801 
$46,517 
(9317) 
$15,201 
(4341) 
$31,316 
(7129) 
Full-Time 
Academe 3611 
$32,394 
(6163) 
$11,122 
(2625) 
$21,273 
(5866) 
Postdoc 10267 
$22,309 
(3554) 
$8,081 
(2004) 
$14,228 
(3793) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 RESULTS FROM RANDOM UTILITY MODEL ESTIMATION 
 
  
 
 This chapter presents results from several random utility models using the choice 
probability equations described in Chapter 2.  The primary objective of this chapter is to 
explore the effects of modeling technique on the coefficient estimates, and to establish a 
set of preferred results to be used later in Chapter 6 to compute Ph.D.s’ willingness to pay 
for changes in the level of amenities in MSAs.  Thus, this chapter focuses on the stability 
of the coefficient estimates and significance levels across models, and discusses whether 
the estimates from each model accord with prior expectations. 64    
    The chapter has several components.  Sections A and B report estimates from the 
conditional logit models that are used to determine the appropriate specifications for the 
more advanced random utility models.  Specifically, section A presents results from 
models using the full sample of all new Ph.D.s in S&E.  These are compared to the 
models presented in section B, which restrict the analysis to Ph.D.s without contractual 
obligations to a previous employer.  The models in these two sections assume preferences 
for city attributes are homogeneous across the population of Ph.D.s.  In section C, this 
assumption is relaxed and conditional logit models are estimated that account for 
observed heterogeneity in preferences by introducing interaction terms between 
individual characteristics and city attributes.
                                                 
64 All of the models presented in this chapter are estimated using NLOGIT 3.0, a separate software 
component of Limdep 7.0.   
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 Section D tests for possible IIA violation and bias to the estimates in the 
conditional logit models.  Although the test results suggest the conditional logit models 
exhibit the IIA property, less restrictive random utility models are estimated to further 
explore the impact of amenities on location choice.   Section E presents results from the 
nested logit model, and Section F presents results from the mixed (random coefficients) 
logit model.   Finally, Section G concludes with a summary of the key results of this 
chapter.  
 
A. Simple Conditional Logit Models Results 
 This section presents and compares results from several simple conditional logit 
models that estimate Ph.D. MSA choice.  We explore the robustness and consistency of 
the models to various factors that may affect the coefficient estimates.  These factors 
include: 1) choice set size (the number of alternative cities included in each Ph.D.’s 
choice set) 2) the specific set of alternative cities selected to each Ph.D.’s choice set, and 
3) the type of Ph.D.s included in the analysis.  To examine the potential influence of the 
number of alternative cities included in the estimation, separate models are estimated 
with choice sets of size six (five alternatives plus the observed city), eleven (ten 
alternatives plus the observed city), and twenty six (twenty five alternatives plus the 
observed city). 65    To examine the sensitivity of the parameters to the specific set of 
cities selected, each model is estimated using three separate draws of alternative cities for 
each choice set size.  Thus, the tables to follow present results for nine separate 
conditional logit models (3 choice set draws * 3 different sized choice sets).   
                                                 
65Recall, the choice set for each individual includes the selected alternative cities and each individual’s 
chosen city.  Duplicate cities are deleted for each individual, such that the choice set sizes are not equal 
across individuals. See Chapter 2 for a detailed description of the choice set selection process. 
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 The choice sets used in each model are selected in the same manner (as described 
in Chapter 2, Section F), and there is no basis a priori to prefer one set of results to 
another.  Theoretically, the models estimated with smaller choice sets may have biased 
coefficients if the choice sets systematically exclude relevant alternatives (cities that were 
likely to be considered by Ph.D.s).  Conversely, the models estimated with larger choice 
sets may have biased coefficients if the choice sets systematically include cities that were 
not considered as potential cities of employment by Ph.D.s.   
 Table 11 presents the coefficients estimates from the nine conditional logit 
models estimated with the full sample of Ph.D.s.  Models 1-3 (Columns 2-4 in Table 11) 
report the coefficient estimates for three models estimated with choice sets of 6 cities; 
models 4-6 (Columns 5-7) report the coefficients for three models estimated with choice 
sets of 11 cities; and models 7-9 (Columns 8-10) report the coefficients for three models 
estimated with choice sets of 26 cities. The results include an indicator of the significance 
level of each coefficient, but t-statistics and standard errors are not reported due to lack of 
space.   The estimation is conducted on the full sample of 22,666 Ph.D.s that had non-
missing values for private consumption and MSA data.  The explanatory variables are the 
same in each model. Specifically, the models estimate coefficients (preferences) for 
private consumption, distance between the location of degree and job location, and the 
twenty-eight MSA characteristics reported in Table 4.   
In all of the models, the sign of a coefficient indicates the effect of a unit increase 
in the value of the attribute on a Ph.D.s’ indirect utility function (equation 5).  For 
instance, a positive coefficient on January temperatures would indicate that Ph.D.s prefer 
warmer winters, or that MSAs with warmer winters have a higher probability of being 
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chosen by Ph.D.s, other things equal.  The coefficients imply ordinal preference for an 
attribute, however, the magnitudes of the reported coefficients are only meaningful in 
determining willingness to pay and implicit prices of city attributes, which are reported 
and discussed in the Chapter 6.  Thus, the discussion centers on the signs and significance 
levels, rather than magnitudes of the coefficients.    
Table 11 indicates that the signs of the coefficients are not sensitive to the set of 
alternative cities included in the choice set.   Of the 30 variables in the model, 21 
coefficients have the same sign in all nine regressions, and 27 have the same sign in at 
least eight of the nine models.  Although the coefficient signs are stable across choice 
sets, there is noticeable variation in the significance levels of the coefficients across 
models.  In general, the standard errors decrease as the choice set size increases. At least 
19 of the 30 coefficients are significant at the 10% level or better in all of the models that 
are estimated with 25 alternative cities in the choice set.  No more than 16 coefficients 
are significant when the models are estimated with 10 alternative cities, and there are 
never more than 14 significant coefficients when the models are estimated with only 5 
alternative cities.66    
 As indicated in Table 11, the coefficient on private consumption (compcons), 
which is particularly important for estimating implicit prices and willingness to pay, is 
reliably positive and significant at the 5% level or better in all nine models.  This result 
indicates that new Ph.D.s prefer cities where they can expect to receive a higher net 
income, other things equal.   The variable distance is included to control for the direct 
and psychological costs associated with migrating to a new city.  The psychological costs 
                                                 
66Feather (1994) and Parsons and Kealy (1992) also find stable coefficients across models with different 
sized choice sets, and that the standard errors decrease as choice set size increases. 
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associated with moving are arguably lower for a Ph.D. at the time of degree than it would 
be during other times in their career due to the fact that a number of a new Ph.D.’s peers 
are also likely to be moving at the same time.  The effect of distance variable is also 
related to a number of observable characteristics, such as marital status, age, etc., as well 
as a number of unobservable characteristics, such as how distance moved will influence 
an individual’s ability to collaborate on research projects with their adviser.67  As 
expected, the coefficient on distance is negative and significant at the 1% level in all nine 
models, suggesting that Ph.D.s are more likely to locate in cities that are geographically 
closer to where they receive their degree.68    
 With the exception of percent of lakes and streams (PWater) and hours of January 
sunlight (JanSun), the signs of the coefficients on natural amenities are consistent with 
prior expectations.   The coefficient on JanSun is consistently negative, and significant at 
the 10% level or better in five of the nine models.  Cragg and Kahn (1997) also find 
mixed results for their ‘sunshine’ variable.  Specifically, of the twelve model results 
presented by the authors, the coefficient on the comparable variable is either not 
statistically significant or negative in nine of the models.  The coefficient estimates for 
JanSun likely does not accurately represent the true preference for sunlight in winter, but 
rather, is likely capturing the influence of an unobserved variable.  One possibility is the 
“Pacific Northwest” (NW) effect.  That is, MSAs in the Pacific NW region (Washington 
and Oregon) have a relatively low amount of January sunlight, but are large employers of 
                                                 
67 The hybrid models presented in Section 3 of this chapter introduce controls for heterogeneity on the 
distance variable. 
68 Although this makes intuitive sense, an additional model was estimated to assess the robustness of the 
distance effect.  Specifically, the coefficient on distance remains negative and significant when the sample 
excludes Ph.D.s who stay in the same state after degree.  This suggests that the further an MSA is from a 
Ph.D.’s current location, the less likely it will be chosen by Ph.D.s who migrate to a new state.  
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S&E Ph.D.s.   Thus, the negative coefficient on JanSun may reflect a preference for the 
shared unobserved characteristics within the Pacific NW.  To test for this, we also 
estimated additional models with a separate indicator for the Pacific NW region.69 The 
coefficients on JanSun are not statistically significant in all of these models, and the 
coefficient on Pacific NW is positive and significant.  These results suggest that the 
negative coefficients on JanSun are at least somewhat driven by the unobserved 
characteristics within the Pacific Northwest. 
 The coefficients on the other climate variables, namely January temperatures 
(JanTemp), July temperature (JulyTemp), and July relative humidity (JulyRH) all have 
the anticipated signs.  Specifically, JanTemp is positive and significant, while the 
coefficients on JulyTemp, JulyRH are both negative and significant at the 10% level or 
better in the majority of the models.70  These results suggest that new Ph.D.s prefer more 
moderate-arid climates, or cities with warmer winters and cooler, dryer summers.  The 
last natural amenity variable included in the models is an indicator for whether the MSA 
lies on the coastline (Coast).  The coefficients on Coast are positive and significant in the 
majority of the models, suggesting that new Ph.D.s are more likely to locate in cities near 
the ocean, other things equal.   
 The coefficients on the publicly-provided amenity variables are less consistent 
with expectations.  For example, the coefficient on SupFunds is positive and significant 
in the majority of equations, suggesting that new Ph.D.s prefer cities with more superfund 
sites to less.  This perplexing result is likely an outcome of the aggregation of 
                                                 
69 Note that because the Pacific region is comprised of California and the Pacific Northwest, including an 
indicator for the Pacific NW is equivalent to introducing a dummy for California. 
70 The coefficients on JanTemp, JulyTemp, and JulyRH are consistent with the results reported in Cragg and 
Kahn (1997) 
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alternatives.  In other words, the presence of a superfund sites may only affect an 
individual’s utility if it is within close proximity to their residence.  Even if an MSA has a 
large number of superfund sites, if individuals can find a home that is not in close 
proximity to one of them, it might not affect their choice of MSA.  Thus, the presence 
(number) of a superfund site(s) likely impacts the choice of a residential area within an 
MSA, but not the choice of MSAs. The aggregation bias, however, does not explain why 
the coefficient on number of superfund sites is statistically significant in seven of the 
models.  The positive and significant coefficients could be related to the larger presence 
of superfund sites in highly industrialized areas.  To test for this possibility, we included 
total industrial productivity in an MSA as an explanatory variable, but found the 
coefficients on SupFunds remained positive and significant. 
 The variables indicating acres of parkland (ParkAcre) and number of art and 
entertainment enterprises (ArtEnt) are included in the models to capture the effects of 
recreational opportunities in MSAs.  The coefficient on ParkAcre is negative and 
significant in two models, and the coefficient on ArtEnt is negative and significant in five 
models. Although counterintuitive, a strict interpretation would suggest that new Ph.D.s 
prefer MSAs with fewer recreational opportunities, other things equal.   
Not all of the coefficients on publicly-provided amenities are counterintuitive. 
The results indicate that new Ph.D.s prefer cities with higher air quality and lower 
commute times, other things constant.  Air quality in an MSA, as measured by the 
number of “unhealthy” AQI days, has a negative and significant coefficient in all nine 
models, and the coefficient on commute time to work is negative and significant in seven 
of the nine models.  Furthermore, the coefficient on violent crimes (VCrime) is negative 
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in all nine models as expected, but not significant.  The results also indicate that new 
Ph.D.s prefer cities where public schools have lower student to teacher ratios, other 
things constant.  
In addition, the coefficient for expenditures per student (Studexp) is negative and 
significant in four of the nine models.  We have no priors regarding this coefficient. It 
could be argued that student expenditures measure school quality (and thus be desirable) 
or the amount of inefficiency in public schools (and thus be undesirable).  There is no 
consensus among educational economists as to whether or not higher student 
expenditures result in better student outcomes.  For example, Hanushek (1998) finds that 
expenditures per student are not significantly related with school quality. 
  The results support the hypotheses of the “talent” literature, namely, that the 
highly educated prefer cities with larger amounts of diversity.  In this model, diversity is 
measured by the percent foreign born (Pforborn) and the percent of minority residents 
(Pnonwhite) in an MSA. The coefficients on Pforborn are positive and significant in all 
nine models, and the coefficients on Pnonwhite are positive in eight of the nine models, 
but not significant.  The effect of ‘political leanings’ of a city, as measured by the percent 
of the population that voted for a Democratic candidate (PerDem), is of special interest 
because no such measure has been included in previous analyses.  The coefficient on 
PerDem is positive in all nine models and significant at the 10% level in four of the nine 
models, indicating that, other things equal, new Ph.D.s prefer cities in which the 
population is more likely to vote for a representative from the Democratic Party.   
  The models suggest that the innovative nature of the community matters, as 
measured by the number of utility patents granted to residents in the MSA during the 
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three-year period.  As expected, the coefficient on Patents is positive and significant in 
all nine models.  In addition, new Ph.D.s are more likely to locate in MSAs with more 
higher education institutions and a higher proportion of highly educated residents.  The 
coefficient on PerBach, or percent of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree, is 
positive and significant in four of the models, and the coefficient on number of higher 
education institutions (HighEd) is also positive and significant in five of the nine models.  
It is important to acknowledge that the variables HighEd and Patents are likely to be 
related to the number of job opportunities available for Ph.D.s in a city, such that the 
results may reflect the fact that Ph.D.s are more likely to locate in a city with more 
potential jobs, as well as indicate a preference for cities with more universities and 
patents.71 
 Finally, the models include dummy variables specifying the region of the country 
in which the MSA is located.  The South Central region is the benchmark in each model.  
The regions are included in the specification to try and capture any shared unobserved 
effects that are not explained by the other covariates. The coefficient on the Pacific 
region has the expected positive sign and is significant in all nine models.   While we had 
no priors for the coefficients on the other regions, we find that the coefficients on the 
North Atlantic and North Central regions are consistently negative in the equations, but 
rarely significant.  Furthermore, the results indicate that Ph.D.s generally prefer the 
shared unobserved characteristics in the Mountain region and the South Atlantic region to 
the South Central region, other things equal.   
                                                 
71 The choice set selection process only partially controls for the influence of the number of employment 
opportunities in an MSA.  This is because each city can only appear once in a choice set. As a result, cities 
with more employment opportunities are more likely to be selected into a Ph.D.’s choice set, but once 
selected, each city is implicitly assumed to offer an equal number of available jobs. 
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B. Conditional Logit Models with New Employees Results 
 A potentially important factor of the conditional logit models presented in Table 
11 is that they include Ph.D.s with contractual obligations to previous employers. About 
20% of all new Ph.D.s in the full sample had made a definite commitment to return to 
their previous employer.  Recall, the model implicitly assumes that Ph.D.s consider 
numerous alternatives, and are observed in the city that maximizes utility.  If a Ph.D.’s 
choice set is constrained by contractual obligations, then that Ph.D. may not be able to 
choose the city that offers them the highest utility.  Thus, the models on city choice 
would not accurately represent the influence of amenities on location choice for these 
Ph.D.s.  To ensure that the coefficients and willingness to pay estimates are not biased by 
the inclusion of Ph.D.s who may not have had full control over their choice of 
employment city, location choice models are estimated that exclude Ph.D.s with 
contractual obligations to a previous employer.72   
The results from the “new employee” models are presented in Table 12.  For 
purposes of comparison, the specification has not changed and the results from each 
model are reported in the same order as in Table 11.  A comparison of the coefficient 
estimates indicates that the signs of the coefficients are not sensitive to the removal of 
Ph.D.s with contractual obligations to their previous employers.  In fact, no significant 
coefficient changes signs when Ph.D.s with contractual obligations are removed from the 
analysis.  However, the magnitudes and the statistical significance of the coefficients 
change considerably for some variables.  Notably, the coefficient on private consumption 
is larger in the models that exclude Ph.D.s with contractual obligations, and the 
                                                 
72 Initially, we also estimated separate models that excluded Ph.D.s who did not move to a new city.  These 
results are not included in order to simplify the discussion, and because the results from these models were 
very similar to the results that exclude Ph.D.s returning to a previous employer.  
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coefficients on amenity variables are generally lower in absolute value.  Thus, the 
estimates for implicit prices and willingness to pay will be more conservative when 
calculated from the models that exclude Ph.D.s with contractual obligations.   
In order to assess the stability of parameters to the sample of Ph.D.s, Table 13 
shows the variation of the coefficients across models in percentage terms.  The 
percentage variation statistic, PRange, equals the difference between the largest and 
smallest coefficient estimate divided by the mean value of the coefficient.  A lower value 
of PRange indicates more stability in the coefficients.   It is evident from Table 13 that 
the coefficients from the new employee models are more stable than the coefficients from 
the models that include all Ph.D.s.    The percentage ranges are smaller for 22 of the 30 
variables, and are on average about 50% lower in the models that only include new 
employees.  As a result of these considerations, the remainder of the analyses will focus 
exclusively on Ph.D.s who do not have contractual obligations to a previous employer.  
  
C. Controlling for Observed Heterogeneity 
 Most previous applications of random utility models assume that consumers have 
homogeneous preferences for site attributes (Dahlberg & Eklof, 2003; Parsons & Kealy, 
1992; Quigley, 1985).  While this may not be an unreasonable assumption in some 
applications relating to recreational sites, individual preferences for city attributes are 
almost certainly characterized by some form of heterogeneity.  For example, it is 
reasonable to expect that single individuals have a lower demand for education than 
people who are married with children.  Similarly, preferences for diversity in a city likely 
differ between whites and non-whites.  In order to understand how individual factors 
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impact amenity preferences, as well as to provide more precise willingness to pay 
estimates, several individual characteristics are introduced into the specification.73   
 Although individual characteristics such as marital status or race may affect 
preferences for amenities, they cannot directly enter the model because any variable that 
is invariant among city alternatives will drop out of the model (see equation 6).  Previous 
studies that control for preference heterogeneity do so either by estimating separate 
demands across socio-demographic characteristics (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002; Cragg 
& Kahn, 1997), or by interacting individual characteristics with relevant city attributes 
(Chattopadhyay, 2000; Hauber & Parsons, 2000; Rolfe & Louviere, 2000).  The latter 
method, herein referred to as the “hybrid” model, is more appropriate for this application 
because it allows us to account for heterogeneity across a larger array of observed 
characteristics.74    
 The hybrid model considers seven socio-demographic attributes that may 
influence the value of amenities.  These include the Ph.D.’s age at the time of degree, and 
dummy variables indicating marital status, parental status, sector of employment, 
citizenship, race, and finally, an indicator of whether the Ph.D. has previously migrated to 
a new state.  Bearing in mind that there are a great number of possible interaction terms 
between individual and MSA attributes, the models first consider interaction terms that 
one would expect to affect preferences a priori.75  The intuitive interaction terms include: 
age, marital status, and the migration indicator with distance; parental status with 
                                                 
73 Rolfe and Louviere (2000) explain that the inclusion of socio-economic characteristics can significantly 
improve the accuracy of the coefficient estimates in discrete choice models.  
74 This is referred to as a “hybrid” model in some literature because it combines aspects of both the 
conditional and the multinomial logit models.   It has also been referred to as an “interactive” random 
utility model (Massey, 2002). 
75 There are over 200 possible interaction terms between seven individual characteristics and thirty city 
attributes. 
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education attributes and violent crime rates; race with percent non-white; citizenship with 
percent foreign born; and finally, an indicator for industry with number of patents.76   
 The role of a Ph.D.’s sector of employment on their choice of city and amenity 
preferences is of particular concern in this application. Because the vast majority of 
postdoctoral appointments will not last for more than two years, postdocs may be more 
willing to accept a position in a city with lower quality amenities than Ph.D.s in more 
permanent positions.  In addition, a postdoc’s choice of city is largely driven by the 
quality of the available appointments in each city.  Because the model does not include 
characteristics of each potential appointment, it implicitly assumes that the quality of 
available appointments is equal across cities.  In reality, there is little doubt that a postdoc 
is more likely to choose a city that offers a more “rewarding” appointment, or one which 
will improve their future employment opportunities.  To this extent, the preferences 
revealed by postdocs’ city choices may be reflective of the preferences of the mentors 
with whom they desire to work. 
 Precisely how preferences for amenities differ across employment sectors, and 
thus how to interact sector dummies with city attributes, is not obvious.   While 
interactions such as parental status with school variables are economically intuitive, 
whether or not preferences for an amenity such as July temperatures will vary across 
sectors is not evident.   To determine how preferences vary across sector of employment, 
and thus which variables to interact with sector indicators, the coefficient on each 
attribute is separately tested for observed heterogeneity across sectors.    
                                                 
76 We also initially considered additional interaction terms that could potentially affect preferences, such as 
age with the art and entertainment index or a faculty indicator with number of higher education institutions.  
However, these were not included in the final specification because they were not statistically significant in 
preliminary models. 
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 The Wald tests are used to determine if sector interaction terms are needed on 
each variable. The Wald test is a flexible and useful method of testing for the equality of 
logit coefficients across groups (Liao, 2004). To implement the test, separate conditional 
logit models are estimated for two mutually exclusive sub-samples; in this case, postdocs 
versus Ph.D.s in industry and faculty.  Next, a Wald statistics is calculated for each 
coefficient, equal to: 
)ˆ)ˆ/()ˆˆ( 22 PX
P
X
T
X
T
XX VVW −−= ββ           (29) 
where superscripts T and P refer to Temporary (postdocs) and Permanent (industry and 
faculty), respectively, TXβˆ and PXβˆ  indicate the estimated coefficients for variable X, and 
T
XVˆ  and
P
XVˆ refer to the variances of these coefficient estimates.  The test statistic is 
distributed chi-square with one degree of freedom, and the null hypothesis is equality of 
the coefficients.  Rejection of the null for a coefficient indicates that observed 
heterogeneity exists in the attribute across sub-samples.  The test is conducted on all 
coefficients of the three new employee conditional logit models estimated with 26 
alternatives in the choice set (models 7-9 in Table 12).  
 The results from the Wald tests are presented in Table B.1 of the appendix.  The 
table shows that the null hypothesis of coefficient equality is consistently rejected for 
seven variables:  JanSun, JulyRH, SupFund, ArtEnt, ComTime, PForBorn, and Patents. 
Thus, these seven variables are interacted with an indicator of sector of employment in 
the hybrid specification. 
 Table 14 presents the definitions and descriptive statistics for relevant individual 
characteristics and interaction terms.   As shown, the hybrid models introduce sixteen 
interaction terms into the specification.  To facilitate the comparison, the hybrid models 
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are estimated using the same nine choice set samples used previously.  The results for all 
nine conditional logit hybrid models are presented in Table 15.   These results are 
comparable to the results from the simple (non-hybrid) conditional logit models 
presented in Table 13. 
 Controlling for observed heterogeneity significantly improves the overall fit of the 
model, as measured by conventional statistics.    Primarily, each model with interaction 
terms has a significantly lower log-likelihood value and a higher pseudo - R2 statistic as 
compared to the same model without interaction terms.77  These improvements are tested 
for significance using the Swait-Louviere log-likelihood ratio test.78  The Swait-Louviere 
tests show that the improvements in the model are significant at the 5% level of 
confidence for all nine models, suggesting that the hybrid specifications more 
comprehensively explain the location choices of new Ph.D.s for these data.79   
 As indicated by Table 15, the inclusion of the interaction terms in the model 
captures a significant amount of heterogeneity in preferences across socio-demographic 
groups.  Most of the coefficients on the interacted variables accord with prior 
expectations.   For example, the three individual variables interacted with distance: Age, 
Married, and SameC_Ph.D., each have a negative and significant coefficient in all nine 
models.  These results suggest that the further a potential city is from Ph.D.s current 
locations, the less likely the city is chosen by older Ph.D.s, married Ph.D.s, or Ph.D.s who 
earned their doctorate in the same state in which they earned their college degree.  
                                                 
77 The pseudo R2 in the conditional logit is similar to the adjusted R2 of ordinary regressions except that the 
significance is assessed at lower values.   
78 The Swiat-Louviere test statistic is distributed chi-square and equals:  
SW = -2(LL1-LL2), where LL1 and LL2 refer to the log-likelihood values from the models without and 
with interaction terms, respectively.  The degrees of freedom equals the difference in the number of 
parameters in the model, in this case, sixteen. 
79 A common assessment tool in random utility modeling is to compare predicted choice probabilities to the 
actual probability.  This test is only usable when the choice set contains the complete set of alternatives. 
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Furthermore, the coefficient on distance is positive and significant, suggesting that 
controlling for age, marital status, and previous migration behavior, Ph.D.s are actually 
more likely to choose a city that is geographically further from where they earned their 
doctorate.   
 Whether or not a Ph.D. is a parent has a large impact on preferences for amenities. 
Parental status is interacted with violent crime rates and the three education variables.  
The coefficient on Par*VCrime is negative and significant in all nine models, indicating 
that an increase in crime has a greater negative impact on the utility levels of Ph.D.s with 
children than Ph.D.s without children.  Furthermore, the results indicate that parents 
prefer MSAs with a larger number of students per capita, and, consistent with earlier 
models, MSAs that have lower student expenditures, relative to Ph.D.s without children.  
The coefficients on Par*PupTeach are not significant at conventional levels, suggesting 
that preferences for pupil teacher ratios in school are relatively equal for parents and 
Ph.D.s without children. 
 The coefficients on White*PNW and USCit*PFB are negative and significant in 
all nine models, indicating, as expected, that whites and U.S. citizens are less likely to 
choose cities with higher amounts of diversity than are non-whites and foreign Ph.D.s, 
respectively.   
The remaining seven interaction terms depict the relative preferences for 
amenities across sectors.  The positive and significant coefficients on Ind*Pats suggest 
that industrial Ph.D.s are more likely to locate in cities with a larger number of utility 
patents, relative to Ph.D.s employed in an academic institution.  The results also suggest 
that postdocs are more likely to locate in cities with more hours of January sunlight and 
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larger amounts of art and entertainment enterprises than Ph.D.s in the other sectors.  
These coefficients are somewhat unexpected if one believes that because their 
employment situation is inherently temporary, postdocs are more willing to accept a 
position in a city with lower quality amenities.  The positive coefficients on Pdoc*CTime 
indicate that the disutility from higher commute times is lower for postdocs than others.  
This result could be a measure of the “renters” effect; or that it is easier for postdocs to 
find an apartment close to campus than it is for others to find a home close to their 
employer.   Furthermore, the results suggest that postdocs are less likely to locate in cities 
with higher amounts of superfund sites and higher July humidity, although the 
coefficients are not statistically significant in the majority of models.  Finally, the 
negative coefficients on Pdoc*PFB suggest that postdocs have a lower likelihood of 
choosing cities with more foreign born, compared to industrial Ph.D.s and faculty. 
In summary, the results suggest that observed heterogeneity is an important factor 
in city choice.  Accounting for observed heterogeneity through the inclusion of the 
interaction terms improves the overall performance of the model.  However, the 
coefficients from the conditional logit models may be biased if the models do not exhibit 
the IIA property.  With this in mind, we now test for IIA violation in the conditional logit 
models. 
 
D. Tests for IIA violation 
 Recall, the conditional logit models assume the data are consistent with the 
restrictive IIA property. Before proceeding with the less restrictive random utility 
models, we first test for violation of IIA in the conditional logit models.  Hausman and 
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McFadden (1984) propose a specification test in which a model with a full set of choice 
alternatives is compared to a model with a restricted set of alternatives.   Intuitively, if the 
conditional logit model exhibits the IIA property, then removing any alternative from the 
estimation will not significantly affect the ratio of probabilities associated with selecting 
a specific alternative.  Thus, the results from a model estimated with the full set of 
alternatives should not change significantly when the same model is estimated with a 
restricted set of choice alternatives. 
 The Hausman-McFadden test statistic,Q , equals: 
][][]'[ 1 ruurruQ ββββ −Ω−Ω−= −        (30) 
where uβ and rβ refer to the vector of estimated coefficients, and uΩ and rΩ represent the 
variance covariance matrices from the unrestricted and restricted models, respectively.  
Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the likelihood ratios are not independent of 
irrelevant alternatives, or that the conditional logit models do not exhibit IIA.  Thus, if the 
null is rejected, this is evidence that the estimates from the conditional logit models are 
not consistent or efficient.  Alternatively, failure to reject the null indicates that the IIA 
property is not violated; hence implying that the conditional logit estimates are consistent 
but inefficient.  The test is distributed 2χ , with the degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of covariates. 
 The Hausman-McFadden test statistics are reported in Table 16.  The test 
statistics are conducted on each of the nine conditional logit models that exclude Ph.D.s 
with contractual obligations.  As indicated by Table 16, the assumption of IIA cannot be 
rejected for any of the conditional logit models.  Generally, the test statistics increase as 
the number of alternatives included in the equations decreases.  This is to be expected 
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because as the number of alternatives decrease, the effect of removing any single 
alternative will increase.  Indeed, when the test was conducted on equations that include 
only four alternatives, we could reject the null of IIA at the 10% level of significance.   
However, the tests suggest that the data used for the conditional logit models satisfy IIA 
and that the estimates are consistent.  This result (no rejection of IIA) is not common in 
the literature (Foster & Maurato, 2002; Mazzanati, 2003).     
 There are two logical explanations as to why the conditional logit models in this 
application exhibit the IIA property.   The first is related to the determination of the 
choice set.  Most previous applications randomly select alternatives into the choice set, or 
use the complete set of alternatives in the estimation.  In this application, only alternative 
cities that were chosen by similar individuals (e.g. those considered to be competing for 
the same jobs) are selected into each individual’s choice set.   The objective of this choice 
set selection process was to decrease the number of irrelevant alternatives that are 
included in each Ph.D.’s choice set.  The low Hausman-McFadden test statistics may 
reflect that this objective was achieved.  
 Furthermore, the model will likely not exhibit the IIA property if the 
unobservable characteristics of MSAs are correlated within regions.  A common method 
for maintaining IIA when this is the case is to cluster alternatives by region, and estimate 
a nested logit that separately models the choice of region and alternatives within a region 
(Knapp et al., 2001).  An alternative method to capturing correlation between regions, 
which is used here, is to include region specific dummies (List & Co, 2000; Parsons & 
Massey, 2003).80    
                                                 
80 The Hausman test statistics significantly increase when the specification does not include region specific 
dummies, but are not high enough to reject IIA at the 10% level of significance.   
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 Although the tests suggest the conditional logit models do not violate the IIA 
property, it is still desirable to estimate choice probability with less restrictive models.  
The Hausman-McFadden test statistics are sensitive to the specific number of alternatives 
included in the choice set, as well as the specific alternative that is removed from the 
unrestricted choice set.  Thus, the test is particularly prone to Type I errors.  If the IIA 
property is exhibited in the conditional logit models (and the test statistics are accurate), 
estimation of the less restrictive models should only lend validity to the previous results.  
 
E. Nested Logit Model Results 
In this section we estimate the nested logit model discussed in Chapter 2, Section C.   
The nested logit framework partitions MSAs into groups (or nests) by sector of 
employment and then estimates the probability an individual will choose a sector of 
employment, in addition to the probability of choosing a city within a sector.  The IIA 
property is still assumed to hold within nests, but is not required across nests. 
The appropriateness of this nesting structure is unknown prior to estimation.  Even if 
a nesting structure seems intuitively suitable, it cannot be known whether or not the 
model will satisfy certain requirements for consistency with utility maximization until the 
model has been estimated and tested.  Specifically, in order for the model to remain 
consistent with utility theory, the coefficient on the inclusive value (IV) must take on a 
value between zero and one (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; McFadden, 1978).81 
To test the validity of the sector-city nesting structure, we first estimate a sequential 
nested logit model that constrains the parameter on the inclusive value to be equal across 
                                                 
81 Borsch-Supan (1990) has shown that in some cases, the coefficient on the inclusive can lie above one and 
still be consistent with utility theory. 
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nests.  Sequential estimation is consistent but inefficient relative to simultaneous (FIML) 
estimation (Amemiya, 1978; Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985).  Procedurally, sequential 
estimation of the nested logit model involves first calculating the inclusive values (log-
sum utility) for each sector, using the estimated coefficients from the conditional logit 
models on city choice.  The inclusive value equals the natural log of the exponentiated 
sum of utilities from all cities in a sector, or: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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where Bˆ and ψˆ  represent the estimated coefficients from the lower level nest, in this case, 
the conditional logit models on the choice of city.  Next, a standard logit probability is 
estimated for the choice of nest (sector), with the inclusive values entering the equation 
as an explanatory variable.  The probability individual i choose sector k equals: 
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where Xi, represents various individual characteristics and Ps refers to characteristics of 
the Ph.D. granting institution.   Table B.2 of the appendix gives definitions and 
descriptive statistics for all individual and institutional characteristics used in the model.  
The individual and institutional variables are interacted with alternative specific constants 
(ASCs) for both the academic and industrial sectors in the model. 
Table B.3 in the appendix presents results from two sector choice logits, NL1 and 
NL2.  The sector choice models are identified for two specifications of the city choice 
logit models: model (1) and model (9) of the “new employee” models (Table 12).  In the 
first model (NL1), the inclusive values are calculated using the coefficients from model 
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(1) of the city choice estimation on new employees (Table 12, Column 2).  The second 
model (NL2) obtains the inclusive values from coefficients in model (9) of the city choice 
model (Table 12, Column 9).      
As indicated in Table B.3, the coefficients on the inclusive value are statistically 
significant at the 99% level, but consistently lie outside of the unit range, and thus outside 
of the theoretically acceptable range.  Specifically, in NL1 the IV coefficient (IncVal) 
equals - 0.32, and in NL2 IncVal equals -0.28.82   These results conflict with utility 
maximization theory because they imply that the greater the expected utility level in a 
sector, the lower is the likelihood that the sector will be chosen by Ph.D.s.   
There are two possible explanations for the illogical outcome of the nested model, 
both relating to the information captured by the inclusive values.  Recall, the inclusive 
value estimates the systematic expected utility of the complete set of alternatives in each 
sector, and brings information from the lower nest (city choice) to the upper nest (sector 
choice) by measuring the shared unobserved attributes common to alternatives in each 
nest.  In this application, each nest includes at least 161 different MSAs, and casual 
observation indicates that the full set of MSAs within each nest generally have very little 
in common with one another. This can be problematic in the nested model because the 
shared unobserved effects and associated correlations among alternatives within a nest 
(cities within a sector) may be so weak that they do not influence an individual’s choice 
of nest (sector).  In other words, with such a wide range of cities in each sector, the 
inclusive values may not sufficiently capture the unobserved sources of correlation across 
the full set of cities in a sector. 
                                                 
82 Several other specifications for the nested logit were estimated, such as including additional individual 
variables or only including the inclusive values as explanatory variables.  Because the IV parameter 
consistently remained negative and statistically significant these results are not reported.   
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Furthermore, in most nested logit applications, each alternative is a member of only 
one nest, whereas is in this application, a city almost always appears in more than one 
nest.83   In fact, approximately 75% of all observed MSAs are members of multiple nests, 
representing the location choices of over 90% of Ph.D.s.84 When such a large proportion 
of the cities are potential alternatives in more than one sector, there is likely to be little 
variation in expected utility across sectors.   
To explore the effects of overlapping nests, we estimate the same model using a 
generalized nested logit (GNL).  The GNL may improve the results by allowing the 
alternatives to have variable influence on each nest in which it appears.  The GNL is 
virtually equivalent to the standard nested logit except it includes fractional allocation 
parameters that reflect the degree to which an MSA is a member of each sector.  The 
allocation parameters are proportional to the percentage of Ph.D.s observed in an MSA in 
each sector. 85 
The results from two GNLs (GNL1 and GNL2) are presented in Tables A8 of the 
appendix.  For purposes of comparison, the models are estimated on the same set of 
explanatory variables, and the inclusive values are calculated using the same sets of 
coefficients as in the nested logit models discussed above (models 1 and 9 in Table 12). 
As shown in Table B.4, the results from the GNL estimation are very similar to those 
from the standard NL estimation.  Of primary importance, the coefficient on the inclusive 
                                                 
83 See Moshe  Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire (1999), Vovsha (1997), or Wen and Koppelman (2001) for 
examples of papers that apply the nested logit with overlapping nests.   
84 Specifically, of the 291 observed MSAs, 142 are chosen by at least one Ph.D. in all three sectors, and 211 
are chosen by Ph.D.s in more than one sector.   
85 In an application to transportation choice Wen and Koppelman (2001) estimate both a GNL and nested 
logit and find the GNL to be statistically superior to the standard nested logit model.   
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value remains negative and statistically significant in both GNL models.  Specifically, the 
IV parameters (IncVal) equal -3.07 and -0.85 in GNL1 and GNL2, respectively.  
Judging from the results of both the standard nested logit and the generalized nested 
logit models, it is evident that the proposed nesting structure is not an appropriate 
characterization of the migration decisions of new Ph.D.s for these data.  Thus, we 
surmise that although the nesting structure is intuitively appealing, it does not improve 
the accuracy of the parameters from the conditional logit estimation, and thus will not be 
used not be used in the calculation of implicit prices or willingness to pay.   
 
 
F. Mixed Logit Model Results 
 
This section presents results from the mixed logit random utility model discussed 
in Chapter 2, Section 4.  The mixed logit is less restrictive than the conditional logit 
model because it does not require the IIA property and allows for unobservable 
heterogeneity in preferences.  Although the conditional hybrid models estimated in 
Section 3 of this chapter control for observed heterogeneity across socio-demographic 
groups, unobserved heterogeneity among individuals with the same observed 
characteristics may continue to affect the coefficient estimates.  Several papers have 
shown that unobservable heterogeneity can be a significant factor in coefficient estimates 
even after the model has controlled for observed heterogeneity (Massey, 2002; Morey & 
Rossmann, 2003; Revelt & Train, 1998; Rouwendal & Meijer, 2001).  
The mixed logit models allow the coefficients for a set of attributes to randomly 
vary across individuals according to a specific distribution.  Although the mixed logit 
exhibits less stringent properties than the conditional logit, a number of assumptions must 
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be made regarding the specific structure of heterogeneity over the population.  Namely, 
in any mixed logit application, the researcher determines the appropriate coefficients to 
distribute (specify as random), as well as make assumptions regarding the appropriate 
mixing distribution for each distributed coefficient (Hensher & Greene, 2001).  
Furthermore, while the mixed logit model can detect the presence of heterogeneity, it 
cannot identify the sources or causes of it (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002). 
Before determining which of the parameters to distribute, one must consider a 
number of both practical and theoretical issues.  Unobserved heterogeneity may affect 
preferences for any attribute, such that all attributes should be considered potential 
candidates for distribution prior to estimation.   However, only those variables for which 
the population has a significant amount of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences need 
to be distributed.  On practical grounds, as the number of distributed parameters 
increases, identification can become very difficult, and computing time needed to obtain 
model convergence can increase dramatically.86  In addition, allowing both the 
coefficient on private consumption (price or cost in other applications) and the 
coefficients on attributes to vary makes the calculation and interpretation of willingness 
to pay measures complex (Hensher & Greene, 2001; Revelt & Train, 1998).    As a result, 
most previous empirical applications have chosen to either distribute the coefficient on 
income (Hess et al., 2004; Layton & Brown, 2000; Nalder & Morrison, 2004) or a set of 
coefficients on non-income related variables (Parsons & Massey, 2003; Revelt & Train, 
1998; Rouwendal & Meijer, 2001), but applications rarely choose to distribute both.87   
                                                 
86 For example, a mixed logit model with fifteen random parameters can take more than three days to 
converge (or report a lack of convergence), while the same mixed logit with only one random parameter 
generally only takes about two hours to converge. 
87 Two known exceptions include (Brownstone & Train, 1999; Train, 1997).  
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In light of these considerations, we test for the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity in each attribute by deriving the standard deviation of the coefficient 
distribution for each variable in separate models.88  The derived standard deviation of a 
coefficient distribution measures the extent of variation in preferences over the 
population, or the degree that unobserved heterogeneity affects preferences for an 
attribute (see section 4, Chapter 2).  Put simply, a derived standard deviation that is not 
significantly different from zero indicates that preferences for an attribute are relatively 
constant across the population, and that the coefficient need not be distributed.  Thus, a 
coefficient is distributed in the final specification if the derived standard deviation of the 
distribution was significantly different from zero at the 10% level or better in preliminary 
models.    Conversely, if the derived standard deviation of the coefficient distribution was 
not significant at the 10% level in the preliminary equations, then the coefficient is held 
constant across individuals.    
The preliminary estimations indicated that the coefficient on composite 
consumption did not have a statistically significant derived standard deviation, suggesting 
that there is not unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for composite consumption in 
the population of Ph.D.s.   Thus, the model only distributes the coefficients on a set of 
non-income related variables for which the derived standard deviation of the distribution 
are significantly different from zero.  The following five variables were found to have a 
                                                 
88The terminology can be confusing here.  There are two types of standard deviations for a coefficient in a 
mixed logit: the derived standard deviation, which only exist for random parameters, and the classical 
standard errors that exist for all (random and nonrandom) parameters.  When discussing the presence of 
heterogeneity, we are referring to the derived standard deviation of the parameter distributions. 
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statistically significant derived standard deviation:  JanSun, JanTemp, StudExp, 
Pnonwhite, and Patents.89   
The choice of a distribution for a coefficient is dependent on how one expects the 
structure of tastes for a particular attribute to vary over the population.  Any coefficient 
could theoretically be specified with any distribution (e.g., normal, uniform, triangular, 
etc.); however, almost all previous applications choose to distribute coefficients with a 
normal or a lognormal distribution.  The advantage of the lognormal distribution is that 
the coefficients are constrained to have the same sign for all individuals, whereas the 
standard normal distribution allows for both positive and negative coefficients (Train, 
1997).  The variables with random coefficients are all attributes that may be desirable to 
some but not preferred by others.90   Thus, the random coefficients on these attributes are 
specified to follow a normal distribution.  
The random coefficient estimates are based on 200 Halton draws in all models.  
Halton draws, or “intelligent” draws, are preferred to standard random draws because 
they reduce the simulation variance and enable faster estimation (Train, 1999).  Unlike 
random draws, the Halton draws use information from previous draws of the coefficient 
to ensure better coverage over the full range of simulated probabilities.  Bhat (2003) has 
shown that a mixed logit model estimated with 100 Halton draws requires more than 
2,000 random draws in order to achieve the same level of accuracy. 
                                                 
89The coefficient on distance was also found to have significant unobserved heterogeneity in some 
preliminary models.  However, it is held constant in the final specification because including it as a random 
coefficient made identification difficult and the interpretation of distance is not central to estimates of 
amenity values. 
90 This is as opposed to the coefficient on a variable like private consumption, for which all individuals can 
be assumed to prefer more of to less. 
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The coefficient estimates for the mixed logit models are presented in Table 17.  
For ease of interpretation, the models are only reported for the three draws on choice set 
size 26 (models 7-9 in previous tables), using the same set of explanatory variables as in 
the conditional logit models.  The results for random coefficients are reported in terms of 
the mean coefficient and the standard deviation.  The results for all coefficients are 
reported with an indicator of whether they are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level.  
The table also reports the derived standard deviation value, indicated by the prefix 
“STD”, and an indicator of the level of significance of the derived standard deviation.  
Table 17 presents results from both the simple specifications (columns 2-4) and the 
hybrid specifications (columns 5-7).  Note that the hybrid mixed logit models allow the 
coefficients on the relevant interacted variables to be random in addition to the non-
interacted variables.  Thus, the hybrid mixed logit controls for observed and unobserved 
(random) heterogeneity in preferences, while the simple specification only accounts for 
unobservable heterogeneity in preferences.   
The mixed logit model results are qualitatively similar to those from the 
conditional logit models.  In fact, all but two of the thirty coefficients in the simple 
specification (Spec 1) have the same sign in the mixed logit as in the previous models.  
However, several notable differences arise.  First, the population mean coefficient values 
are not statistically significant for all of the distributed variables except for StudExp in the 
simple specification.  However, the derived standard deviations are statistically 
significant for JanTemp, StudExp, Pnonwhite, and Patents.  This suggests that 
preferences for these variables are not homogenous across the population.  Furthermore, 
the derived standard deviation is larger than the mean coefficient values for each of the 
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five attributes with random coefficients, which indicates that there are both positive and 
negative preferences in the population for all five variables.   Thus, while the mean 
values of the random coefficients are not significantly different from zero, this does not 
imply that the attribute has no effect on the likelihood of choosing a city for all Ph.D.s.   
The coefficients from the mixed logit models with interaction terms are also very 
similar to those from the hybrid specification of the conditional logit models.  The model 
performs considerably better than the mixed logit with the simple specification, at least in 
terms of the significance levels of the mean random coefficients.91   Whereas only the 
mean coefficient value for Studexp is statistically significant in the Specification 1 of the 
mixed logit, the mean coefficient values are statistically significant for Studexp, 
Pnonwhite, and the interacted variables White*Pnonwhite, Par*Studexp and Ind*Pats.  
The derived standard deviations of the random coefficients are generally significant as 
well.   Specifically, only the estimated standard deviation for the variables Par*Studexp 
and Pnonwhite are not significantly different from zero. 
The hybrid specifications of the mixed logit models provide a more 
comprehensive recognition of the degree and type of heterogeneity in preferences than 
the other models.  The case of preferences for the percentage of minority residents 
(Pnonwhite) in an MSA serves as a good example.  In specification 1 of the mixed logit, 
the mean coefficient on Pnonwhite is positive and the derived standard deviation is 
statistically significant.  This suggests that on average Ph.D.s prefer MSAs with higher 
percentages of minorities, and that the preference for this attribute significantly varies 
across the population of Ph.D.s.   In the hybrid mixed logit with interaction terms, the 
                                                 
91 The coefficient is JanSun is held constant in the hybrid specifications of the mixed logit because the 
derived standard deviation is not statistically significant in the simple specification. 
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mean coefficient on Pnonwhite is positive and the derived standard deviation is not 
significantly different from zero.  Furthermore, the mean coefficient on White*Pnonwhite 
is negative and the derived standard deviation is statistically significant.  One can tell a 
much richer story regarding how preferences for the percentages of minorities in an MSA 
vary across the population of Ph.D.s using these results.  The positive mean coefficient 
on Pnonwhite (not interacted) suggests that on average Ph.D.s prefer MSAs with higher 
percentages of minorities.  The fact that the derived standard deviation on the coefficient 
is not significantly different from zero suggests that preferences for Pnonwhite are 
relatively constant across the population of minority Ph.D.s.  In addition, the negative and 
significant mean coefficient on the interaction term, White*Pnonwhite, indicates that 
white Ph.D.s have systematically lower preferences for cities with higher percentages of 
minorities.  Finally, the statistically significant derived standard deviation on the 
interacted coefficient suggests that that this preference varies across the population of 
white Ph.D.s.   
The overall performance of the mixed logit models relative to the conditional logit 
models were also tested using the log-likelihood ratio test.  The tests suggest that both the 
hybrid and the simple mixed logit models better explain location choices of Ph.D.s for 
these data, relative to the conditional logit models with the same specification, at the 5% 
level.92  Based on these results, we can conclude that the mixed logit model not only 
uncovers a significant amount of unobservable heterogeneity in preferences, but that 
accounting for this heterogeneity improves the overall performance of the model.  This 
                                                 
92 Note that here we are testing the model performance of the mixed logit models relative to the conditional 
logit model with the same specification, not the performance of the mixed logit specifications to one 
another.  
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result generally accords with the conclusions of the majority of research that compares 
mixed logit models to conditional logit model.93   
 
G. Summary 
 This chapter has explored the impact of city attributes on Ph.D. utility through the 
estimation of numerous random utility models.   While the qualitative interpretations of 
the coefficients are similar across models, several important differences have been 
revealed.  The main findings relating to the estimation strategy can be summarized as 
follows. 
- The results are more stable across models, and the coefficient standard errors are 
smaller when Ph.D.s’ choice sets include a larger number of alternative cities.   
- Ph.D.s who have contractual obligations to a previous employer may have biased 
utility estimates if their commitment prevents them from choosing the city they 
would otherwise prefer.  Although the results cannot detect this theoretical bias, 
the coefficients are more stable and consistent in the models that are restricted to 
new employees.  
- Accounting for heterogeneity in preferences is an important feature of the model.  
The introduction of interaction terms into the specification not only significantly 
improves the parametric fit of the model, but also shows how preferences for city 
attributes differ across observable characteristics.  Specifically, preferences vary 
according observable characteristics for the following ten city attributes: January 
sunlight, July humidity, art and entertainment enterprises, violent crime rates, 
                                                 
93 Exceptions are rare but do exist.  For example, Birol et al. (2004) and Dahlberg and Eklof (2003) find 
that the mixed logit and the conditional logit models perform equally well. 
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number of students, student expenditures, commute times, percent nonwhite, 
percent foreign born, and number of patents. 
- The Hausman McFadden tests do not detect IIA violation in the conditional logit 
models, suggesting that the coefficient estimates from the conditional logit 
models are consistent. 
- The sector-city nested logit model, although intuitively appealing, does not 
appropriately characterize city choice for these data, as assessed by the negative 
coefficient on the inclusive value.  This is likely the result of the large degree of 
non-exclusivity of cities across nests. 
- The coefficient estimates from the mixed logit model are very similar to the 
conditional logit model.  Log-likelihood ratio tests suggest that the mixed logit 
models perform better than the conditional logit models.  Furthermore, the mixed 
logit models detect unobservable heterogeneity in preferences for January 
temperature, student expenditures, percent nonwhite, and number of patents.  The 
results from the hybrid mixed logit suggest that unobserved heterogeneity affects 
preferences for these attributes even after controlling for observed characteristics 
of Ph.D.s.   
 Based on the above considerations, the preferred results from the conditional and 
mixed logit models are used in the next chapter to estimate and compare willingness to 
pay for various amenities.
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Table 11 
 
Coefficient Estimates from Simple Conditional Logit: 
 Full Sample 
 
 SAMPLE 1:  Full Sample (N=22,666) 
  Choice Set Size = 6   Choice Set Size = 11   Choice Set Size = 26 
Variable 
Model 1 
(Draw 1) 
Model 2 
(Draw 2) 
Model 3 
(Draw 3)   
Model 4 
 (Draw 1) 
Model 5 
 (Draw 2) 
Model 6 
 (Draw 3)   
Model 7 
(Draw 1) 
Model 8 
(Draw 2) 
Model 9 
(Draw 3) 
CompCons 0.00006C 0.00005 B 0.00004 B   0.00006 C 0.00008 C 0.00008 C   0.00013 C 0.00013 C 0.00013 C 
Distance -1.163 C -1.160 C -1.164 C   -1.2246 C -1.218 C -1.212 C   -1.2777 C -1.2749 C -1.2744 C 
JanSun -0.0006 B -0.0010 C -0.0003   -0.0003 -0.0007 B -0.0008 B   -0.0007 B -0.0006 B -0.0006 B 
JanTemp 0.0089 C 0.0077 C 0.0079 C   0.0090 C 0.0100 C 0.0089 C   0.0104 C 0.0101 C 0.0099 C 
JulRH -0.0051 C -0.0054 C -0.0045 C   -0.0056 C -0.0063 C -0.0054 C   -0.0089 C -0.0091 C -0.0091 C 
JulTemp -0.0077 -0.0086 A -0.0087 A   -0.0095 B -0.0133 C -0.0080 A   -0.0169 C -0.0170 C -0.0166 C 
PWater 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009   0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0007   -0.0020 B -0.0015 A -0.0014  
Coast 0.0171 0.0467 0.0344   0.0809 C 0.0553 B 0.0737 C   0.1176 C 0.1106 C 0.1043 C 
Vcrime -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.00007   0.00002 -0.00004 -0.000005   -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00003 
Parkacre -0.0014 -0.0016 A -0.0011   0.0001 -0.00124 -0.00076   -0.00114 -0.00137 A -0.00123 
BadAQ -0.0025 B -0.0029 C -0.0029 C   -0.0015 -0.0033 C -0.0030 C   -0.0029 C -0.0028 C -0.0031 C 
Supfund 0.0016 0.0015 0.0018 A   0.0013 0.0025 C 0.0023 B   0.0024 C 0.0028 C 0.0028 C 
Art_Ent -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0012   -0.0026 C -0.0013 -0.0015 A   -0.0020 B -0.0015 A -0.0016 B 
Studexp -0.0199 -0.0294 A -0.0289 A   -0.0140 -0.0198 -0.0109   -0.0213 -0.0265 A -0.0258 A 
PupTeach -0.0046 A -0.0047 A -0.0038   -0.0021 -0.0040 -0.0032   -0.0050 B -0.0039  -0.0038 
NStudnts -0.0029 -0.0006 -0.0029  -0.0017 -0.0009 0.0029  -0.0029 -0.0001 -0.0007 
Comtime -0.0053 -0.0066 A -0.0024   -0.0087 C -0.0078 B -0.0076 B  -0.0103 C -0.0103 C -0.0085 B 
MSASize 0.0123 C 0.0139 C 0.0095 B  0.0082 0.0131 C 0.0087 B  0.0121 C 0.0122 C 0.0110 C 
PopDens 0.0049 0.0014 0.0013  -0.0139 0.0100 0.0012  -0.0122 -0.0094 -0.0151 
PerDem 0.0012 A 0.0006 0.0009   0.0017 C 0.0005 0.0009   0.0013 B 0.0010 0.0011 A 
PerBach 0.0011 0.0005 -0.0002   0.0036 B 0.0014 0.0020   0.0031 B 0.0037 B 0.0035 B 
Pnonwhite 0.0004 0.0028 0.0020   0.0007 0.0009 0.0010   0.0022 0.0023 0.0022 
Pforborn 0.0054 B 0.0052 B 0.0046 B   0.0064 C 0.0060 C 0.0057 C   0.0083 C 0.0080 C 0.0088 C 
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HighEd 0.0011 0.0007 0.0010   0.0037 B 0.0031 A 0.0029 A   0.0085 C 0.0078 C 0.0081 C 
Pats 0.0007 C 0.0010 C 0.0009 C   0.0012 C 0.0013 C 0.0013 C   0.0020 C 0.0021 C 0.0020 C 
NorthAtl -0.021 0.018 -0.002   -0.0129 -0.0561 -0.0454   -0.0785 -0.0577 -0.0600 
SouthAtl 0.050 0.067 A 0.046   0.0057 0.0535 0.0562   0.0876 B 0.0856 B 0.0913 B 
NorthCen -0.024 -0.037 -0.012   -0.0632 -0.0545 -0.0386   -0.0485 -0.0483 -0.0377 
Mount 0.183 C 0.127 B 0.159 B   0.0656 0.1191 B 0.1610 C   0.0438 0.0123 0.0205 
Pacific 0.392 C 0.388 C 0.375 C   0.3709 C 0.2960 C 0.3653 C   0.2626 C 0.2426 C 0.2546 C 
Log-Likeli -33766 -33798 -33799   -45247 -45321 -45375   -60575 -60594 -60583 
Pseudo  R2 0.169 0.168 0.168  0.167 0.166 0.165  0.180 0.179 0.180 
 
 A Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level of significance. 
 B Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance. 
 C Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 12 
 
Coefficient Estimates from Simple Conditional Logit:  
New Employees   
 
 SAMPLE 2:  Ph.D.s without Contractual Obligation to Previous Employers (N= 18,795) 
  Choice Set Size = 6   Choice Set Size = 11   Choice Set Size = 26 
Variable 
Model 1 
(Draw 1) 
Model 2 
(Draw 2) 
Model 3 
(Draw 3)   
Model 4 
 (Draw 1) 
Model 5 
 (Draw 2) 
Model 6 
 (Draw 3)   
Model 7 
(Draw 1) 
Model 8 
(Draw 2) 
Model 9 
(Draw 3) 
CompCons 0.00008 C 0.00007 C 0.00006 C   0.00008 C 0.00011 C 0.00011 C   0.00015 C 0.00016 C 0.00016 C 
Distance -0.999 C -0.996 C -0.996 C   -1.0447 C -1.038 C -1.034 C   -1.077 C -1.073 C -1.073 C 
JanSun -0.0008 B -0.0011 C -0.0007 A   -0.0005 -0.0009 C -0.0010 C   -0.0008 B -0.0007 B -0.0007 B 
JanTemp 0.0075 C 0.0065 C 0.0069 C   0.0076 C 0.0086 C 0.0073 C   0.0087 C 0.0085 C 0.0081 C 
JulRH -0.0041 C -0.0047 C -0.0040 C   -0.0047 C -0.0055 C -0.0045 C   -0.0082 C -0.0084 C -0.0083 C 
JulTemp -0.0056 -0.0066 -0.0064   -0.0061 -0.0113 B -0.0060   -0.0147 C -0.0157 C -0.0135 C 
PWater -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004   -0.0009 -0.0022 B -0.0023 B   -0.0031 C -0.0029 C -0.0026 C 
Coast 0.0375 0.0660 B 0.0507   0.1019 C 0.0832 C 0.1010 C   0.1348 C 0.1391 C 0.1284 C 
Vcrime -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00008   -0.00001 -0.00004 -0.00001   -0.00004 -0.00002 -0.00005 
Parkacre -0.0018 A -0.0019 A -0.0014   -0.0002 -0.0016 A -0.0012   -0.0017 A -0.0019 A -0.0018 A 
BadAQ -0.0033 C -0.0033 C -0.0031 C   -0.0017 -0.0036 C -0.0033 A   -0.0032 A -0.0031 A -0.0036 A 
Supfund 0.0011 0.0008 0.0011   0.0004  0.0016 0.0016   0.0017 A 0.0021 B 0.0021 B 
Art_Ent 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0003   -0.0019 B -0.0007 -0.0007   -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0008 
PupTeach -0.0088 C -0.0089 C -0.0093 C   -0.0134 C -0.0095 C -0.0076 C   -0.0102 C -0.0090 C -0.0093 C 
Studexp -0.0259 -0.0268 -0.0281 A   -0.0076 -0.0226 -0.0109   -0.0254 A -0.0298 A -0.0275 A 
NStudnts -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0019  -0.0029  -0.0004 0.0014  -0.0044 -0.0007 -0.0013 
Comtime -0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0019   -0.0068 A -0.0066 -0.0063   -0.0082 B -0.0088 B -0.0064 A 
MSASize 0.0121 B 0.0121 B 0.0072  0.0048 0.0116 C 0.0078 A  0.0105 B 0.0117 C 0.0094 B 
PopDens -0.0012 -0.0102 -0.0111  -0.0318 B -0.0026 -0.0110  -0.0253 A -0.0185 -0.0299 B 
PerDem 0.0010 0.0002 0.0009   0.0018 B 0.0004 0.0008   0.0014 B 0.0009 0.0011 
PerBach 0.0017 0.0007 0.0003   0.0038 B 0.0021 0.0022   0.0035 B 0.0044 B 0.0038 B 
Pnonwhite 0.0008 0.0026 0.0023   0.0009 0.0013 0.0011   0.0029A 0.0030 A 0.0028 A 
Pforborn 0.0056 B 0.0059 B 0.0059 B   0.0081 C 0.0069 C 0.0070 C   0.0094 C 0.0084 C 0.0099 C 
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HighEd 0.0018 0.0019 0.0024   0.0055 C 0.0044B 0.0039 B   0.0097 C 0.0086 C 0.0095 C 
Pats 0.0009 C 0.0012 C 0.0011 C   0.0014 C 0.0015 C 0.0015 C   0.0022 C 0.0024 C 0.0022 C 
NorthAtl 0.067 0.097 0.082   0.0762 0.0466 0.0459   0.0237 0.0417 0.0420 
SouthAtl 0.113 B 0.131 C 0.120 C   0.0799 A 0.1341 C 0.1342 C   0.1686 C 0.1611 C 0.1755 C 
NorthCen 0.028 0.026 0.055   0.0103 0.0157 0.0270   0.0242 0.0198 0.0365 
Mount 0.207 C 0.170 B 0.211 C   0.1204 A 0.163 C 0.216 C   0.064 0.037 0.059 
Pacific 0.428 C 0.441 C 0.426 C   0.4391 C 0.3612 C 0.4194 C   0.3197 C 0.2933 C 0.3318 C 
Log-Likeli -28817 -28844 -28867   -38471.9 -38532 -38569   -51283 -51280 -51285 
Pseudo  R2 0.144 0.143 0.143  0.146 0.145 0.144  0.163 0.163 0.163 
 
 A Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level of significance. 
 B Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance. 
 C Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 13 
 
Percent Ranges of Coefficients across Simple Conditional Logit Models 
 
  ALL Ph.D.S (N=22,666)   New Employees (N=18,795) 
Variable 
PRange 
All Csets 
PRange 
Cset=6 
PRange 
Cset=11 
PRange 
Cset=26   
PRange 
All Csets 
PRange 
Cset=6 
PRange 
Cset=11 
PRange 
Cset=26 
CompCons 1.46 0.27 1.18 0.02  1.17 0.24 0.83 0.04 
Distance 0.096 0.003 0.047 0.003  0.074 0.003 0.048 0.0004 
JanSun 1.16 1.05 0.87 0.19  0.73 0.49 0.61 0.10 
JanTemp 0.29 0.15 0.12 0.05  0.28 0.15 0.17 0.07 
JulRH 0.71 0.17 0.31 0.03  0.82 0.17 0.39 0.02 
JulTemp 0.91 0.12 0.73 0.03  1.37 0.16 1.21 0.14 
PWater 14.06 0.10 3.26 0.37  2.11 0.41 1.78 0.16 
Coast 1.50 0.90 0.52 0.12  1.14 0.55 0.49 0.08 
Vcrime 3.27 0.22 13.35 0.28  2.08 0.27 3.00 0.85 
Parkacre 1.66 0.37 2.41 0.18  1.24 0.28 1.58 0.11 
BadAQ 0.58 0.17 0.62 0.11  0.58 0.07 0.62 0.17 
Supfund 0.74 0.17 0.60 0.17  1.25 0.31 1.02 0.24 
Art_Ent 1.31 1.21 0.33 0.31  3.89 4.18 0.58 0.65 
PupTeach 0.92 0.21 0.86 0.30  0.37 0.05 0.33 0.12 
Studexp 0.85 0.36 0.63 0.21  0.77 0.08 0.84 0.16 
NStudnts 6.65 1.08 5.14 2.24  3.40 2.42 2.90 1.73 
Comtime 1.07 0.88 0.05 0.19  1.23 0.66 0.18 0.30 
MSASize 0.47 0.38 0.44 0.10  0.72 0.47 0.80 0.23 
PopDens 11.35 1.43 4.03 0.47  1.98 1.31 1.57 0.47 
PerDem 0.90 0.73 0.97 0.25  1.38 1.06 1.23 0.38 
PerBach 1.87 2.69 1.01 0.19  1.64 1.55 0.68 0.24 
Pnonwhite 2.37 1.43 4.08 0.02  1.94 0.99 2.92 0.04 
Pforborn 0.68 0.17 0.25 0.10  0.59 0.06 0.08 0.16 
HighEd 2.14 0.41 1.16 0.09  1.59 0.28 0.65 0.11 
Pats 1.26 0.26 0.78 0.06  1.12 0.20 0.66 0.08 
NorthAtl 2.76 29.46 1.10 0.32  1.27 0.37 0.55 0.51 
SouthAtl 2.05 0.38 2.90 0.07  0.95 0.15 0.79 0.09 
NorthCen 1.60 1.03 0.71 0.24  2.37 0.80 2.52 0.62 
Mount 1.56 0.36 0.40 0.91   1.25 0.21 0.30 0.49 
Pacific 0.51 0.04 0.32 0.08  0.48 0.03 0.28 0.12 
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Table 14 
 
Individual Variable Definitions, Interaction Terms, and Summary Statistics 
 
Individual 
Variables Definition Mean Std Dev 
Age Age of individual at the time of Ph.D. 32.7 5.4 
Married Dummy variable indicating whether or not Ph.D. is married  0.4 0.49 
SameC_Ph.D. 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not a Ph.D. was went college and 
earned in their Ph.D. in the same state 0.19 0.39 
Parent Dummy variable indicating whether or not Ph.D. has a child 0.22 0.42 
White Dummy variable indicating whether or not a Ph.D. is Caucasian 0.62 0.48 
USCit Dummy variable indicating whether or not a Ph.D. is a US Citizen 0.62 0.48 
Industry 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not a Ph.D. has definite plans for 
employment in industry 0.39 0.49 
Postdoc 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not a Ph.D. has definite plans for 
employment in a postdoctoral appointment 0.45 0.50 
Interacted 
Variable 
Names Interaction Mean Std Dev 
Age*Dist Age*Distance 213 25.2 
Marr*Dist Married*Distance 0.35 0.7 
C_Ph.D.*Dist SameC_Ph.D.*Distance 0.10 0.4 
Par*Vcrim Parent*VCrime 132.1 314.9 
Par*Nstuds Parent*NStudnts 3.0 6.3 
Par*Stuexp Parent*StudExp 1.2 2.6 
Par*PupT Parent*Pupteach 3.5 7.3 
White*PNW White*Pnonwhite 16.5 16.3 
USCit*PFB USCit*Pforborn 8.4 10.6 
Ind*Pats Industry*Pats 30.1 64.7 
Pdoc*JanSun Postdoc* JanSun 75.6 84.2 
Pdoc *JulRH Postdoc* JulyRH 28.0 30.8 
Pdoc *SupFun Postdoc* SupFund 4.0 9.1 
Pdoc *ArtEnt Postdoc* Art_Ent 18.2 21.0 
Pdoc *Ctime Postdoc* ComTime 12.4 13.4 
Pdoc *PFB Postdoc* Pforborn 6.5 9.9 
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Table 15 
 
Coefficient Estimates from Hybrid Conditional Logit Models 
 
 Sample:  Ph.D.s without Contractual Obligation to Previous Employers (N= 18,795) 
  Choice Set Size = 6   Choice Set Size = 11   Choice Set Size = 26 
Variable 
Model 1 
(Draw 1) 
Model 2 
(Draw 2) 
Model 3 
(Draw 3)   
Model 4 
 (Draw 1) 
Model 5 
 (Draw 2)
Model 6 
 (Draw 3)   
Model 7 
(Draw 1) 
Model 8 
(Draw 2) 
Model 9 
(Draw 3) 
CompCons 0.00005B 0.00004 0.00003   0.00004 A 0.00005 B 0.00006 B   0.00007 C 0.00008 C 0.00008 C 
Distance 0.8025 C 0.8680 C 0.8979 C   0.9686 C 1.0559 C 0.9834 C   1.1780 C 1.1425 C 1.1759 C 
JanSun -0.0014 C -0.0017 C -0.0013 C   -0.0012 C -0.0015 C -0.0017 C   -0.0018 C -0.0017 C -0.0018 C 
JanTemp 0.0072 C 0.0067 C 0.0075 C   0.0080 C 0.0093 C 0.0076 C   0.0093 C 0.0092 C 0.0087 C 
JulRH -0.0042 C -0.0056 C -0.0041 C   -0.0051 C -0.0058 C -0.0047 C   -0.0073 C -0.0073 C -0.0073 C 
JulTemp -0.0034 -0.0054 -0.0068   -0.0062 -0.0111 B -0.0051   -0.0139 C -0.0155 C -0.0132 C 
PWater -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003   -0.0005 -0.0019 A -0.0020 B   -0.0026 C -0.0025 C -0.0021 C 
Coast 0.0525  0.0743 A 0.0582 B   0.1093 C 0.0910 C 0.1161 C   0.1444 C 0.1468 C 0.1395 C 
Vcrime -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00003   0.00005 0.00001 0.00004   0.00003 0.00004 0.00001 
Parkacre -0.0018 -0.0022 A -0.0017   -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0013   -0.0016 -0.0019 A -0.0018 A 
BadAQ -0.0035 C -0.0035 C -0.0031   -0.0016 C -0.0037 C -0.0033 C   -0.0034 C -0.0032 C -0.0037 C 
Supfund 0.0011 0.0011 0.0017   0.0007 0.0020 0.0020   0.0027 B 0.0034 C 0.0031 C 
Art_Ent -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0006   -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0015   -0.0031 C -0.0026 B -0.0025 C 
Studexp -0.0085 -0.0169 -0.0153   -0.0028 -0.0125 -0.0010   -0.0183 -0.0237 -0.0204 
PupTeach -0.0087 C -0.0081 B -0.0093 C   -0.0069 B -0.0090 C -0.0065 B   -0.0095 C -0.0086 C -0.0087 C 
NStudnts -0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0063   -0.0081 -0.0032 -0.0035   -0.0073 -0.0034 -0.0042 
Comtime -0.0060 -0.0039 -0.0034   -0.0090 A -0.0076 -0.0088 A   -0.0119 B -0.0110 B -0.0089 A 
MSASize 0.0111 B 0.0112 B 0.0078   0.0048 0.0119 C 0.0070   0.0106 B 0.0122 C 0.0096 B 
PopDens -0.0135 -0.0211 -0.0179   -0.0411 C -0.0116 -0.0248   -0.0380 C -0.0289 B -0.0416 C 
PerDem 0.0008 0.00001 0.0007   0.0015 B 0.0001 0.0005   0.0009 0.0004 0.0006 
PerBach 0.0022 0.0010 0.0012   0.0046 B 0.0028 0.0026   0.0042 B 0.0053 C 0.0046 C 
Pnonwhite 0.0073 C 0.0094 C 0.0091 C   0.0078 C 0.0084 C 0.0076 C   0.0097 C 0.0096 C 0.0093 C 
Pforborn 0.0159 C 0.0155 C 0.0149 C   0.0184 C 0.0178 C 0.0195 C   0.0238 C 0.0224 C 0.0239 C 
HighEd 0.0015 0.0016 0.0018   0.0047 B 0.0034 A 0.0033 A   0.0085 C 0.0073 C 0.0083 C 
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Pats 0.0005 A 0.0007 B 0.0005 A   0.0007 B 0.0006 B 0.0008 B   0.0012 C 0.0013 C 0.0011 C 
NorthAtl 0.1165 0.1481 B 0.1273 A   0.1223 A 0.1127 A 0.1097   0.1102 A 0.1242 A 0.1195 A 
SouthAtl 0.1292 C 0.1493 C 0.1318 C   0.0876 B 0.1491 C 0.1475 C   0.1824 C 0.1704 C 0.1845 C 
NorthCen 0.0501 0.0515 0.0783   0.0342 0.0510 0.0619   0.0678 0.0605 0.0752 A 
Mount 0.2181 C 0.1726 B 0.2080 C   0.1119 A 0.1580 B 0.2161 C   0.0640 0.0314 0.0539 
Pacific 0.4502 C 0.4510 C 0.4148 C   0.4199 C 0.3437 C 0.4130 C   0.2955 C 0.2669 C 0.3021 C 
Age*Dist -0.0509 C -0.0533 C -0.0539 C   -0.0575 C -0.0601 C -0.0575 C   -0.0650 C -0.0635 C -0.0648 C 
Marr*Dist -0.2847 C -0.2642 C -0.2835 C   -0.3012 C -0.2988 C -0.3084 C   -0.3135 C -0.3256 C -0.3146 C 
C_Ph.D.*Dist -0.4272 C -0.4130 C -0.4283 C   -0.4357 C -0.4332 C -0.4389 C   -0.4880 C -0.4985 C -0.4900 C 
Par*VCrim -0.0003 C -0.0003 C -0.0002 C   -0.0003 C -0.0003 C -0.0002 C   -0.0003 C -0.0002 C -0.0003 C 
Par*Nstuds 0.0092 0.0195 A 0.0265 B   0.0289 C 0.0200 A 0.0298 C   0.0230 B 0.0241 B 0.0247 B 
Par*Stuexp -0.0953 C -0.0674 C -0.0754 C   -0.0681 C -0.0762 C -0.0731 C   -0.0788 C -0.0786 C -0.0795 C 
Par*PupT 0.0006 -0.0013 0.0018   -0.0028 0.0007 -0.0029   0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 
White*PNW -0.0107 C -0.0111 C -0.0109 C   -0.0113 C -0.0115 C -0.0109 C   -0.0118 C -0.0115 C -0.0115 C 
USCit*PFB -0.0113 C -0.0116 C -0.0120 C   -0.0126 C -0.0123 C -0.0140 C   -0.0140 C -0.0143 C -0.0143 C 
Ind*Pats 0.0005 0.0006 A 0.0007 A   0.0011 C 0.0014 C 0.0011 C   0.0018 C 0.0018 C 0.0019 C 
Pdoc*JanSun 0.0010 A 0.0010 B 0.0010 B   0.0015 C 0.0012B 0.0014 C   0.0020 C 0.0020 C 0.0021 C 
Pdoc*JulRH 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0002   0.0002 0.0001 0.0003   -0.0018 -0.0023 A -0.0019 C 
Pdoc*SupFun -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0013   -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0012   -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0023 
Pdoc*ArtEnt 0.0019 0.0007 0.0014   0.0004 0.0029 B 0.0029 B   0.0057 C 0.0057 C 0.0050 C 
Pdoc*CTime 0.0128 B 0.0079 0.0082   0.0108 B 0.0104 B 0.0125 B   0.0177 C 0.0151 C 0.0151 C 
Pdoc*PFB -0.0081 C -0.0061 B -0.0048   -0.0063 B -0.0086 C -0.0092 C   -0.0134 C -0.0126 C -0.0122 C 
Log-Likeli -28442 -28474 -28473   -38004 -38037 -38078   -50646 -50644 -50647 
Pseudo R2 0.155 0.154 0.154   0.157 0.156 0.155   0.173 0.173 0.173 
 
  A Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level of significance. 
  B Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance. 
  C Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 16 
   
Hausman-McFadden Tests for IIA 
Conditional Logit Models 
 
Model CL: New 
Employees (Table 12) 
Chi-Sq 
Stat 
Critical  
Chi-Sq Stat Comment 
1: CC=6, Draw 1 9.26 43.7 No Rejection*  
2: CC=6, Draw 2 12.31 43.7 No Rejection  
3: CC=6, Draw 3 12.11 43.7 No Rejection  
1: CC=11, Draw 1 7.87 43.7 No Rejection  
2: CC=11, Draw 2 4.94 43.7 No Rejection  
3: CC=11, Draw 3 4.07 43.7 No Rejection  
1: CC=26, Draw 1 0.74 43.7 No Rejection  
2: CC=26, Draw 2 1.46 43.7 No Rejection  
3: CC=26, Draw 3 0.59 43.7 No Rejection  
   
  *Indicates the Null Hypothesis of IIA cannot be rejected  
    at the 95% level of significance. 
 (d.f. equals 30 in all tests) 
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Table 17 
 
Coefficient Estimates from Mixed Logit Models 
 
  
Specification I:   
No Interaction Terms  
Specification 2:   
With Interaction Terms 
  Choice Set Size = 26  Choice Set Size = 26 
Variable  Draw 1 Draw 2 Draw 3   Draw 1 Draw 2 Draw 3 
CompCons 0.00015 C 0.00016 C 0.00016 C  0.00009 C 0.00009 C 0.00009 C 
Distance -1.1659 C -1.1665 C -1.1678 C  1.1463 C 1.1010 C 1.1365 C 
JanSun -0.00014 -0.00003 -0.00005  -0.0014 C -0.0012 C -0.0013 C 
Ns JanSun 0.00011 0.00001 0.00020  n/a n/a n/a 
JanTemp 0.0021 0.0029 0.0022  0.0026 0.0029 0.0021 
STD JanTemp 0.0145 C 0.0132 C 0.0133 C  0.0151 C 0.0145 C 0.0152 C 
JulRH -0.0089 C -0.0093 C -0.0092 C  -0.0080 C -0.0081 C -0.0082 C 
JulTemp -0.0134 C -0.0154 C -0.0129 C  -0.0099 A -0.0123 B -0.0099 A 
PWater -0.0017 A -0.0014  -0.0010   -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0010 
Coast 0.1825 C 0.1873 C 0.1773 C  0.1823 C 0.1863 C 0.1800 C 
Vcrime 0.00001 0.00003 0.00001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Parkacre -0.0015 -0.0018 A -0.0016  -0.0013 -0.0017 A -0.0015 
BadAQ -0.0026 B -0.0025 B -0.0032 C  -0.0027 C -0.0026 B -0.0031 C 
Supfund 0.0004 0.0010 0.0010  0.0013 0.0021 A 0.0019 
Art_Ent -0.0028 C -0.0027 C -0.0030 C  -0.0040 C -0.0037 C -0.0036 C 
Studexp -0.0560 C -0.0590 C -0.0592 C  -0.0356 A -0.0440 B -0.0462 B 
STD Studexp 0.2120 C 0.2246 C 0.2337 C  0.1510 C 0.1734 C 0.1923 C 
PupTeach -0.0126 C -0.0119 C -0.0118 C  -0.0123 C -0.0112 C -0.0108 C 
NStudnts -0.0142 C -0.0105 B -0.0117 B  -0.0148 C -0.0115 B -0.0131 B 
Comtime -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0005  -0.0057 -0.0049 -0.0031 
MSASize 0.0094 B 0.0116 C 0.0087 B  0.0087 B 0.0109 B 0.0078 A 
PopDens -0.0629 C -0.0601 C -0.0744 C  -0.0679 C -0.0607 C -0.0755 C 
PerDem 0.0013 B 0.0008 0.0010  0.0009 0.0004 0.0007 
PerBach 0.0071 0.0081 0.0071  0.0072 C 0.0080 C 0.0070 C 
Pnonwhite 0.0014 C 0.0015 C 0.0013 C  0.0091 C 0.0090 C 0.0089 C 
STD Pnonwhite 0.0193 C 0.0241 C 0.0251 C  0.0063 0.0143 0.0158 B 
Pforborn 0.0078 C 0.0067 C 0.0082 C  0.0222 C 0.0208 C 0.0222 C 
HighEd 0.0104 C 0.0096 C 0.0106 C  0.0088 C 0.0078 C 0.0090 C 
Pats 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004  -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
STD Pats 0.0066 C 0.0065 C 0.0062 C  0.0048 C 0.0046 C 0.0043 C 
NorthAtl 0.0368 0.0498 0.0524  0.1125 A 0.1275 A 0.1295 B 
SouthAtl 0.1548 C 0.1555 C 0.1763 C  0.1631 C 0.1571 C 0.1779 C 
NorthCen -0.0087 -0.0010 0.0175  0.0207 0.0214 0.0385 
Mount -0.0384 -0.0720 -0.0521  -0.0084 -0.0482 -0.0311 
Pacific 0.4175 C 0.3820 C 0.4301 C  0.4071 C 0.3714 C 0.4141 C 
Age*Dist n/a n/a n/a  -0.0657 C -0.0640 C -0.0655 C 
Marr*Dist n/a n/a n/a  -0.3306 C -0.3447 C -0.3322 C 
C_Ph.D.*Dist n/a n/a n/a  -0.5002 C -0.5122 C -0.4978 C 
Par*VCrim n/a n/a n/a  -0.0003 C -0.0003 C -0.0003 C 
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Par*Nstuds n/a n/a n/a  0.0227 B 0.0238 B 0.0239 B 
Par*Stuexp n/a n/a n/a  -0.0819 C -0.0811 C -0.0840 C 
Ns Par*Stuexp n/a n/a n/a  0.0184 0.0172 0.0176 
Par*PupTeach n/a n/a n/a  0.0020 0.0016 0.0017 
White*PNW n/a n/a n/a  -0.0126 C -0.0121 C -0.0122 C 
STD White*PNW n/a n/a n/a  0.0181 C 0.0144 B 0.0127  
USCit*PFB n/a n/a n/a  -0.0139 C -0.0144 C -0.0143 C  
Ind*Pats n/a n/a n/a  0.0011 B 0.0012 B 0.0012 B 
STD Ind*Pats n/a n/a n/a  0.0050 C 0.0049 C 0.0049 C 
Pdoc*JanSun n/a n/a n/a  0.0022 C 0.0021 C 0.0023 C 
Pdoc*JulRH n/a n/a n/a  -0.0011  -0.0016  -0.0011  
Pdoc*SupFun n/a n/a n/a  -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0020 
Pdoc*ArtEnt n/a n/a n/a  0.0051 C 0.0051 C 0.0044 C 
Pdoc*CTime n/a n/a n/a  0.0164 C 0.0134 C 0.0134 C 
Pdoc*PFB n/a n/a n/a  -0.0124 C -0.0114 C -0.0110 C 
Log-Likelihood -51207 -51200 -51207  -50588 -50589 -50593 
Pseudo R2 0.164 0.164 0.164   0.174 0.174 0.174 
 
      A Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level of significance. 
      B Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance. 
      C Indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY ESTIMATES 
 
 
 
 The results presented in Chapter 5 offer insight into Ph.D.s’ qualitative 
preferences toward MSA attributes.  However, the estimated utility coefficients can 
provide only limited insight into preference intensities, or the extent to which the 
attributes of MSAs affect Ph.D.s’ location choice.   To gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the role of amenities in location choice, this chapter translates the utility 
coefficients estimated in Chapter 5 into willingness to pay (WTP) estimates.  Estimating 
willingness to pay is analogous to asking, “If the level of an attribute increased by 10% 
percent in all MSAs, how much private consumption could we take away from (or give 
to) each Ph.D. such that their expected utility level remain unchanged?”  In answering 
this question, the WTP estimates facilitate an equalized measure of the relative 
importance of attributes on Ph.D. location choice. 94    
 To assess the reliability of the estimates across models, WTP is calculated using 
coefficients from four different types of random utility models: the simple conditional 
logit, the simple mixed logit, the hybrid conditional logit, and the hybrid mixed logit 
model.95  The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section A presents the 
WTP estimates using the estimated coefficients from the simple specifications of the 
                                                 
94 All WTP estimates are reported in constant 1999 dollars. 
95 The marginal WTP estimates, or the implicit prices attributes, are reported in Table A8 of the appendix.  
The implicit price represents the amount a Ph.D. pays for unit change in the value of an attribute 
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conditional and mixed logit models (e.g.,, the models that do not control for observed 
preference heterogeneity).  These estimates provide insight into the relative values for 
attributes across the full population of Ph.D.s in our sample.  Section B reports the WTP 
estimates using the coefficients from the conditional and mixed logit hybrid models, and 
provides greater insight into how values for attributes vary across observable 
characteristics of Ph.D.s.  Section C summarizes the main findings of this chapter.   
 
A. Simple Specifications 
 Each WTP estimate represents the average amount a Ph.D.’s net income must 
change after a 10% increase to the value of the attribute in order to keep their utility 
constant.   The WTP estimates are calculated for each attribute as follows.  First, each 
Ph.D.’s expected maximum utility is estimated before any changes are made to the level 
of amenities in cities.  This is calculated as the product of the utility coefficients from the 
RUM, and the observed levels of each attribute in all cities, or: 
BASEEU  =ln∑
=
+++
J
j
njnjj XBXBXB
1
2211 )}ˆ...ˆˆ{exp(      (40) 
where 1Bˆ represents the estimated coefficient on attribute 1X , nBˆ  represents the estimated 
coefficient on attribute nX , and
BASEEU  represents Ph.D.s’ baseline expected maximum 
utility level.  Next, the level of the attribute in question, 1X , is exogenously increased by 
10% in all cities, and the new maximum expected utility level, NEWEU , is  computed 
with the change in the attribute set:   
NEWEU  =ln∑
=
+++
J
j
njnjj XBXBXB
1
22
*
11 )}ˆ...ˆˆ{exp(      (41) 
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where the vector *1 jX denotes that city j has a 10% greater amount of attribute 1X than 
previously. Finally, each Ph.D.’s WTP for a 10% increase in attribute 1X equals the 
change in expected utility divided by the coefficient on private consumption, or:  
WTP=( NEWEU - BASEEU )/ ψˆ          (42) 
where ψˆ  is the coefficient on private consumption that converts the utility difference into 
monetary terms. 
  Intuitively, a WTP estimate for attribute X of say, $1,000, indicates that on 
average Ph.D.s are willing to sacrifice $1,000 of private consumption for a 10% increase 
in the level of attribute X in all MSAs.  Similarly, a WTP estimate of -$1,000 suggests 
that on average Ph.D.s are willing to pay $1,000 for a 10% decrease in the level of 
amenity X in all MSAs.   
 Table 18 reports the WTP estimates for city attributes using the coefficient 
estimates from the simple specifications of the conditional and mixed logit models.  For 
simplicity, the WTP estimates reported in Table 18 are calculated using the coefficients 
from the same choice set sample; draw 3 of choice set 26.  The WTP estimates are 
separately calculated for all city attributes, excluding the control variables, MSA size, 
population density, and the region indicators.  Model 1 (column 3) reports the WTP 
estimates for the simple specification of the conditional logit model, and Model 2 
(column 4) reports the WTP estimates for the simple specification of the mixed logit 
model.  Table 18 also reports the mean value of a 10% change for each attribute and an 
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indicator for whether the estimated coefficient from the model was significant at the 10% 
level or better.96   
 The WTP estimates give us a sense of the relative values Ph.D.s place on 
amenities, and therefore provide some indication as to the impact amenity changes have 
on Ph.D. location choice.  With this in mind, it is evident from Table 18 that Ph.D.’s 
place substantially larger values toward natural amenities than other city attributes.  The 
highest valued attribute, due to its binary nature, is the value of living on the coastline.  
The estimates from the conditional (CL) and mixed logit (MXL) models, respectively, 
suggest that Ph.D.s are willing to pay $8,156 and $11,856 to live on the coastline.  Of the 
continuous variables, Ph.D.s reveal the strongest preferences for summer temperatures 
and summer humidity (JulyRH).  The results from both the CL and MXL models suggest 
that Ph.D.s are willing to pay more than $6,000 to avoid a 10% increase in JulyTemp, and 
approximately $3,000 to avoid a 10% increase in JulyRH.97   The results also suggest that 
changes in winter temperatures can have a substantial effect to Ph.D. welfare. The 
estimates from the CL model imply that Ph.D.s are willing to pay $1,856 for a 10% 
increase in January temperatures.98 
 The WTP estimates on publicly-provided amenities are generally much lower in 
absolute value.  One exception is the surprisingly large and counterintuitive estimated 
value for expenditures per student.  The MXL model suggests that Ph.D.s value a 10% 
                                                 
96 Note the indicator for significance does not indicate that the willingness to pay estimate is significantly 
different from zero, but that the estimated coefficient on the variable was significant at the 10% level or 
better in the RUM. 
97 The interpretation of a 10% increase in variables that are already defined in percentage terms can be 
confusing.  The change represents a percentage increase relative to the current levels, not a percentage 
increase in absolute terms.  For example, a 10% increase in July relative humidity in a city would be 
represented by a change from 60% to 66%, not a change from 60% to 70%.      
98 To place the estimates in perspective, the mean estimated net income for all Ph.D.s equals $33,309.  
Thus, the estimates suggest that, on average, Ph.D.s are willing to sacrifice approximately 5.5% of their net 
income for a 10% increase in January temperatures. 
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decrease in expenditures per student at over $2,000; the estimate from the CL model is 
approximately $940.  These large estimates suggest that the variable is likely capturing 
more than just the influence of spending on students.  For instance, Berne and Steifel 
(1994) found a positive relationship between poverty rates, as measured by the percent of 
students who qualified for the free lunch program, and per pupil spending. Thus, the large 
negative estimate on Studexp may reflect a broader distaste for MSAs with higher 
property tax rates and/or higher poverty rates.   
 The WTP estimates are lower in absolute value for the remaining publicly-
provided amenities.  The results from both models suggest that Ph.D.s value a 10% 
improvement in air quality at approximately $200.  Congestion may have a greater 
impact on Ph.D. welfare than air quality.  The estimates from the CL model suggest that 
new Ph.D.s are willing to pay $940 for a 10% decrease in commute times.  The value of 
pupil to teacher ratios is within a similar range.  The estimates from the CL and MXL 
models suggest that Ph.D.s value a 10% decrease in pupil to teacher ratios at $1,018 and 
$1,273, respectively.  
 The WTP estimates for changes in the demographic composition of MSAs are 
similar in magnitude to those of the publicly-provided amenities.  The estimates for a 
10% increase in the percent highly educated range from $591in the CL model to $1,088 
in the MXL model.  In addition, the estimated value placed on a 10% increase in the 
percent foreign born is approximately $500 and $400 in the CL and MXL models, 
respectively, while the same increase in percent non-white is valued at $366 in the CL 
model.  Finally, the CL models suggest Ph.D.s are willing to pay $462 and $257 for a 
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10% increase in the number of patents and the number of universities in an MSA, 
respectively. 
B. Hybrid Specifications 
 Table 19 presents the WTP estimates based on the hybrid specifications of the 
conditional and mixed logit models.   The estimates are calculated using the coefficients 
from the same choice set samples as earlier (choice set size 26, draw 3).  The method of 
estimating WTP for the hybrid specifications is the same as described in the previous 
section, except relevant individual characteristics are included in the formulation of 
expected utility (see Table 14 for the list of relevant individual characteristics).    
 The inclusion of the interaction terms allows us to estimate how values vary 
across groups of Ph.D.s.    For instance, the inclusion of the interacted term 
Vcrime*Parent allows us to assess the welfare changes associated with a 10% in violent 
crime for both parents and Ph.D.s without children.   To facilitate comparison across 
observable characteristics, Table 19 reports the WTP estimates on interacted variables for 
both relevant groups. Non-interacted variables, on the other hand, do not systematically 
vary across observable characteristics of Ph.D.s.  Thus, Table 19 reports only one 
estimate for non-interacted variables, reflecting the average willingness to pay across the 
entire sample of Ph.D.s.    
 The estimates from the hybrid models are qualitatively similar to the non-hybrid 
models, but generally larger in magnitude.   For example, the hybrid specifications of the 
CL and MXL models suggest that Ph.D.s value the coast at $19,253 and $18,326, 
respectively.  These estimates are more than $8,000 greater than the comparable 
estimates from the simple specifications.   The primary reason the estimates are higher in 
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magnitude in the hybrid specifications is the difference in the estimated coefficient on 
private consumption.  Recall, the coefficient on private consumption represents Ph.D.s’ 
marginal utility of income, and the WTP estimates are very sensitive to its value.  A 
lower marginal utility of income, other things constant, implies larger willingness to pay 
estimates (see equation 42).   The coefficients on private consumption are approximately 
50% smaller in the hybrid models than in the simple specifications, implying that 
attribute values are approximately twice as large in absolute terms, other things equal.    
 Despite the quantitative differences, the attributes’ relative values are very similar 
across specifications.  As in the non-hybrid models, the climate variables are shown to be 
the highest valued attributes among Ph.D.s.   The results from the CL and MXL models, 
respectively, suggest that Ph.D.s are willing to pay approximately $13,000 and $8,000 for 
a 10% increase in July temperature.  In addition, the estimates for July humidity range 
between $5,000 and $6,857 in the CL and MXL models, respectively.  January 
temperatures are also highly valued.  The results from the CL hybrid model suggest that 
Ph.D.s are willing to pay $4,222 for a 10% increase in January temperature.  In 
comparison, the estimates from the CL and MXL models suggest Ph.D.s are willing to 
pay $436 and $297 for a 10% improvement in air quality, respectively. 
 The strength of the hybrid models is their ability to inform policymakers as to 
how changes to amenity levels may impact different subgroups of the population of 
Ph.D.s.  To facilitate comparison across observed characteristics, Table 19 categorizes 
the WTP estimates by individual characteristics for interacted variables.   The estimates 
from the CL model suggest that parents are willing to pay $1,817 for a 10% reduction in 
violent crime rates, while the comparable willingness to pay for Ph.D.s without children 
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is virtually zero ($90 but not statistically significant).  The implication is that lowering 
violent crime rates in a city can be an important draw for Ph.D.s with children, but would 
likely have a small impact on the location choices of Ph.D.s without children.    
 The values Ph.D.s place on certain amenities vary substantially across sector 
choice.  For instance, the estimates from the CL model suggests that Ph.D.s in industry 
value are willing to pay $1,445 for a 10% increase in the number of patents in cities, 
compared to only $474 for faculty and postdocs.   In addition, the WTP estimates on 
hours of January sunlight, the number of art and entertainment enterprises, and commute 
times are all positive for postdocs, but negative for industrial Ph.D.s and faculty.99  The 
difference in the values across sectors exceeds $3,000 for four of the seven attributes.    
 The diversity variables also take on considerably different values across socio-
demographic groups.  For instance, the CL model suggests that nonwhites value a 10% 
increase in the percentage of nonwhite residents at $2,713, whereas whites are willing to 
pay $719 for a 10% decrease in the percentage of nonwhite residents.  Similarly, the 
results suggest foreign-born Ph.D.s are willing to pay approximately $300 more for a 
10% increase in the percentage of foreign-born residents than are U.S. citizens.  These 
results are enlightening in light of Florida's (2002a, 2002b) works, which have asserted 
the importance of diversity to the highly educated.  The estimates do not run counter to 
the idea that the highly educated prefer diversity; in fact, the results suggest that, on 
average, new Ph.D.s are more likely to choose cities with more diversity, other things 
equal.  However, the results imply that this outcome is largely driven by the location 
choices of nonwhite and foreign-born Ph.D.s. 
                                                 
99 The negative estimate on January sunlight is likely driven by the “Pacific-Northwest effect” discussed in 
Chapter 5, which was particularly strong for Ph.D.s in industry 
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 Due to the unique nature of the model used to arrive at these estimates, many of 
the estimates presented here are not directly comparable to the estimates found in 
previous studies. One notable exception is Cragg and Kahn (1997), who estimate demand 
for several climate attributes using a random utility model on individual state location 
choices.   Table A.10 in the appendix provides a summary of how our findings on 
selected climate variables compare to those reported in Cragg and Kahn’s paper.  The 
results are generally within a favorable range of one another.  Notably, the authors 
estimate that college graduates are willing to pay between $984 and $5,788 for a 5.2 
degree decrease in July temperatures, where as our estimates range between $6,068 and 
$6,495 for an average decrease of 7.4 degrees.  In addition, the authors estimated values 
for July relative humidity range between $846 and $3,906; our comparable estimates 
range from $2,990 to $3,246.  Finally, Cragg and Kahn find demand estimates for winter 
(February) temperatures ranging from $1,182 to $10,860, while we find willingness to 
pay estimates that range between $497 and $1,856.100 
 In assessing the accuracy of these estimates, one must consider a number of 
factors relating to how closely the model can approximate the actual job/city choice 
process faced by Ph.D.s at the time of degree.  All random utility models must assume 
that an individual has complete information regarding the set of attributes available in 
each alternative prior to making the choice, and that they are able to recognize the trade-
offs among attributes in each alternative (McFadden, 2004).  While the validity of this 
                                                 
100 The estimates on winter temperatures reported here appear to be substantially different from the 
estimates found by Cragg and Kahn.  However, the variation is largely attributable to the difference in the 
amount that temperature changes. In particular, in Cragg and Kahn’s paper the estimates reflect the 
willingness to pay for a 10.4 degree increase in February temperature, whereas our estimates reflect the 
willingness to pay for an average increase of only 3.7 degrees in January temperature. 
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assumption is questionable in all discrete choice models, we recognize that it is 
particularly dubious in this application.   
 The choice of where to work and live is very complex and heterogeneous, and 
new Ph.D.s, most of whom are inexperienced in making employment related decisions, 
may not be fully aware of precisely what their choice entails.   For example, a new Ph.D. 
who has never seen an income above, say, $20,000, may overestimate the potential 
consumption power of $60,000 simply because they cannot draw upon previous 
experiences to process and appreciate the real value of that income.101  Consequently, 
new Ph.D.s’ ability to relate their expected income with the amenity levels in alternatives 
may be somewhat clouded.  This is not to say that a new Ph.D.’s choice of city will not 
be based on (and reveal) their preferences for city attributes; rather, that the imputed 
values for amenities, or willingness to tradeoff income, may be biased due to the 
cognitive context surrounding this choice. 
 
C. Summary 
 This chapter has provided insights into the relative importance of MSA attributes 
on Ph.D. location choice by estimating Ph.D.s willingness to pay for equal percentage 
changes in the level of amenities.  In both the simple and hybrid specifications, the 
estimates are substantially higher for climate variables than for publicly-provided 
amenities or other attributes.   Specifically, the highest valued attributes of all continuous 
variables are those indicating general climate (JulyTemp, JulyRH, and JanTemp).  Of 
publicly-provided amenities that are significant and of the expected sign, the highest 
                                                 
101 This is more of an issue with industrial Ph.D.s and faculty than for postdocs, simply because postdocs 
will not realize as drastic a change an income in their new position. 
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valued attribute is pupil to teacher ratios in public schools (Pupteach), followed by 
commute time to work (ComTime) and the level of air quality in the MSA (BadAQ).   
 In addition, it is evident from these results that the magnitudes of the WTP 
estimates are dependent on the structure of the model.  The models that control for 
observable heterogeneity have significantly larger WTP estimates.  These quantitative 
differences are largely driven by the lower estimated marginal utility of income in the 
hybrid specifications.  However, the relative values of amenities are generally consistent 
across specifications.  
 The hybrid specifications also highlight differences in valuations across 
observable characteristics of Ph.D.s. In particular, the results suggest that nonwhite 
Ph.D.s have a higher preference for cities with a higher level of racial diversity, and 
parents are more concerned with the level of violent crime in a city than are Ph.D.s 
without children.   The estimates also illustrate that sector choice plays a large role in 
how Ph.D.’s value amenities.  Based on these results, we now consider potential policy 
implications of results, acknowledge the limitations of the analysis, and discuss potential 
avenues for future research.  
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Table 18 
 
Mean Willingness to Pay for 10% Changes in Attribute Values: 
Simple Specification 
 
Variable 
Mean 10 % 
change 
Model (1): A  
Cond'l Logit 
(Spec 1) 
Model (2): B  
Mixed Logit 
(Spec 1) 
Coast1 n/a 8,156* 11,696* 
JanSun 15.2 -726* -48 
JanTemp 3.7 1,856* 497 
JulRH 5.7 -2,990* -3,246* 
JulTemp 7.6 -6,495* -6,068* 
PWater 0.83 -131* -50* 
Vcrime 56.2 -179 18 
Parkacre 435 -38* -34* 
BadAQ 0.82 -202* -173* 
Supfund 0.31 46* 22 
Art_Ent 3.6 -174* -667* 
Studexp 599 -943* -2,231* 
PupTeach 1.7 -1,018* -1,273* 
NStudnts 1.7 -140* -1,236 
Comtime 2.3 -940* -73 
PerDem 4.6 322 298 
PerBach 2.4 591* 1,088* 
Pnonwhite 2.0 366* 197 
Pforborn 0.74 508* 401* 
HighEd 0.34 257* 281* 
Pats 2.8 462* 74 
  
 A Estimates are based upon the coefficients in Model 9 of simple conditional logit (Table 15). 
 B Estimates are based upon the coefficients in Model 3 of simple mixed logit (Table 17). 
 * Indicates that the estimated coefficient on the attribute was significant at the 10% level or better. 
 1 Represents a change from 0 to 1 
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Table 19 
  
Mean Willingness to Pay for 10% Changes in Attribute Levels: 
  Hybrid Models 
 
Non-Interacted 
Variables 
Mean 10% 
change 
Model (3): A 
 Conditional Logit Hybrid 
Model (4): B  
Mixed Logit Hybrid 
Coast1 n/a 18,326* 19,253* 
JanTemp 3.7 4,222* 792 
JulTemp 7.6 -13,049* -7,975* 
PWater 0.83 -236* -88 
Parkacre 435 -78 -57 
BadAQ 0.82 -436* -297* 
PerDem 4.6 360 328 
PerBach 2.4 1,522* 1,829* 
HighEd 0.34 491* 396* 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 
Interacted 
Variables 
Mean 10% 
change Postdoc=0 Postdoc=1 Postdoc=0 Postdoc=1 
JanSun 15.2 -3,589* 575* -2,164* 1,556* 
JulRH 5.7 -5,505* -6857 -5,000* -5,666 
Supfund 0.31 153* 39* 75 -3 
Art_Ent 3.6 -1,165* 1202* -1,382* 286* 
Comtime 2.3 -2,707* 1916* -759* 2,583* 
Pforborn 0.74 1,774* 2120* 1,249* 1,534* 
  Parent=0 Parent=1 Parent=0 Parent=1 
Vcrime 56.2 90 -1817* 371 -1287* 
Studexp 599 -1,641* -7880* -3,018* -8,335* 
PupTeach 1.7 -1,997* -1894 -2,002* -1678 
NStudnts 1.7 -925 4566* -2,333* 1,943* 
   White=0 White=1 White=0 White=1 
Pnonwhite 2.0 2,713* -575* 2,074* -719 
    US Cit=0 US Cit=1 US Cit=0 US Cit=1 
Pforborn 0.74 2,156* 1,802* 1,598* 1,250* 
   Industry=0 Industry=1 Industry=0 Industry=1 
Pats 2.8 474* 1,445* 24 479* 
 
 A Estimates are based upon the coefficients in Model 9 of hybrid conditional logit (Table 16). 
 B Estimates are based upon the coefficients in Model 3 of hybrid mixed logit (Table 18).  
 * Indicates that the estimated coefficient on the attribute was significant at the 10% level or better. 
 1 Represents a change from 0 to 1. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Due to their role in enhancing regional productivity, Ph.D.s in science and 
engineering represent a very attractive cohort of the labor force to municipal 
policymakers.  The flow of new Ph.D.s from graduate school to the labor force represents 
one means by which networks are created and knowledge is transferred.  When hired by 
private firms new Ph.D.s not only transfer knowledge, but contribute to productivity by 
engaging in scientific discovery and improving technological innovation (Stern, 2004).  
New Ph.D.s in the academic sector also contribute to productivity through their scientific 
research and by training future productive workers.  Despite the significant role these 
workers can play in innovation and economic development, to date relatively little is 
known regarding the factors that determine their location choices.  This dissertation 
addresses this deficiency by using a random utility model framework to examine the role 
of amenities on the MSA location decisions of new S&E Ph.D.s. 
 The random utility models presented in this research represent the first models to 
estimate amenity values using individual location decisions at a city level and on a 
national scale.  The primary advantage of using location decisions at the city/national 
level is that we can arrive at values for local public goods, such as air quality and crime, 
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as well as for pure public goods, such as climate, in one framework.  By focusing the 
analysis on the location decisions of new Ph.D.s in science and engineering, the results of 
this research help inform policymakers as to their ability (or inability) to attract and retain 
highly educated workers to their region through public investment in amenity quality.   
 The results provide several interesting insights into the influence of city attributes 
on the location choices of new Ph.D.s.  The estimates of amenity values are generally 
higher in magnitude for natural amenities, such as summer and winter temperatures, than 
for publicly-provided amenities, such crime or air quality.   The implication is that cities 
with superior natural amenities hold an advantage over other cities in terms of their 
ability to improve the composition their workforce.  It is important to acknowledge, 
however, that the estimates may under-represent the true influence of some reproducible 
amenities because of the underlying assumption that the levels of amenities are constant 
within MSAs.  An MSA has high crime areas and low crime areas, neighborhoods with 
good school districts and bad school districts, etc., that coexist within its borders.  In 
reality, individuals may be more concerned with (and influenced by) the quality of these 
amenities within their neighborhood than with the average quality across their MSA.  We 
assume that it is the average measure of these amenities across the MSA that influences 
their location decisions, not a neighborhood specific measure.     
 Future research could potentially address this issue by modeling residential 
location choices at a more spatially disaggregated level, such as the census tract level.  
After identifying individual location decisions and collecting the relevant data on 
amenities (e.g. crime rates, student expenditures, etc.) at the census tract level, one could 
develop a nested logit model in which an individual’s MSA choice represents the upper 
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nest, and an individual’s choice of census tract represents the lower nest.  In this 
framework, MSA choice could be used to estimate values for amenities that are relatively 
constant in an MSA (climate), and the choice of census tract within an MSA could be 
used to estimate values for amenities that vary within MSAs (school quality, crime, 
proximity to superfund sites, etc.).   
 The results from this research do not, however, imply that reproducible amenities 
have no influence on the location choices of new S&E Ph.D.s.  The models consistently 
suggest that new Ph.D.s are more likely to locate in cities with higher air quality, lower 
pupil to teacher ratios, less traffic, lower crime rates, and greater levels of diversity.  
Thus, abstracting from the costs of providing these amenities, the results suggest that 
improving the quality of these amenities will attract more highly skilled S&E workers to 
an area.  Taken together, the effects could be substantial.   
 The analysis also illustrates how preferences vary across the population of Ph.D.s.  
Specifically, we compare models that control for observed heterogeneity (hybrid models) 
and unobserved heterogeneity (mixed logit models) with models that assume 
homogeneous preferences (simple conditional logit models).  As a whole, the models that 
control for either unobserved or observed heterogeneity in preferences perform better 
than the models that do not control for either of these types of heterogeneity.  This result 
is generally consistent with the findings of other studies that examine the impact of 
heterogeneous modeling techniques (Morey & Rossmann, 2003; Parsons & Massey, 
2003).  Furthermore, the coefficients on the interacted terms are generally consistent with 
economic intuition.  Notably, the results consistently suggest that younger, single Ph.D.s 
are likely to move greater distances than older, married Ph.D.s; non-citizens are more 
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likely to locate in cities with greater amounts of foreign born residents; white Ph.D.s are 
less drawn to cities with more racial diversity; and parents are less likely to locate in 
cities with higher violent crime rates.  In addition, preferences for city attributes vary 
substantially depending on the Ph.D.’s choice of employment sector.   
 Prior to using the results of this analysis to guide public policy, a number of 
empirical issues need to be addressed.   The analysis currently focuses on how amenities 
influence the location choices of new Ph.D.s.  Absent from this model are characteristics 
which relate to the work and research environment of the doctoral science and 
engineering labor force.   In particular, new Ph.D.s desire to work in an area that may 
facilitate better research opportunities, in which it is easier to obtain tacit knowledge, 
build networks and collaborate with other scientists.   Areas richer in attributes relating to 
the work environment of new S&E Ph.D.s are more desirable not only because they may 
enhance one’s own productivity and future employment prospects, but also because of 
the psychological gains associated with being around like-minded people.   Variables that 
could account for these effects include measures of industrial and/or academic research 
and development expenditures, the composition of the workforce, as well as the number 
of top-ranked research institutions in the MSA.   
 There are a number of important empirical questions that remain unanswered by 
this study and are open to further investigation.  In particular, this study provides insight 
into one of the potential streams of benefits policymakers can receive from improving 
amenities: the growth of a talented labor force.  This study does not inform policymakers, 
however, whether it is worth investing in these amenities.  Future research should address 
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the efficiency of amenity improvement policies by weighing the potential long-term 
benefits associated with amenity changes against the costs of improving amenities.   
 In addition to examining the cost effectiveness of any amenity improvement 
investment policy, policymakers and researchers should also consider the effectiveness of 
alternative policies which can attract highly educated workers and stimulate economic 
growth.  Investing in amenities is just one of a number of alternatives policymakers can 
act on in order to facilitate an increase in the proportion of highly educated in a particular 
region.  Others include tax breaks to companies that employ highly educated workers, 
investment in higher education or workforce development facilities, or providing direct or 
indirect compensation to workers who locate in an area.    
 The discrete choice approach used in this dissertation is not the only empirical 
technique researchers used to estimate amenity values.  Future research could compare 
the estimates found using a discrete choice model with those obtained from the traditional 
approach to estimating amenity demand, the hedonic model.   The hedonic method 
assumes that in spatial equilibrium, the values of local public goods are fully capitalized 
into the wages and rents in each location. Amenity values can be found by specifying the 
amenity bundles across locations as a function of the spatial variation in housing prices 
and wages.   This type of analysis is particularly feasible because we have already 
gathered the necessary data required to estimate hedonic equations; specifically, housing 
prices, wages, and amenity quality.  The results would provide insight into the issues of 
comparability across estimation techniques, as well as provide confirmation as to the 
consistency and plausibility of the results from a particular method.   The hedonic and 
discrete choice approaches could also be used to estimate the quality of life in MSAs and 
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construct an ordinal ranking as to the attractiveness of cities to the highly educated 
scientific workforce.   
Finally, it is important to recognize that the conclusions drawn from this study are 
limited in a number of ways.  First, the analysis only includes new S&E Ph.D.s who had 
made a definite commitment to an employer at the time the survey was administered and 
reported an identifiable U.S. location.  To the extent that this sample is not representative 
of the entire population of new S&E Ph.D.s, the inferences drawn regarding their 
preferences do not accurately represent the preferences of all new S&E Ph.D.s.  
Furthermore, previous studies which examine the economic benefits of a highly educated 
workforce relate these benefits to the stock of highly educated workers in an area.  Due to 
the high turnover rate in the initial years of employment for new Ph.D.s, particularly 
postdocs, the ability of an area to improve its stock of highly educated workers would be 
better represented by the location choices of “seasoned” Ph.D.s, or those who have been 
employed for at least five years.  The results are also limited due to the time period of the 
analysis.  Specifically, the information-technology (IT) boom and strong labor market 
conditions in the late 1990s may be responsible for inflating or deflating some of the 
estimated amenity demand values.  Whether and how the estimated values Ph.D.s’ place 
on amenities changed following the IT boom could be investigated by extending the time 
period of the analysis to include post-2000 location choices.  
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Table A.1 
 
Number and Percent of New S&E Ph.D.s in Each Sector with Definite Plans by Field  
Graduating Years FY 1997-1999 
 
 Field All S&E 
Number 
Industry 
Percent 
Industry 
Number 
Academe 
Percent  
Academe 
Number 
Postdocs 
 Percent 
Postdocs 
 
Number 
Other 
Percent 
Other 
Aerospace Engineering 435 176 40.5% 23 5.3% 101 23.2% 135 31.0% 
Chemical Engineering 1348 838 62.2% 97 7.2% 314 23.3% 99 7.3% 
Civil Engineering 1053 365 34.7% 218 20.7% 246 23.4% 224 21.3% 
Electrical Engineering 3053 2019 66.1% 346 11.3% 322 10.5% 366 12.0% 
Mechanical 
Engineering 1600 825 51.6% 196 12.3% 376 23.5% 203 12.7% 
Other Engineering 3189 1431 44.9% 453 14.2% 821 25.7% 484 15.2% 
Agriculture 1975 336 17.0% 466 23.6% 760 38.5% 413 20.9% 
Astronomy 408 44 10.8% 30 7.4% 305 74.8% 29 7.1% 
Biology 11051 647 5.9% 979 8.9% 8488 76.8% 937 8.5% 
Chemistry 4289 1269 29.6% 369 8.6% 2437 56.8% 214 5.0% 
Computer Science 1778 801 45.1% 539 30.3% 227 12.8% 211 11.9% 
Earth Science 1292 268 20.7% 200 15.5% 626 48.5% 198 15.3% 
Math 2340 496 21.2% 889 38.0% 703 30.0% 252 10.8% 
Medicine 5290 463 8.8% 1491 28.2% 1776 33.6% 1560 29.5% 
Physics 2569 688 26.8% 204 7.9% 1449 56.4% 228 8.9% 
SUM  41670 10666 25.6% 6500 15.6% 18951 45.5% 5553 13.3% 
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Table A.2: 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Type of Ph.D.  
 
    
New Ph.D.s 
with 
Definite 
Plans 
(N=41,670)
New Ph.D.s 
without 
Definite 
Plans 
(N=23,757)
 
 
 
New Ph.D.s 
with a known 
U.S. 
academic 
institution 
(N=15,809) 
New Ph.D.s 
with an 
unknown U.S. 
academic 
institution 
(N=6,896) 
 
 
 
Variable 
Name Variable Definition Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Difference 
age Age of the individual at the time of Ph.D. 33.12 34.0 -0.804 33.05 32.50 0.557 
male Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is male 0.679 0.622 0.057 0.638 0.613 0.025 
White Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is White 0.651 0.577 0.073 0.679 0.657 0.022 
Asian 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is Asian or 
pacific islander 0.273 0.326 -0.053 0.246 0.256 -0.010 
married Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is married 0.583 0.563 0.020 0.566 0.539 0.028 
child 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is married 
with at least one child 0.255 0.227 0.028 0.234 0.205 0.028 
UScit 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is a U.S. 
citizen 0.670 0.614 0.056 0.676 0.690 -0.014 
permres 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is a 
permanent resident in the U.S. 0.080 0.108 -0.028 0.067 0.082 -0.014 
tempres 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is a 
temporary resident in the U.S. 0.241 0.259 -0.018 0.248 0.221 0.027 
supp_Fellow 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual's primary source 
of support during graduate school was fellowship or dissertation grant 0.165 0.138 0.027 0.180 0.191 -0.011 
supp_TA 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual's primary source 
of support during graduate school was teaching assistantship 0.143 0.165 -0.022 0.170 0.122 0.048 
supp_RA_Tr 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual's primary source 
of support during graduate school was research assistantship, 
internship, or traineeship 0.444 0.399 0.045 0.451 0.470 -0.019 
supp_Emp Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual's primary source 0.033 0.010 0.024 0.014 0.008 0.006 
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of support during graduate school was employer reimbursement. 
preftemp 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual was full-time 
employed one year prior to Ph.D. 0.265 0.125 0.140 0.205 0.170 0.035 
preptemp 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual was part-time 
employed one year prior to Ph.D. 0.063 0.111 -0.047 0.059 0.059 0.000 
prefellow 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual had a 
fellowship one year prior to Ph.D. 0.609 0.602 0.007 0.674 0.688 -0.014 
prepother 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual was anything 
other than full or part time employed one year prior to Ph.D. 0.671 0.765 -0.101 0.737 0.770 -0.021 
alleng 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was engineering 0.250 0.268 -0.018 0.131 0.116 0.015 
astr 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was astronomy 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.010 0.017 -0.006 
agri 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was in agriculture 0.039 0.049 -0.010 0.045 0.033 0.012 
biol 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was biology 0.274 0.240 0.034 0.372 0.428 -0.056 
chem 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was chemistry 0.108 0.090 0.018 0.121 0.102 0.019 
comp 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was computer science 0.043 0.038 0.005 0.034 0.015 0.019 
earth 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was earth science 0.030 0.029 0.001 0.029 0.036 -0.007 
math 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was mathematics 0.054 0.056 -0.002 0.072 0.031 0.041 
medi 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was medicine 0.133 0.163 -0.031 0.127 0.152 -0.025 
phys 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's field of 
training was physics 0.061 0.062 -0.001 0.059 0.070 -0.011 
top110 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual received their 
Ph.D. from a top 110 institution 0.805 0.757 0.049 0.829 0.793 0.036 
ru1Ph.D. 
Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding degree 
is Research University I. 0.734 0.686 0.048 0.751 0.715 0.036 
ru2Ph.D. 
Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding degree 
is Research University II. 0.100 0.119 -0.019 0.101 0.092 0.009 
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doc1Ph.D. 
Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding degree 
is Doctoral Granting I. 0.054 0.072 -0.018 0.042 0.054 -0.012 
doc2Ph.D. 
Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding degree 
is Doctoral Granting II. 0.048 0.054 -0.006 0.043 0.043 0.000 
mediPh.D. 
Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding degree 
is Medical school. 0.037 0.034 0.003 0.046 0.058 -0.012 
elsePh.D. 
Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school awarding degree 
is anything other than RU1, RU2, Doc1, Doc2, or Medical. 0.024 0.032 
 
-0.008 0.015 0.033 -0.018 
public 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual received their 
Ph.D. from a Public Institution 0.689 0.711 -0.022 0.703 0.668 0.035 
topfld 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual received their 
Ph.D. from an institution that was top ranked in their field of training. 0.646 0.588 0.058 0.664 0.637 0.027 
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A.3:  MSA Data Sources 
 
1.  Hours of January sunlight, January temperatures, July temperatures, July relative 
humidity, and percentage of surface area covered by water come from Economic 
Research Service (E.R.S.) at the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture.  E.R.S. offers data on climate 
for all counties in the continental U.S.  The variables represent the mean from 1941-1970.  
For all MSAs with more than one county, the mean across each county within the MSA 
was taken.  When more than one PMSA lies in one county (ie. NECMAs), the same 
values were given to each PMSA within that county. 
 
2.   Violent crime rates, number of park acres, commute times and percent Democratic 
were collected from the 1999 Places Rated Almanac, Savageau and D’Agostino.  Violent 
crimes include murders, rapes, armed robberies, and aggravated assaults. The park 
measure includes all national forest, park, and wildlife refuge acres, plus state park units 
located within metro area counties. 
 
3.   Days with unhealthy air quality (days with an air quality index above 100) and 
number of superfund sites come from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(E.P.A.).  The air quality index includes measurement on the following air pollutants: 
ground-level ozone, particle pollution (also known as particulate matter), carbon 
monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide.  If the AQI is above 100, it is unhealthy 
for sensitive groups.   
 
4.  Pupil to teacher ratios, student expenditures, and number of students come from the 
National Center for Education Statistics. 
 
5.  The Art and Entertainment Index was collected from the 1999 County Business 
Patterns Report.  The measure includes the total number of establishments in MSA in 
1999 with NAICS code 71 ('Arts, entertainment, & recreation'): Museums, Historical 
Sites, Zoos and Botanical Gardens, Performing Arts, Amusement, Gambling and 
Recreation Industries 
 
6.  Number of year colleges and universities was collected from Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS).   
 
7.  Number of utility patents was collected from U.S. Patent and trademark office. 
 
8.  MSA size, population density, percent with a bachelor’s degree or higher, percent 
nonwhite, percent foreign born, and region indicators were collected from the 2000 U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
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A.4: MSAs by Region 
 
East North Central Pacific 
  
Akron, OH PMSA Anaheim--Santa Ana, CA PMSA 
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA Anchorage, AK MSA 
Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah, WI MSA Bakersfield, CA MSA 
Benton Harbor, MI MSA Chico, CA MSA 
Bloomington, IN MSA Eugene--Springfield, OR MSA 
Bloomington--Normal, IL MSA Fresno, CA MSA 
Canton, OH MSA Honolulu, HI MSA 
Champaign--Urbana--Rantoul, IL MSA Los Angeles--Long Beach, CA PMSA 
Chicago, IL PMSA Medford, OR MSA 
Cincinnati, OH--KY--IN PMSA Modesto, CA MSA 
Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria, OH PMSA Oakland, CA PMSA 
Columbus, OH MSA Olympia, WA MSA 
Dayton--Springfield, OH MSA Oxnard--Ventura, CA PMSA 
Decatur, IL MSA Portland--Vancouver, OR--WA PMSA 
Detroit, MI PMSA Redding, CA MSA 
Eau Claire, WI MSA Richland--Kennewick--Pasco, WA MSA 
Elkhart--Goshen, IN MSA Riverside--San Bernardino, CA PMSA 
Evansville, IN--KY MSA Sacramento, CA MSA 
Flint, MI MSA Salem, OR MSA 
Fort Wayne, IN MSA Salinas--Seaside--Monterey, CA MSA 
Gary--Hammond, IN PMSA San Diego, CA MSA 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI MSA San Francisco, CA PMSA 
Green Bay, WI MSA San Jose, CA PMSA 
Hamilton--Middletown, OH PMSA Santa Barbara--Lompoc, CA MSA 
Indianapolis, IN MSA Santa Cruz, CA PMSA 
Jackson, MI MSA Santa Rosa--Petaluma, CA PMSA 
Janesville--Beloit, WI MSA Seattle, WA PMSA 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI MSA Spokane, WA MSA 
Kenosha, WI PMSA Stockton, CA MSA 
Kokomo, IN MSA Tacoma, WA PMSA 
La Crosse, WI MSA Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa, CA PMSA 
Lafayette--West Lafayette, IN MSA Yakima, WA MSA 
Lansing--East Lansing, MI MSA  
Madison, WI MSA South Atlantic 
Mansfield, OH MSA  
Milwaukee, WI PMSA Albany, GA MSA 
Muncie, IN MSA Asheville, NC MSA 
Peoria, IL MSA Athens, GA MSA 
Racine, WI PMSA Atlanta, GA MSA 
Rockford, IL MSA Augusta, GA--SC MSA 
Saginaw--Bay City--Midland, MI MSA Baltimore, MD MSA 
Sheboygan, WI MSA Charleston, SC MSA 
South Bend--Mishawaka, IN MSA Charleston, WV MSA 
Springfield, IL MSA Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill, NC--SC MSA 
Steubenville--Weirton, OH--WV MSA Charlottesville, VA MSA 
Terre Haute, IN MSA Columbia, SC MSA 
Toledo, OH MSA Cumberland, MD--WV MSA 
Wausau, WI MSA Daytona Beach, FL MSA 
Youngstown--Warren, OH MSA Dover, DE MSA 
 Fayetteville, NC MSA 
East South Central Florence, SC MSA 
 Fort Lauderdale--Pompano Beach, FL MSA 
Biloxi--Gulfport, MS MSA Fort Myers--Cape Coral, FL MSA 
Birmingham, AL MSA Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA 
Chattanooga, TN--GA MSA Gainesville, FL MSA 
Clarksville--Hopkinsville, TN--KY MSA Goldsboro, NC MSA 
Decatur, AL MSA Greensboro--Winston-Salem, NC MSA 
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Florence, AL MSA Greenville--Spartanburg--Anderson, SC MSA 
Gadsden, AL MSA Hagerstown, MD MSA 
Huntsville, AL MSA Hickory--Morganton, NC MSA 
Jackson, MS MSA Huntington--Ashland, WV--KY--OH MSA 
Jackson, TN MSA Jacksonville, FL MSA 
Johnson City--Kingsport--Bristol, TN--VA MSA Jacksonville, NC MSA 
Knoxville, TN MSA Lakeland--Winter Haven, FL MSA 
Lexington-Fayette, KY MSA Lynchburg, VA MSA 
Louisville, KY--IN MSA Macon--Warner Robins, GA MSA 
Memphis, TN--AR--MS MSA Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay, FL MSA 
Mobile, AL MSA Miami--Hialeah, FL PMSA 
Montgomery, AL MSA Naples, FL MSA 
Nashville, TN MSA Norfolk--Virginia Beach, VA MSA 
Owensboro, KY MSA Orlando, FL MSA 
Pascagoula, MS MSA Panama City, FL MSA 
Tuscaloosa, AL MSA Parkersburg--Marietta, WV--OH MSA 
 Raleigh--Durham, NC MSA 
Mid Atlantic Richmond--Petersburg, VA MSA 
 Roanoke, VA MSA 
Albany--Schenectady--Troy, NY MSA Rocky Mount, NC MSA 
Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton, PA--NJ MSA Sarasota, FL MSA 
Altoona, PA MSA Savannah, GA MSA 
Atlantic City, NJ MSA Tallahassee, FL MSA 
Bergen--Passaic, NJ PMSA Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearwater, FL MSA 
Binghamton, NY MSA Washington, DC--MD--VA MSA 
Buffalo--Niagara Falls, NY MSA West Palm Beach--Boca Raton, FL MSA 
Dutchess, NY MSA Wheeling, WV--OH MSA 
Erie, PA MSA Wilmington, DE--NJ--MD PMSA 
Glens Falls, NY MSA Wilmington, NC MSA 
Harrisburg--Lebanon--Carlisle, PA MSA  
Jamestown--Dunkirk, NY West North Central 
Jersey City, NJ PMSA  
Johnstown, PA MSA Bismarck, ND MSA 
Lancaster, PA MSA Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 
Middlesex--Somerset--Hunterdon, NJ PMSA Columbia, MO MSA 
Monmouth--Ocean, NJ PMSA Davenport--Moline, IA--IL MSA 
Nassau--Suffolk, NY PMSA Des Moines, IA MSA 
New York, NY PMSA Dubuque, IA MSA 
Newark, NJ PMSA Duluth, MN--WI MSA 
Newburgh, NY--PA MSA Fargo--Moorhead, ND--MN MSA 
Philadelphia, PA--NJ PMSA Grand Forks, ND MSA 
Pittsburgh, PA PMSA Iowa City, IA MSA 
Reading, PA MSA Joplin, MO MSA 
Rochester, NY MSA Kansas City, MO--KS MSA 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA MSA Lawrence, KS MSA 
State College, PA MSA Lincoln, NE MSA 
Syracuse, NY MSA Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN--WI MSA 
Trenton, NJ PMSA Omaha, NE--IA MSA 
Utica--Rome, NY MSA Rapid City, SD MSA 
Vineland--Millville--Bridgeton, NJ PMSA Rochester, MN MSA 
Williamsport, PA MSA Sioux City, IA--NE MSA 
York, PA MSA Sioux Falls, SD MSA 
 Springfield, MO MSA 
Mountain St. Cloud, MN MSA 
 St. Joseph, MO MSA 
Albuquerque, NM MSA St. Louis, MO--IL MSA 
Billings, MT MSA Topeka, KS MSA 
Boise City, ID MSA Waterloo--Cedar Falls, IA MSA 
Boulder--Longmont, CO PMSA Wichita, KS MSA 
Colorado Springs, CO MSA  
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Denver, CO PMSA West South Central 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA  
Fort Collins--Loveland, CO MSA Abilene, TX MSA 
Grand Junction, CO MSA Amarillo, TX MSA 
Greeley, CO MSA Austin, TX MSA 
Las Cruces, NM MSA Baton Rouge, LA MSA 
Las Vegas, NV MSA Beaumont--Port Arthur, TX MSA 
Phoenix, AZ MSA Brazoria, TX PMSA 
Pocatello, ID MSA Brownsville--Harlingen, TX MSA 
Provo--Orem, UT MSA Bryan--College Station, TX MSA 
Pueblo, CO MSA Corpus Christi, TX MSA 
Reno, NV MSA Dallas, TX PMSA 
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT MSA El Paso, TX MSA 
Santa Fe, NM MSA Fayetteville--Springdale, AR MSA 
Tucson, AZ MSA Fort Worth--Arlington, TX PMSA 
 Galveston--Texas City, TX PMSA 
New England Houma--Thibodaux, LA MSA 
 Houston, TX PMSA 
Bangor, ME MSA Killeen--Temple, TX MSA 
Boston, MA--NH PMSA Lafayette, LA MSA 
Bridgeport--Milford, CT PMSA Lake Charles, LA MSA 
Brockton, MA PMSA Lawton, OK MSA 
Burlington, VT MSA Little Rock--North Little Rock, AR MSA 
Danbury, CT PMSA Longview--Marshall, TX MSA 
Fitchburg--Leominster, MA MSA Lubbock, TX MSA 
Hartford, CT PMSA Mcallen--Edinburg--Mission, TX MSA 
Lawrence--Haverhill, MA--NH PMSA Monroe, LA MSA 
Lewiston--Auburn, ME MSA New Orleans, LA MSA 
Lowell, MA--NH PMSA Odessa--Midland, TX MSA 
Manchester, NH MSA Oklahoma City, OK MSA 
Nashua, NH PMSA Pine Bluff, AR MSA 
New Bedford, MA MSA San Antonio, TX MSA 
New Haven--Meriden, CT MSA Shreveport, LA MSA 
New London--Norwich, CT--RI MSA Tulsa, OK MSA 
Pittsfield, MA MSA Tyler, TX MSA 
Portland, ME MSA Waco, TX MSA 
Portsmouth--Rochester, NH-ME MSA Wichita Falls, TX MSA 
Providence--Warwick, RI--MA MSA  
Springfield, MA MSA  
Stamford--Norwalk, CT PMSA  
Waterbury, CT MSA  
Worcester, MA MSA  
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Table B.1 
 
Wald Tests for Parameter Equality Across Sectors1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 Sub-samples: Permanent (Industrial Ph.D.s/Faculty) and Temporary (Postdocs) 
  *Indicates rejection of the null of equality at the 0.05 level of significance  
     (critical value=3.85) 
 
 
 
 
 
CC 26, 
Draw 1 
CC 26, 
Draw 2 
CC 26, 
Draw 3 
Variable Wald Stat Wald Stat Wald Stat 
CompCons 0.12 0.00 0.22 
Distance 3.00 2.29 3.06 
JanSun 13.43* 13.10* 13.06* 
JanTemp 3.60 3.46 2.70 
JulRH 4.27* 5.56* 5.42* 
JulTemp 2.50 2.37 2.98 
PWater 2.88 2.54 2.31 
Coast 0.28 0.48 0.14 
Vcrime 0.18 0.04 0.19 
Parkacre 1.33 1.23 1.16 
BadAQ 0.00 0.00 0.10 
Supfund 6.53* 6.88* 6.94* 
Art_Ent 5.44* 5.99* 3.50 
Studexp 0.08 0.17 0.30 
PupTeach 0.18 0.00 0.28 
NStudnts 0.00 0.04 0.08 
Comtime 6.74* 5.57* 4.68* 
MSASize 1.72 1.56 1.34 
PopDens 0.11 0.08 0.26 
PerDem 0.55 0.57 0.36 
PerBach 3.25 3.02 1.82 
Pnonwhite 0.34 0.20 0.09 
Pforborn 26.41* 22.30* 18.54* 
HighEd 1.48 0.81 1.18 
Pats 5.91* 7.03* 8.05* 
NorthAtl 2.30 3.68 2.88 
SouthAtl 1.67 2.05 2.71 
NorthCen 2.44 3.24 2.45 
Mount 0.10 0.01 0.05 
Pacific 0.02 0.11 0.00 
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Table B.2 
 
Summary Statistics for Variables Included In Sector Logit Equations 
 
Variable 
Name Definition 
Industry 
Mean 
FTAcad 
Mean 
Postdoc 
Mean 
ASC_Ind Alternative Specific Constant for Industry 1.00 0.00 0.00 
ASC_Acad Alternative Specific Constant for FT Academe 0.00 1.00 0.00 
ASC_Pdoc* Alternative Specific Constant for Postdoc 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Age Age of the individual  32.31 36.04 31.77 
Male 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual is 
male 0.81 0.57 0.66 
Citizen 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual 
is a U.S. citizen 0.55 0.82 0.61 
Married 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual 
is married 0.61 0.62 0.54 
Parent 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual 
has at least one child 0.44 0.44 0.35 
Alleng 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was engineering 0.53 0.18 0.11 
Astr 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was astronomy 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Agri 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was agriculture 0.02 0.04 0.03 
Biol* 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was biology 0.06 0.15 0.47 
Chem 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was chemistry 0.12 0.06 0.14 
Comp 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was computer science 0.08 0.09 0.01 
Math 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was mathematics 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Earth 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was earth science 0.05 0.15 0.04 
Medi 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was in a medical related field 0.04 0.26 0.08 
Phys 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual's 
field of training was physics 0.07 0.03 0.07 
Private 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not  an individual 
received their Ph.D. from a private institution 0.84 0.79 0.86 
Top110 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual 
received their Ph.D. from a top 110 institution 0.32 0.26 0.32 
 
Ru1Ph.D. 
Zero-one dummy if Carnegie classification of school 
awarding degree is Research University I. 0.78 0.73 0.78 
      
*Indicates the Benchmark or Control Group  
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Table B.3 
 
Results From Nested Logit Equations 
(Dependent Variable=Sector Choice) 
 
  NL1 (N=18795) NL2 (N=18795) 
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
IncVal -0.320 -3.13 -0.278 -7.21 
ASC_Acad -4.204 -8.24 -0.953 -3.80 
Acad*Age 0.080 15.34 0.051 11.53 
Acad*Male -0.263 -4.66 -0.078 -1.84 
Acad*Citizen 1.206 20.16 0.457 11.99 
Acad*Married 0.225 3.29 0.186 3.77 
Acad*Parent 0.087 1.20 0.088 1.67 
Acad*Alleng 2.283 27.98 2.102 41.65 
Acad*Astr 0.843 3.26 0.775 4.00 
Acad*Agri 1.460 11.61 1.216 11.34 
Acad*Chem 0.603 6.10 0.827 13.61 
Acad*Comp 3.695 27.39 2.870 31.69 
Acad*Earth 1.459 10.37 1.163 10.04 
Acad*Math 3.130 33.23 2.650 33.33 
Acad*Medi 1.645 19.42 1.418 18.60 
Acad*Phys 0.795 6.02 1.187 14.97 
Acad*Top110 -0.186 -1.69 -0.061 -0.76 
Acad*Private -0.217 -3.87 -0.201 -5.14 
Acad*Ru1Ph.D. -0.042 -0.44 -0.112 -1.62 
ASC_Ind 2.388 12.19 9.860 41.83 
Ind*Age -0.001 -0.28 0.013 2.92 
Ind*Male 0.167 3.56 0.129 3.03 
Ind*Citizen 0.150 3.67 0.196 5.14 
Ind*Married 0.343 6.46 0.222 4.49 
Ind*Parent 0.026 0.46 -0.015 -0.29 
Ind*Alleng 3.824 58.36 3.331 65.09 
Ind*Astr 1.155 5.74 1.081 5.58 
Ind*Agri 1.825 16.77 1.412 13.16 
Ind*Chem 2.020 30.19 1.487 24.43 
Ind*Comp 3.986 32.76 3.364 37.09 
Ind*Earth 1.962 17.26 1.716 14.82 
Ind*Math 2.390 25.86 2.242 28.20 
Ind*Medi 1.269 13.65 1.166 15.29 
Ind*Phys 2.181 27.26 1.968 24.82 
Ind*Top110 -0.080 -0.89 0.013 0.16 
Ind*Private -0.025 -0.61 0.017 0.42 
Ind*Ru1Ph.D. -0.081 -1.05 -0.077 -1.11 
Log-Likeli -14347.6 -14648.42 
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Table B.4 
 
Results From Generalized Nested Logit Equations 
(Dependent Variable=Sector Choice) 
 
  GNL1 (N=18795) GNL2 (N=18795) 
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
IncVal -3.073 -14.52 -0.853 -35.24 
ASC_Acad -4.153 -18.85 -2.939 -13.22 
Acad*Age 0.078 14.86 0.078 14.49 
Acad*Male -0.269 -4.75 -0.270 -4.67 
Acad*Citizen 1.144 19.08 1.075 17.66 
Acad*Married 0.250 3.63 0.285 4.05 
Acad*Parent 0.126 1.72 0.181 2.43 
Acad*Alleng 2.280 27.91 2.351 28.32 
Acad*Astr 0.790 3.04 0.772 2.89 
Acad*Agri 1.542 12.21 1.682 13.09 
Acad*Chem 0.597 6.03 0.610 6.07 
Acad*Comp 3.705 27.39 3.824 27.82 
Acad*Earth 1.386 9.82 1.385 9.58 
Acad*Math 3.169 33.60 3.285 34.07 
Acad*Medi 1.663 19.51 1.753 20.00 
Acad*Phys 0.814 6.15 0.893 6.66 
Acad*Top110 -0.255 -2.31 -0.328 -2.90 
Acad*Private -0.254 -4.51 -0.324 -5.63 
Acad*Ru1Ph.D. -0.045 -0.46 -0.069 -0.69 
ASC_Ind -0.390 -1.77 1.612 7.17 
Ind*Age -0.003 -0.51 -0.001 -0.11 
Ind*Male 0.155 3.27 0.150 3.10 
Ind*Citizen 0.101 2.45 0.072 1.70 
Ind*Married 0.357 6.66 0.372 6.79 
Ind*Parent 0.033 0.58 0.044 0.75 
Ind*Alleng 3.845 57.94 3.887 57.41 
Ind*Astr 1.118 5.46 1.141 5.38 
Ind*Agri 1.898 17.23 1.983 17.74 
Ind*Chem 2.030 29.95 2.035 29.36 
Ind*Comp 4.050 33.02 4.190 33.65 
Ind*Earth 1.905 16.47 1.901 15.92 
Ind*Math 2.471 26.44 2.601 27.26 
Ind*Medi 1.301 13.83 1.383 14.42 
Ind*Phys 2.248 27.70 2.348 28.10 
Ind*Top110 -0.082 -0.91 -0.058 -0.63 
Ind*Private 0.131 3.04 0.262 5.91 
Ind*Ru1Ph.D. -0.117 -1.49 -0.141 -1.77 
Log-Likeli -14145.9 -13610.1 
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Table C.1 
 
Implicit Prices of City Attributes: All Models 
 
Variable 
Model 1: A 
Cond’l Logit  
(Spec 1) 
Model 2: B 
Mixed Logit  
(Spec 1)   
Model 3: C 
Cond’l Logit 
Hybrid  
Model 4: D 
Mixed Logit 
Hybrid  
JanSun -47.1* -1.7   -339.7* -142.7* 
JanSun Postdocs n/a n/a   37.4* 99.3* 
JanTemp 512.3* 181.6   1148.3* 225.5* 
JulRH -527.3* -582.2*   -960.3* -876.0 
JulRH Postdocs n/a n/a   -1205 -998 
JulTemp -861.0* -959.9*   -1734.1* -1063.3* 
PWater -164.8* -87.0   -276.4* -107.9 
Coast 8156* 11696*   18326* 19253* 
Vcrime -3.2 1.9   1.6 6.3 
Vcrime Parents n/a n/a   -32.8* -23.9* 
Parkacre -111.9* -110.0*   -230.4* -164.9* 
BadAQ -232.2* -157.7*   -481.7* -331.9* 
Supfund 131.1* 63.8   409.8* 203.0 
Supfund Postdocs n/a n/a   106.7* -7.9 
Art_Ent -48.6 -167.3*   -327.5* -388.6* 
Art_Ent Postdocs n/a n/a   330.7* 78.7* 
Studexp -1745* -3686*   -2677* -4943* 
Studexp Parents n/a n/a   -13122* -13931* 
PupTeach -589.0* -743.1*   -1145.9* -1150.2 
PupTeach Parents n/a n/a   -1089.4 -968.7 
NStudnts -83.2* -656.7   -554.9 -1400* 
Nstudnts Parents n/a n/a   2693.8* 1153.0* 
Comtime -409.8* -156.9   -1169.4* -328.8 
Comtime Postdocs n/a n/a   819.7* 1107.6* 
MSASize 594.8* 722.5*   1259.2* 834.8* 
PopDens -1902* -3754*   -5469.7* -8077.3* 
PerDem 67.9 52.3   75.9 69.9 
PerBach 238.7* 503.8*   608.3* 744.0* 
Pnonwhite 178.1* 92.7   1227.7* 952.1* 
Pnonwhite White n/a n/a   -281.8* -358.2* 
Pforborn 629.0* 415.2*   3134.9* 2377.9* 
Pforborn Citizens n/a n/a   1254.9* 845.9* 
Pforborn Postdocs n/a n/a   1526.6* 1196.7* 
HighEd 603.0* 597.5*   1095.4* 965.3* 
Pats 139.2* 26.0   143.0* 7.6 
Pats Industry n/a n/a   394.3* 141.0* 
  
  * Indicates that the estimated coefficient on the attribute was significant at the 10% level or better. 
   A Calculations are made from coefficients in Model 9 of simple conditional logit (Table 15). 
    B Calculations are made from coefficients in Model 3 of simple mixed logit (Table 17). 
    C Calculations are made from coefficients in Model 9 of hybrid conditional logit (Table 16). 
   D Calculations are made from coefficients in Model 3 of hybrid mixed logit (Table 18).  
   147
Table C.2 
 
1997 Cragg/Kahn WTP Estimates vs. Our WTP Estimates 
for Selected Climate Variables 
 
Cragg and Kahn Estimates  Our Estimates 
Cragg/Kahn 
Variable  
Mean 
Change 
Range WTP 
Estimates* 
Mean WTP 
Estimate*  Our Variable 
Mean 
Change 
Range WTP 
Estimates** 
Mean 
WTP 
Estimate**
Hours of Jan 
Sunlight 8.1 $338 - $1,885 $1,045   
Hours of Jan 
Sunlight 15.2 -$48 - -$726 -$387 
Feb Temperature 10.4 $1,182 - $10,860 $5,263   Jan Temperature 3.7 $497 - $1,856 $1,177  
July Temperature 5.2 -$984 - -$5,788 -$2,840  July Temperature 7.6 -$6,068 - -$6,495 -$6,218  
July Humidity 10.3 -$846 - -$3,906 -$1,866  July Humidity 5.7 -$2,990 - -$3,246 -$3,118  
 
* Range/Means represent estimates across all age cohorts for college educated individuals. 
**Range/Means represent estimates across the conditional and mixed logit non-hybrid models. 
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